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LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS NOT ADOPTED

House Conference Report. 114-270

Sections of House and Senate Bills Not Enacted

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 336) that would limit the conversion of a function to performance by a contractor until an assessment has been made as to whether the Department has carried out sufficient outreach programs to assist small business concerns owned and controlled by women (as such term is defined in section 8(d)(3)(D) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(d)(3)(D))) and small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals (as such term is defined in section 8(d)(3)(C) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(d)(3)(C))) that are located in the geographic area near the military base.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The conferees note the concern that the incentives of the current acquisition system lead to too many defense acquisitions concurrently chasing finite dollars. The conferees
are concerned that the Nation often endures weapons delivered late, at too high of a cost, with performance that falls short, and that are difficult and costly to maintain. Furthermore, the conventional acquisition process is not sufficiently agile to
support warfighter demands.

The conferees express the need for reform for national security reasons to maintain technological and military dominance. The conferees are concerned that the current process is so rigid and time-consuming that the Department is often unable to effectively tap into the innovation occurring in the commercial marketplace. The conferees note that commercial research and development (R&D) now represents 75 percent of the national total, and global R&D is now more than twice that of the United States. The conferees suggest that removing unnecessary legislative, regulatory, and cultural barriers to
new commercial competitions is necessary to create better incentives for and increased access to innovation beyond the Department. The conferees believe these steps are critical for national security in the future, especially in areas such as cyber security, robotics, data analytics, miniaturization, and autonomy.

The conferees are concerned that the Department of Defense currently lacks effective oversight over a contracted services portfolio that has grown in magnitude over the last
decade. The military departments and defense agencies have failed to adopt leading private sector best practices in the acquisition and management of commercially available services and information technologies. Departmental leadership has limited insight into the services being acquired and even less awareness of the services that may be needed in the future.

The conferees believe that the acquisition reform provisions in this bill are a first start in addressing these challenges but it will require all stakeholders in the acquisition system--the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry--to work together to achieve success. Success will be measured by the timely delivery of affordable and effective military equipment and services. The conferees will continue to work for an acquisition system that is more proactive, agile, transparent, and innovative.

(1) The Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives held a series of hearings in 2013, 2014, and 2015 gathering testimony from key acquisition leaders and experts. It is clear that the acquisition reform efforts of the last 50 years continue to founder because they fail to address the motivational and environmental factors in which they must be implemented. The acquisition system, though frustrating to all, is in one sense in equilibrium. The acquisition system provides enough benefits to proponents and opponents to continue, with only minor changes, despite its shortcomings.

(2) The Armed Forces continue to pursue too many defense acquisitions, chasing too few dollars. Consequently, there remains a vast difference between the budgeting plans of the Department and the reality of the cost of its systems or the services it acquires.

(3) To keep programs alive, the Department develops and Congress accepts fragile acquisition strategies that downplay technical issues and assume only successful outcomes from high-risk efforts. As a result, the Department often ends up with too few weapons, with performance that falls short, that are difficult and costly to maintain, delivered late at too high a cost. Congressional and Department of Defense leadership have limited insight into the services acquired or what services need to be acquired in the future. Furthermore, the conventional acquisition process is not agile enough for today’s demands. Finally, the Department of Defense continues to struggle with financial management and auditability, affecting its ability to control costs, ensure basic accountability, anticipate future costs and claims on the budget, and measure performance.

(4) Too often today, all stakeholders in the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry, accept that—

(A) for the acquisition process, success is defined as maximizing technical performance or protecting organizational interests, without regard to funding disruptions and delivery delays of needed capability or services to the warfighter; and

(B) the acquisition process is—

(i) reactive, meaning issues are addressed late and at great cost only after problems are realized;

(ii) plodding, meaning the bureaucratic processes are sclerotic and cumbersome;

(iii) opaque, meaning that limiting information is necessary to protect programs; and

(iv) traditional, meaning that customary approaches and suppliers are preferred over perceived risk of new or unique concepts and vendors.

(5) Today, the United States is at a cross-roads, and if changes to the acquisition system are not made soon, the trend of fewer and more costly systems and services that fall short of the needs of the Armed Forces will continue. Congress, the Department of Defense, and industry all have a stake in making positive changes. Each plays a role in contributing to the current system. Each gains benefits from that system, but each is frustrated by it as well.

