HOME  |  CONTENTS  |  DISCUSSIONS  DISCUSSION ARCHIVES  |  BLOG  |  QUICK-KITs|  STATES

Loading

How To Use the NDAA Pages

Back to NDAA Contents

TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

Subtitle B--Department of Defense Management

P. L. 113-66

Explanatory Statement, H7894

SEC. 903. CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY FOR THE COMMAND ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND.

Section 167(e)(4)(C)(ii) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after `shall be' the following: `responsible to the commander for rapidly delivering acquisition solutions to meet validated special operations-peculiar requirements, subordinate to the Defense Acquisition Executive in matters of acquisition, subject to the same oversight as the service acquisition executives, and'.

Clarification of authority for the command acquisition executive of the United States Special Operations Command (sec. 903)

The Senate committee-reported bill contained a provision (sec. 902) that would make the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Acquisition Executive subject to the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)). The provision would also require the USD(AT&L) to designate an appropriate official within the Office of the USD(AT&L) to provide such oversight and direction for those programs.

The House bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement includes the Senate provision with an amendment that would modify the provision to make clear that the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive is responsible to the Commander of USSOCOM for the acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment and subordinate to the USD (AT&L) for all acquisition matters. The provision would not alter the relationship between the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive and the Commander of USSOCOM. Further, it is not the intent of the provision to delay, unnecessarily impede, or undermine the flexibility of USSOCOM development and acquisition efforts.

We remain supportive of USSOCOM's unique acquisition authorities to provide for the special operations-peculiar requirements of its forces, including rapid acquisition of urgently needed capabilities for deployed or deploying special operations forces. Further, we note that the flexibility inherent in these authorities is important to ensuring that special operations forces can adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of global threats. However, given the significant growth in USSOCOM's budget in recent years and current fiscal pressures, we believe it is necessary to clarify civilian oversight of USSOCOM investment programs, particularly the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar platforms.

We note that the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364), as amended, requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior acquisition official within USD (AT&L) to oversee the exercise of acquisition authority by USSOCOM, among others. Additionally, section 138 of title 10, United States Code, states that the ``principal duty'' of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SOLIC) is ``overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations activities.'' We believe appropriate civilian oversight by USD (AT&L) and ASD SOLIC of USSOCOM acquisition activities is critical to ensuring effective use of taxpayer funds, particularly with regard to the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar platforms and advanced technology programs that are at greatest risk of incurring delays and additional costs. Therefore, we direct the Secretary of Defense to provide the congressional defense committees, not later than 90 days after enactment of this act, a directive type memorandum outlining the respective roles and responsibilities of the USD (AT&L) and ASD SOLIC with regard to the oversight of USSOCOM acquisition activities and the mechanisms through which such oversight will occur.


Senate Report 113-044

Supervision of Command Acquisition Executive of the United States Special Operations Command by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (sec. 902)

The budget request for U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) included approximately $1.6 billion for procurement and $372.7 million for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE). The committee notes that this total represents an increase of more than double in USSOCOM's investment accounts since fiscal year 2001.

The Commander of USSOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense as the only combatant commander empowered with authorities for the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment. Furthermore, the staff of the Commander of USSOCOM includes an acquisition executive that reports solely to the Commander. This is unlike the service acquisition executives of the military departments who are subject to the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) in addition to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the military department concerned.

The committee is supportive of USSOCOM's unique acquisition authorities to provide for the special operations-peculiar requirements of its forces, including rapid acquisition of urgently needed capabilities for deployed or deploying special operations forces. Further, the committee notes that the flexibility inherent in these authorities is enormously important to ensuring that our special operations forces can adapt to the rapidly evolving nature of global threats. However, given the significant growth in USSOCOM's budget in recent years and current fiscal pressures, the committee believes additional civilian oversight of USSOCOM investment programs is prudent, particularly the development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar platforms.

Therefore, the committee recommends a provision that would make the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive subject to the direction of the USD(AT&L) for certain acquisition programs. The provision would also require the USD(AT&L) to designate an appropriate official within the Office of the USD(AT&L) to provide such oversight and direction for those programs. The provision would not alter the relationship between the USSOCOM Acquisition Executive and the Commander of USSOCOM and it is not the intent of the committee to delay, unnecessarily impede, or undermine the flexibility of USSOCOM development and acquisition efforts.

ABOUT  l CONTACT