By
AnonyMAC on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 02:48 pm:
There is a a DoD contracting office whose contract
vehicle of choice is an “omnibus” multiple award ID/IQ contract
that has a large number of primes (20+), a base period of 10
years with no options, and permits FFP, CPFF, CPAF, and T&M
task/delivery orders. Each prime contract had a nominal minimum
and a maximum equal to the anticipated value of the entire
contract ($2B). The statement of work is fairly broad and
provides for the development and delivery of various systems in
support of the program offices that this contracting office
supports. This contract does not have any priced CLINs or
established prices, no established profit/fee guidance or cap,
and no established overhead rates. Each “order” is competed (for
the most part) under the concept of fair opportunity and allows
each contractor to propose prices/costs as the requirement seems
to dictate. CLIN’s for each order are created as required to
meet the needs of the requirement. Prime contractor’s can
add/subtract “team members” as needed to compete under the fair
opportunity concept. When this MAC was competed 2-3 years ago,
it was stated that it would be the preferred vehicle for
requirements for the program offices that the contracting office
supports. There is a “reopener” clause included in the contracts
that permits other prime contracts to be added in the event it
is decided by the Gov’t that it is needed to sustain a
competitive environment. This contract also has a clause that
permits competition/award of orders on a small-business
set-aside basis. Under these circumstances, only the small
businesses that have prime contracts have the fair opportunity
to compete. An argument has been made that what that contracting
office has created is an agreement to restrict competition to a
group of best-value selected primes. The argument also contends
that a valid ID/IQ contract does not truly exist. What I’m
looking for are thoughts on this argument and perspectives on
the CICA compliance of this MAC (not to mention regulatory
considerations of some other well-founded contracting
principles).
By
Anonymous on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 02:56 pm:
If the contract has no priced line items how was best
value analysis achieved?
By
Anonymous on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 03:05 pm:
I personally don't see problems with this. This is similar to
some other big contract vehicles such as the HHS "ITOP" and the
Commerce "COMMIT" programs.
The awards are competitively established. The extent of what
offerors compete for, which is an ID/IQ contract with known min
and max for work spelled out in the SOW, is clear cut.
Furthermore the ground rules for task orders are spelled out. So
if the resulting orders are within the scope of the contract and
the task order award process is consistent with what is laid
out, it is fine.
It's also commendable that the agency does small business
set-asides.
I'm curious as to why you think it doesn't comply with CICA as
well as the other regulatory considerations.
By
AnonyMAC on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 03:38 pm:
As I understand it, the best value decision was made
based on a demonstrated understanding of the technology areas
identified in the SOW, a demonstrated ability to manage such
areas on a program level, and past/present performance in those
technology areas. To understand how the offeror might price
things, a representative list of labor categories was provided
as a part of the RFP. Each offeror provided their rates for each
of these labor categories (though they are not used to price any
orders). The Gov't established the maximum (dollar figure) that
is the same for all of the primes. As best as I can tell, the
ability of an offeror to price the labor categories, the
presence of an approved acct'g system, and a track record of
pricing orders was also evaluated. In essence, it appears that
if an offeror demonstrated an acceptable track record in the
technology areas of the SOW they were awarded a contract.
By
formerfed on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 03:50 pm:
AnonyMAC,
I believe they had to consider price/cost in the award
selection. From what you described, they must have done a price
realism exercise or had offerors propose against something like
a model/sample task.
By
AnonyMAC on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 04:04 pm:
The reason for initiating a discussion on this topic
was to help resolve the question of whether or this MAC is
consistent with the principles of CICA. Not sure yet if I think
it is or isn't. One argument on why it isn’t CICA compliant is
that it appears that this agency has created a MAC environment
to limit competition to those contractor’s who received awards
when the MAC was competed. The lack of anything resembling
pricing is bothersome from the fact that orders are competed as
if no MAC exists. In other words, the MAC primes are free to
propose any combination of labor, materials, overhead, and
profit as they see fit under each competition. For example, GSA
FSS contracts are ID/IQ MAC’s. They have a price list of one
form or another that you can use in any combination to arrive at
a price and has established procedures for discounting those
prices in the event it’s a significant order. These MAC vehicles
don’t have anything like that. I can’t speak for the ITOP and
COMMIT MAC’s you reference. This SOW permits orders for product
deliverables that can run the spectrum from small to large in
both size and unit cost. Clearly, the prime contracts were
competed so at least the principles of CICA were considered;
however, the SOW is very, very top level and is in terms of
technology areas vice specific requirements so, in practice, it
almost appears that it’s more of a qualified bidders list (if
you will) wrapped in the terminology of a MAC. The small
business set-aside element of this MAC is commendable, but an
argument can be made that it doesn’t truly follow the intent of
the rule of two of FAR 19.502-1 as the rule of two is applied
only to the SB’s that have awards under this MAC.