(6) The acquisition improvement effort of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives proposes a different approach from previous efforts by seeking to improve the environment (i.e., statutes, regulations, processes, and culture) driving acquisition decisions in the Department of Defense, industry, and Congress. The Committee has solicited input from industry and the Department of Defense, as well as others in Congress, and will continue to do so. The Committee recognizes that there are no “silver bullets” that can immediately fix the current acquisition system in a holistic and long-standing manner. Therefore, the reform effort will be an ongoing and iterative process that will result in legislation not only this year, but will be embedded in the Committee’s annual and regular work.

(b) Sense of congress on the tenets of an improved acquisition system.—It is the sense of Congress that all stakeholders in the acquisition system—the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry—should be governed by the following tenets:

(1) SUCCESS.—Success in the acquisition system means the timely delivery of affordable and effective military equipment and services.

(2) PROACTIVE.—The acquisition system should be proactive, meaning—

(A) the system should recognize that development and acquisition problems can occur; and

(B) officials at all levels should be empowered to solve problems and reduce risks by surfacing issues early and honestly and taking action to resolve them.

(3) AGILE.—The acquisition system should be agile, meaning that needed program adjustments to both respond to emerging threats and the rapid pace of technological change and to address development or production issues should be proposed and adjudicated quickly.

(4) TRANSPARENT.—The acquisition system should be transparent, meaning that—

(A) all decision makers should be given useful, relevant, credible, and reliable information when making commitments;

(B) Government and industry communication should be clear and open; and

(C) the Department of Defense should produce auditable financial management statements.

(5) INNOVATIVE.—The acquisition system should be innovative, meaning that barriers should be removed that preclude companies from undertaking defense business or officials from proposing new approaches.

SEC. 821. Sense of Congress on the desired characteristics for the weapon systems acquisition system.

(a) Findings.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) CURRENT SITUATION.—Despite significant and repeated attempts at acquisition reform, the Department of Defense still experiences case after case of expensive weapon system acquisition failures. The Department of Defense has a track record of too many cancellations, schedule slippages, cost over-runs, and failures to deliver timely solutions to the requirements of the Armed Forces. This situation is unacceptable. For example, according to the Final Report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review, between 1996 and 2010, the Army expended approximately $1 billion to $3 billion annually on two dozen programs that were eventually cancelled. No military service and no type of weapon acquisition has been immune.

(2) PROBLEMS IN ALL PHASES OF ACQUISITIONS.—

(A) Despite detailed weapon acquisition processes and procedures, there is only limited discipline in starting programs. Many programs begin without a solid foundation. They have too many requirements deemed “critical”, which are driven by too many organizations and individuals. Approved requirements are often set with only a limited understanding of the technical feasibility of achieving them. The resulting compromises of good program management and engineering judgment that allow the programs to proceed are the “spackle” of the acquisition system that covers up the risks and enables the system to operate.

(B) As these weapon systems proceed into engineering and manufacturing development, they often encounter development problems leading to cost growth, schedule delay, and performance reductions. Industry and Government officials frequently respond by taking additional development risks to resolve basic performance issues by reducing the time to analyze and assess development results, overlapping key development efforts, and reducing testing. The Department of Defense and Congress disrupt the planned funding of stable programs to find resources for troubled programs or to fund across-the-board spending cuts. Funding instability is the inevitable price that programs pay for survival because funding disruptions actually keep more programs alive.

(C) Finally, these weapons are often rushed into production only to encounter production problems, and are fielded with many unknowns or deficiencies leading to significantly reduced quantities and force structure reductions. The warfighter faces the challenge of operating weapons with poor reliability, high maintenance demands, reduced performance, and many capability shortfalls.

(b) Sense of Congress.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that, in accordance with the tenets described in section 800, to improve weapon system acquisitions, the Department of Defense, Congress, and industry should develop an acquisition system characterized by highly disciplined program initiation coupled with agile program execution and balanced oversight, as described in paragraphs (2), (3), and (4).

(2) HIGHLY DISCIPLINED PROGRAM INITIATION.—An acquisition system characterized by highly disciplined program initiation means that programs do not begin engineering development until firm requirements are matched to a flexible acquisition strategy structured to develop militarily useful capability that can be delivered in a relevant period of time with available technologies, funding, and management capacity. Such a highly disciplined program initiation includes—

(A) a workforce with smart requirements setters and expert buyers, with the knowledge, skills, and experience to successfully plan for and execute highly complex acquisitions;

(B) requirements that are well-defined, technically feasible, and affordable;

(C) acquisition strategies that are designed to minimize time to market of militarily useful capability, with the program concerned being structured so that—

(i) lower-risk, technically mature capabilities are matched to delivering capability to the warfighter in the near term, while remaining requirements are aligned and resources are programmed to support integration into later increments to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces;

(ii) capabilities are approved for an increment only when their developmental risks have been appropriately reduced; and

(iii) increments are planned to complete engineering and manufacturing development in a reasonable period of time;

(D) a science and technology development enterprise that is responsive to the acquisition process before engineering and manufacturing development begins, and sufficiently resourced to reduce risks and enable programs to make smart decisions without losing critical funds; and

(E) redtape reduction in order to free up program and Department officials to focus on their mission of defining an executable program and understanding and addressing risks.

(3) AGILE PROGRAM EXECUTION.—An acquisition system characterized by agile program execution means a system in which acquisition speed and flexibility to make trade-offs are balanced with the need to achieve desired technical performance. Such agile program execution includes—

(A) program managers and program officials who are expert buyers and negotiators who anticipate problems, negotiate solutions, and are empowered to manage;

(B) a preference for fixed price contracting where appropriate for the size and complexity of the work and for the nature and scope of the capabilities being developed;

(C) program managers who avoid increasing program risk by resisting the addition of new requirements or the reduction of developmental activities;

(D) empowering program managers and senior decisionmakers to make decisions easily in order to move forward with capabilities that mature quickly, cancel those that encounter greater difficulties than expected, and trade-off or reduce requirements to maintain cost and schedule;

(E) enabling program managers to focus on overcoming execution challenges and delivering success rather than concentrating on compliance with reporting, certifications, and other redtape; and

(F) senior decisionmakers who have knowledge of demonstrated performance as programs proceed through development, with robust developmental testing occurring before committing to production for operational use as a basis for decision making.

(4) BALANCED OVERSIGHT.—An acquisition system characterized by balanced oversight means that the focus is on ensuring discipline initiating programs and that appropriate adjustments are made during development, so that programs have the best chance to succeed. Such balanced oversight includes—

(A) involvement by decisionmakers early to ensure that an understanding of trade-offs, risks, and needs are considered, resourced, and validated, and that agreement is reached between the executive and legislative branches;

(B) acceptance by decisionmakers that complex weapon system developments are inherently risky and require expertise and flexibility to manage effectively;

(C) conscious decisions by decisionmakers regarding where to accept risk, while ensuring that risk mitigation plans are resourced (with time, funding, alternatives, and competent government and contractor officials);

(D) measuring and monitoring by decisionmakers of the right factors, such as technology maturation progress and systems engineering during risk reduction, development cost growth during engineering and manufacturing development, and reliability growth during system demonstration;

(E) work by Congress and the Department of Defense, once a program has begun, to resolve issues by considering trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance necessary to best support the warfighter; and

(F) congressional understanding of risks and efforts to mitigate such risks even if they are through non-traditional means or other technological advances.

The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 880) that would require a report by the Government Accountability Office on bid protests.

The conference agreement does not include either of these provisions.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The conferees continue to recognize the value of obtaining better visibility over the use of services contracts by defense components and agencies to better understand how contracted services are being used to support Department of Defense missions. The conferees note a distinction between services contracts which are measured in the same manner as staff augmentation contracts of contractor full-time equivalents and performance-based services contracts and other services contracts which rely on a high degree of embedded capital equipment and business process re-engineering. The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to examine the approach the Department is taking to comply with section 2330a, United States Code, and determine whether it is or is not producing a product that enhances the oversight of service contracting activities and submit a report explaining the results of that examination to the congressional defense committees no later than March 1, 2016, including efforts to better manage contractor and civilian personnel costs within the Department. The conferees recognize the information technology aspects of the inventory present technical challenges and encourage the Secretary of Defense to investigate and pursue existing Department of Defense and service component information technology systems which could present a timely solution and provide data relevant to strategic workforce planning. To the extent that the Secretary identifies that the process and technology are not producing an oversight-enhancing product, the conferees expect the Secretary to propose an alternative method of inventory.