By
AnonyMAC on Tuesday, January 28,
2003 - 04:13 pm:
Formerfed-
The offeror’s proposed against a set of T&M labor categories. To
the best of my knowledge there was no sample task order. Only
the labor category rates were evaluated for price
realism/reasonableness. I believe part of the idea was that real
price/cost realism would be evaluated as a part of the fair
opportunity process. Keep in mind that relative to discussions
on the RFP I have only the solicitation to go by. Can’t really
speak for what was actually done as I was not a participant.
By
Vern Edwards on Wednesday, January
29, 2003 - 07:58 am:
If the contract was competed as described in the last
post, then I don't think it was done in compliance with CICA.
The GAO has ruled in the past that price must be an evaluation
factor and that evaluation of rates alone is not sufficient.
Such a contract does nothing more than to establish a limited
pool of prospective offerors for future competitions that are
shielded from protests. It may be administratively economical,
but it is the kind of thing that will lead to stricter
limitations on task order contracting in the long run. It is not
consistent with the spirit of CICA.
By
formerfed on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 09:12 am:
AnonyMAC,
Do you know someone in that office to ask, or is there any way
of finding out more on the price evaluation? It just seems odd
that something flawed like that could slip by. I would expect an
unsuccessful offeror to at least protest on that issue.
By
ANON2;56 on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 09:25 am:
Vern is right on the money.....and along with your
comments on small business what about the rule of two for
Hubzone firms. Secondly I think the ITOP was a DOT action. One
of the unplanned outcomes was use of the MAC disrupted many of
the 8a,HZ and SB plans operating administrations were trying to
execute.
By the way were the minimums high enough to compel submission of
sub contracting plans by the large MAC holders?
By
AnonyMAC on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 09:59 am:
Formerfed/Anon2;56-
Price was evaluated. To paraphrase from the solicitation, the
T&M labor rates were multiplied by the estimated hours the Gov’t
determined to be representative of the effort anticipated to be
expended as T&M for the first couple of years of the contract.
In practice I don’t see that the T&M rates have been used much
as few of the orders have been T&M in nature. My guess is that
if I’ve read this correctly it “slipped” by because some of the
necessary elements where there on face value and that there was
a combined lack of expertise in MAC contracting on most levels.
To my knowledge, no protests were received, but that could be
because just about everyone who demonstrated a technical
competency got a contract.
Subcontracting plans were submitted (not because of the minimum
but because of the anticipated value). In practice, individual
orders do reflect varying subcontracting goals as appropriate
for the order in question.
I have to admit the lack of identified prices for anything in
the basic contracts give me reason to pause. Pricing for
individual orders appears to be unique to each requirement and
not based on anything in the contract or provided in response to
the solicitation.
Mr. Edwards statement that “Such a contract does nothing more
than to establish a limited pool of prospective offerors for
future competitions that are shielded from protests” appears to
hit the nail on the head.
Maybe I'm missing something, but I've talked to one or two folks
in that agency and I think that I've got the story straight.
Seems like a inquiry waiting to happen.
By
formerfed on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 11:18 am:
AnonyMAC,
Your statement that "it “slipped” by because some of the
necessary elements were there on face value and that there was a
combined lack of expertise in MAC contracting on most levels"
might be a good way to summarize it.
Based on what you've said thus far, there are both positive and
negative perspectives.
On the negative side, just using T&M rates to evaluate proposals
is shaky at best. One could argue they are indicative of an
offerors entire pricing structure so T&M is a realistic
indicator of pricing in general. The big problem is you said
they are priced only for the first couple years of a ten year
contract. If there's no link of option year prices to what was
bid, in effect these are unpriced options and the option isn't
valid. Having too broad a SOW where just about anything in the
way of a task order fits is suspect as well.