(1) the “Department of Defense Compliance Plan for Section 8108(c) of Public Law 112–10”, as contained in a memorandum and enclosure dated November 22, 2011, is implemented;

(2) the implementing direction contained in the “Enterprise-wide Contractor Manpower Reporting Application”, as contained in a memorandum dated November 28, 2012, from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and the (then) Acting Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is fulfilled; and

(3) the funds made available in March 2014 to establish the Total Force Management Support Office to define business processes for compiling, reviewing, and using the inventory required under section 2330a(c) of title 10, United States Code, have been obligated.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

(1) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E);

(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking “and” at the end; and

(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following:

“(D) new or expanded critical skills and competencies needed by the existing civilian employee workforce of the Department to address new acquisition process requirements established by law or policy during the four years preceding the year of submission of the plan; and”.

(b) Conforming amendments.—Section 115b of such title is further amended—

(1) in subparagraph (E) of subsection (b)(1), as redesignated by subsection (a)(1), by striking “(C)” and inserting “(D)”;

(2) in paragraph (2) of subsection (b), in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking “(1)(D)” and inserting “(1)(E)”; and

(3) in paragraph (2)(A) of each of subsections (c), (d), and (e), by striking “through (D)” and inserting “through (E)”.

The Senate amendment contained a related provision (sec. 821) that would require the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to be revised to establish a preference for fixed-price contracts, including fixed-price incentive contracts, in the determination of contract type for
development programs.

The conference agreement does not include either provision.

“(i) Required elements of guidance relating to contract type.— (1) The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the guidance of the Department of Defense relating to major defense acquisition programs, major systems, and major automated information systems includes a requirement that the acquisition strategy required under section 2431a of this title for such a program or system includes—

“(A) a separate identification of the contract type for each acquisition phase of the program or system; and

“(B) a justification of the contract type identified.

“(2) The contract type identified in accordance with paragraph (1)(A) may be—

“(A) a fixed-price type contract (including a fixed-price incentive contract); or

“(B) a cost-type contract (including a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract).

“(3) The guidance referred to in paragraph (1) shall require that the justification for the contract type selected explain—

“(A) how the level of program risk in each acquisition phase relates to the contract type selected;

“(B) how the use of incentives (especially cost incentives) in the contract, if any, supports the program or system objectives during each acquisition phase; and

“(C) how the plans for the program or system to reduce risk enable the use of fixed-price elements in subsequent contracts.

“(4) The guidance shall also specify that the use of contracts with target costs, target profits or fees, and profit or fee adjustment formulas can be an appropriate contract type.”.

(b) Repeal.—Section 818 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109–364; 10 U.S.C. 2306 note) is amended by striking subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e).

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

“(A) Auxiliary equipment, including pumps, for all shipboard services.

“(B) Propulsion system components, including engines, reduction gears, and propellers.

“(C) Shipboard cranes.

“(D) Spreaders for shipboard cranes.”.

(b) Implementation.—Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(k) Implementation of auxiliary ship component limitation.—Subsection (a)(6) applies only with respect to contracts awarded by the Secretary of a military department for new construction of an auxiliary ship after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 using funds available for National Defense Sealift Fund programs or Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy.”.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The conferees agree on the importance of sustaining rocket motor production options to ensure a healthy tactical missile industrial base.

(b) Waiver.—The Secretary may waive subsection (a) in the case of compelling national security reasons.
 

The House recedes.

The conferees believe that the FAR Council should work closely with the Small Business Administration to ensure that consistent regulations are issued from both organizations, to the benefit of both Federal agencies and their small business contractors.

(1) by striking “and” at the end of subparagraph (C);

(2) by striking the period and inserting “; and” at the end of subparagraph (D); and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(E) the Administrator of the Small Business Administration.”.

(b) Conforming amendments.—Such title is amended—

(1) in section 1303(a)(1)—

(A) by striking “and the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space,” and inserting “the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of the Small Business Administration,”; and

(B) by striking “and the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.),” and inserting “the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (42 U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), and the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 631 et seq.),”; and

(2) in section 1121(d), by striking “and the General Services Administration” and inserting “the General Services Administration, and the Small Business Administration”.

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The conferees note that similar language independent of the Small Business Act and applicable only to the Department of Defense was adopted as section 824 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291). Recognizing that two-thirds of reverse auctions are conducted outside of the Department of Defense, the conferees see value in addressing
the use of this procurement method in civilian agencies but believe it is premature to place additional restrictions upon the Department until section 824 of last year's authorization is implemented.

(1) by redesignating section 47 (15 U.S.C. 631 note) as section 48; and

(2) by inserting after section 46 the following new section:

“SEC. 47. Limitations on reverse auctions.

“(a) Prohibition on using reverse auctions for covered contracts.—In the case of a covered contract described in subsection (c), a reverse auction may not be used if the award of the contract is to be made under—

“(1) section 8(a);

“(2) section 8(m);

“(3) section 15(a);

“(4) section 15(j);

“(5) section 31; or

“(6) section 36.

“(b) Limitations on using reverse auctions.—In the case of the award of a contract made under paragraphs (1) through (6) of subsection (a) that is not a covered contract, a reverse auction may be used for the award of such a contract, but only if the following requirements are met:

“(1) DECISIONS REGARDING USE OF A REVERSE AUCTION.—Subject to paragraph (2), the following decisions with respect to such a contract shall be made only by a contracting officer:

“(A) A decision to use a reverse auction as part of the competition for award of such a contract.

“(B) Any decision made after the decision described in subsection (A) regarding the appropriate evaluation criteria, the inclusion of vendors, the acceptability of vendor submissions (including decisions regarding timeliness), and the selection of the winner.

“(2) TRAINING REQUIRED.—Only a contracting officer who has received training on the appropriate use and supervision of reverse auctions may use or supervise a reverse auction for the award of such a contract. The training shall be provided by, or similar to the training provided by, the Defense Acquisition University as described in section 824 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113–291).

“(3) NUMBER OF OFFERS; REVISIONS TO BIDS.—A Federal agency may not award such a contract using a reverse auction if only one offer is received or if offerors do not have the ability to submit revised bids with lower prices throughout the course of the auction.

“(4) TECHNICALLY ACCEPTABLE OFFERS.—A Federal agency awarding such a contract using a reverse auction shall evaluate the technical acceptability of offers only as technically acceptable or unacceptable.

“(5) USE OF PRICE RANKINGS.—A Federal agency may not award such a contract using a reverse auction if at any time during the award process the Federal agency misinforms an offeror about the price ranking of the offeror’s last offer submitted in relation to offers submitted by other offerors.

“(6) USE OF THIRD-PARTY AGENTS.—If a Federal agency uses a third party agent to assist with the award of such a contract using a reverse auction, the Federal agency shall ensure that—

“(A) inherently governmental functions (as such term is used in section 2303 of title 41, United States Code) are not performed by private contractors, including by the third party agent;

“(B) information on the past contract performance of offerors created by the third party agent and shared with the Federal agency is collected, maintained, and shared in compliance with section 1126 of title 41, United States Code;

“(C) information on whether an offeror is a responsible source (as defined in section 113 of title 41, United States Code) that is created by the third party agent and shared with the Federal agency is shared with the offeror and complies with section 8(b)(7) of this Act; and

“(D) disputes between the third party agent and an offeror may not be used to justify a determination that an offeror is not a responsible source (as defined in section 113 of title 41, United States Code) or to otherwise restrict the ability of an offeror to compete for the award of such a contract or task or delivery order.

“(c) Definitions.—In this section:

“(1) CONTRACTING OFFICER.—The term ‘contracting officer’ has the meaning given that term in section 2101(1) of title 41, United States Code.

“(2) COVERED CONTRACT.—The term ‘covered contract’ means a contract—

“(A) for design and construction services;

“(B) for goods purchased to protect Federal employees, members of the Armed Forces, or civilians from bodily harm; or

“(C) for goods or services other than those goods or services described in subparagraph (A) or (B)—

“(i) to be awarded based on factors other than price and technical responsibility; or

“(ii) if awarding the contract requires the contracting officer to conduct discussions with the offerors about their offer.

“(3) DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION SERVICES.—The term ‘design and construction services’ means—

“(A) site planning and landscape design;

“(B) architectural and interior design;

“(C) engineering system design;

“(D) performance of construction work for facility, infrastructure, and environmental restoration projects;

“(E) delivery and supply of construction materials to construction sites;

“(F) construction, alteration, or repair, including painting and decorating, of public buildings and public works; and

“(G) architectural and engineering services as defined in section 1102 of title 40, United States Code.

“(4) REVERSE AUCTION.—The term ‘reverse auction’, with respect to procurement by an agency, means an auction between a group of offerors who compete against each other by submitting offers for a contract or task or delivery order with the ability to submit revised offers with lower prices throughout the course of the auction.”.