The only thing that is good from what you said is that the task
orders are competed. As long as this continues and nothing gets
priced exceptionally out of line as what might happen with a
sole source, maybe no inquiry ever happens.
By
formerfed on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 11:20 am:
AnonyMAC,
I just remembered you saying there are no options. How then are
prices established beyond what was proposed?
By
AnonyMAC on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 12:51 pm:
formerfed-
The contracts include a statement that rates for the remaining
years may be requested later. There is no clause or citeable
paragraph that I've seen on how the rates would be requested or
subsequently incorporated. Given that only a single digit % of
orders use the T&M rates it probably doesn't matter. On the vast
majority of the orders (which are not T&M) the contractors would
seem to simply propose what they think is necessary for labor
and material. The contracts do include a statement that such
labor categories proposed in orders will be binding for that
order. The majority of the orders do appear to be competed;
however some are awarded in accordance with the exceptions at
FAR 16.505.
You seem to keying in on one of the areas that makes me scratch
my head. How can you have an unpriced ID/IQ contract with a
min/max where pricing occurs at the order level? Fundamentally
I'm beginning to think that they have created a "contract" that
restricts competition to a pool of "precertified" contractors
for administrative/economical purposes.
By
formerfed on Wednesday, January 29,
2003 - 03:15 pm:
AnonyMAC,
I see your concern better now. I originally thought offerors
proposed all labor on an hourly rate but were free to discount
them when competing for task orders. The really unusual part is
how rates are only valid for an initial period, but somehow they
get established for remaining years later. Then it looks like
price wasn’t appropriately considered in the source selection.
If this program got this far without attracting attention, the
issues might never surface.
By
Anonymous on Thursday, February 06,
2003 - 01:53 pm:
Vern, you stated that the "GAO has ruled in the past
that price must be an evaluation factor and that evaluation of
rates alone is not sufficient." Can you provide the case(s)?
By
Eric Ottinger on Thursday, February
06, 2003 - 05:02 pm:
Anon,
Take a look at United International Engineering, Inc.; Morrison
Knudsen-Dynamics Research; PRC Inc; and Science Applications
International Corporation, Comptroller General Decision , No.
B-245448.3; B-245448.4; B-245448.5; B-245448.6; B-245448.7;
B-245448.8; B-245448.9; B-245448.10, January 29, 1992
“While a reasonably derived agency estimate of direct,
unburdened labor rates for comparable labor categories, based
upon historical experience, can provide an objective standard
against which the realism of proposals can be measured, an
agency may not mechanically apply that estimate to determine
evaluated costs. It may well be that in some instances an
estimate has limited applicability to a particular company, as
for example where such company currently employs comparable
personnel in the same geographic area for a different
combination of wages and benefits. In those instances, any
absolute reliance upon estimates could have the effect of
arbitrarily and unfairly penalizing the firm and depriving the
government of the benefit available from such a firm.
Accordingly, in order to undertake a proper cost realism
evaluation, the agency must independently analyze the realism of
an offeror’s proposed costs based upon its particular approach,
personnel and other circumstances. See Allied Cleaning Servs.,
Inc., 69 Comp. Gen. 248 (1990), 90-1 CPD 275 (realism of
proposed prices); Kinton, Inc., supra; cf. Range Technical
Servs., 68 Comp. Gen. 81 (1988), 88-2 CPD 474.”
There are several cases where the Comp. Gen. opines that the
agency should use sample tasks for the purpose of making cost
comparisons. Personally, I am not sure that I have that much
confidence in sample tasks used for that purpose.
Eric
By
Anonymous on Wednesday, February
26, 2003 - 10:36 am:
Vern/Eric,
I am also interested in following up on Vern's statement about
GAO ruling that evaluation of rates is insufficient to meet the
requirement that price always be evaluated as part of the source
selection process. If, for example, you are awarding a
competitive T&M or Labor Hour contract the contract pricing to
be evaluated and ultimately awarded is at the "rate" level since
there is not a firm SOW established at the contract level --
only at the order level.
Regarding Eric's posting it appears to not be on point since it
refers to "cost realism" analysis, which means evaluation of the
realism of an offeror's cost proposal under a solicitation for a
cost-type contract. The purpose there is to analyze whether a
cost proposal is a realistic projection of anticipated costs
given the offeror's technical proposal, rate structure and
accounting system. What is at issue here is whether competitive
price proposals have been substantively evaluated at all as part
of the source selection process.