(amendment no. 72 offered by mr. hanna of new york)

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

(1) in subsections (a) and (b), by striking “or 2015” and inserting “2015, or 2016”;

(2) in subsection (c)(3), by striking “and 2015” and inserting “2015, and 2016”;

(3) in subsection (d)(4), by striking “or 2015” and inserting “2015, or 2016”; and

(4) in subsection (e), by striking “2015” and inserting “2016”.

The Senate amendment contained a similar provision (sec. 810) that would outline Department of Defense responsibilities under chapter 87 of title 10, United States Code for improving program and project management.

The conference agreement does not include either provision.

(1) Creation of a specialized career path for program management.

(2) The development of a competency model for program management consistent with the IT project manager model.

(3) A career advancement model that requires appropriate expertise and experience for advancement.

(4) A career advancement model that is more competitive with the private sector and that recognizes both Government and private sector experience.

(c) Combination with other cadres plan.—The Director may combine the plan required by subsection (a) with the acquisition human capital plans that were developed pursuant to the October 27, 2009, guidance issued by the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy in furtherance of section 1704(g) of title 41, United States Code (originally enacted as section 869 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417; 122 Stat. 4553)), to address how the agencies are meeting their human capital requirements to support the timely and effective acquisition of information technology.

(amendment no. 80 offered by mr. connolly of virginia)

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

The conferees note that the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) plays an important role in enhancing the quality and innovative capacity of the defense acquisition workforce. DAU training and education will be critical to enable the workforce to better position DOD to access global and commercial technologies and services, as well as to put the tenets of acquisition reform into actual practice. The conferees urge DAU to work with other educational institutions within and outside DOD to leverage a wide array of available expertise and synchronize acquisition educational activities, best practices and curricula. Further, in order to enhance education and training of the acquisition workforce and support effective acquisition reform, the conferees direct DAU to engage with leading educational and research experts on procurement and acquisition issues from both within and outside the Federal Government, including through personal exchanges, joint studies and analyses, and other interactions.

(1) by striking “The” and inserting “(1) The”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(2) The President of such University shall also convene a review board annually with faculty representatives from relevant professional schools and degree-granting institutions of the Department of Defense and military departments, such as the service academies, the Naval Postgraduate School, and other similar schools and institutions, in order to review and synchronize defense acquisition curricula across the entire Department of Defense.”.

(amendment no. 81 offered by mr. farr of california)

 

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

(amendment no. 82 offered by mr. farr of california)

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The House recedes.

(1) DEFENSE PROCUREMENTS.—Section 2304(f)(2)(D)(ii) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting “if such procurement is for property or services in an amount less than $20,000,000” before the semicolon at the end.


(2) CIVILIAN PROCUREMENTS.—Section 3304(e)(4) of title 41, United States Code, is amended—

(A) in subparagraph (C), by striking “or” at the end;

(B) in subparagraph (D), by striking “or section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)).” and inserting “; or”; and

(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(E) the procurement is for property or services in an amount less than $20,000,000 and is conducted under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637(a)).”.

The House bill had no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

The conferees note that the Department's Report to Congress on Fiscal Year 2014 Purchases from Foreign Entities identified approximately $5.4 billion in spending on nearly
23,000 purchases for which the restrictions of the Buy America Act are not applicable because they are for items that are manufactured and used outside the United States.
The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to submit to the appropriate congressional defense committees a report listing specific procurements by the Department of Defense in fiscal year 2016 of articles, materials, or supplies valued greater than $5.0 million, using the exception under section 8302(a)(2)(A) of title 41, United States Code, relating to articles, materials, and supplies for use outside the United States. The conferees note that this report may be submitted as part of the report required under section 8305 of such title.

Ҥ 2338. Reporting on foreign purchases

“(a) In general.—Not later than 60 days after the end of fiscal year 2016, and each fiscal year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate congressional defense committees a report listing specific procurements by the Department of Defense in that fiscal year of articles, materials, or supplies valued greater than $5,000,000, indexed to inflation, using the exception under section 8302(a)(2)(A) of title 41. This report may be submitted as part of the report required under section 8305 of such title.

“(b) Appropriate congressional committees defined.—In this section, the term ‘appropriate congressional committees’ means the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, and the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives.”.

(b) Clerical amendment.—The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2337 the following new item:

“2338. Reporting on foreign purchases.”.