By the way, I agree with Vern and others that the contract and
source selection process used here, as described, is an
inappropriate application of multiple award contracting to set
up a mechanism for future contracting with a preselected
universe of contractors within a constrained environment that is
not a meaningful contract structure in and of itself.
By
Linda Koone on Thursday, February
27, 2003 - 09:50 am:
Anonymous:
I believe that 'S. J. Thomas Co., Inc., B-283192, October 20,
1999' supports Vern's comments regarding evaluation of rates.
The webmaster has a link to this case under the Protest area of
this site.
By
Eric Ottinger on Thursday, February
27, 2003 - 12:40 pm:
Linda,
Good catch.
However, in the S.J. Thomas case, the agency evaluated only the
“markup” (AKA the “load factor”), not the labor rates. The
discussion is excellent. Obviously, the GAO is very ambivalent.
http://frwebgate3.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=3676426144+0+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve
I was about to concede that Anon 10:36 appears to be right. I
put “T&M” and “realism” into the search. Nothing came up to
indicate that this rule would be applied in a T&M type
competition as it would in a cost type competition.
However, I see no practical difference, in this regard, between
a CPFF LOE tasking contract and a T&M tasking contract. You
could argue tht the only thing that you are buying on the T&M is
just the labor hour. But that is a silly argument. Nobody just
buys hours. We always buy hours to get some work done.
Eric
By
Vern Edwards on Thursday, February
27, 2003 - 06:12 pm:
See: Healthcare Services International, Inc.; Apex
Environmental, Inc., B-247433, June 5, 1992:
"Our review of the record in the context of the various protest
contentions leads us to the conclusion that the evaluation was
flawed in three respects. First, the price evaluation was
deficient in that it did not include an accurate assessment of
probable costs of performing the required services. Agencies
must consider cost to the government in evaluating competitive
proposals. 41 U.S.C. §§ 253a(b)(1), 253b(d)(4) (1988). While it
is up to the agency to decide upon some appropriate, reasonable
method for proposal evaluation, an agency may not use an
evaluation method that produces a misleading result. Aurora
Assocs., Inc., B-215565, Apr. 26, 1985, 85-1 CPD ¶ 470.
Here, although the RFP required offerors to insert in their
proposals loaded hourly rates for each of the six categories of
labor, the price evaluation was not based on a comparison of an
offeror's proposed hourly rates for each of those six categories
in the context of an estimate of the quantity of the particular
labor category the agency expects to order. Rather, the
evaluation considered only each offeror's "average hourly rate,"
which was calculated by adding the costs submitted in each of
the six categories and dividing the sum by six. As discussed
below, this method does not establish whether one offeror's
proposal would be more or less costly than another's, because
there is no necessary relationship between an offeror's average
hourly rate and the likely actual cost of the contract to the
government. See, for example, KISS Eng'g Corp., B-221356,
May 2, 1986, 86-1 CPD ¶ 425.
"In this regard, the price of each delivery order under the
contract will not be based on the contractor's average rate.
According to the solicitation, delivery orders are to be based
on the loaded rates for the mix of the labor categories which is
determined by the agency's needs for the particular tasks to be
ordered. This means that over the period covered by the contract
the agency will require different amounts of each of the various
labor categories. For example, the record indicates that on the
predecessor contract, the contractor used approximately 1,300
hours of Senior level staff, 500 hours of Junior level staff and
approximately 300 hours of Support staff in performing the
delivery orders. Using this and other information available from
the predecessor contract, the agency should have created and
applied in the price evaluation realistic estimates of the
number of labor hours expected to be used in each category.
Without using such estimates, there was nothing to assure that
the evaluation would account for the possible wide disparity in
labor hour usage between the various labor categories and, as a
result, there was no direct relationship between the evaluated
price of a particular offeror and the actual price of
performance by that offeror. See for example R.P. Densen
Contractors, Inc., 66 Comp.Gen. 31 (1986), 86-2 CPD ¶ 401."
The GAO sustained the protest. Also see Prof. Ralph Nash's
analysis in "Evaluating Cost to the Government When Quantities
Are Unknown: A Puzzlement," 14 N&CR ¶ 10 (February 2000).