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TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED MATTERS Subtitle B—Acquisition Policy and Management |
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JWNDAA Section |
House Conference Report 109-702 |
SEC. 812. PILOT PROGRAM ON TIME-CERTAIN DEVELOPMENT
IN ACQUISITION OF
MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS.
(a) PILOT PROGRAM AUTHORIZED.—The Secretary of Defense may carry out a pilot program on the use of time-certain development in the acquisition of major weapon systems. (b) PURPOSE OF PILOT PROGRAM.—The purpose of the pilot program authorized by subsection (a) is to assess the feasibility and advisability of utilizing time-certain development in the acquisition of major weapon systems in order to deliver new capabilities to the warfighter more rapidly through—
(c) INCLUSION OF SYSTEMS IN PILOT PROGRAM.—
(d) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN PILOT PROGRAM.—The number of major weapon systems included in the pilot program at any time may not exceed six major weapon systems. (e) LIMITATION ON COST OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense may include a major weapon system in the pilot program only if, at the time a major weapon system is proposed for inclusion, the total cost for system design and development of the weapon system, as set forth in the cost estimate referred to in subsection (c)(2)(D), does not exceed $1,000,000,000 during the period covered by the current future-years defense program. (f) SPECIAL FUNDING AUTHORITY.—
(g) ADMINISTRATION OF PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe policies and procedures on the administration of the pilot program. Such policies and procedures shall—
(h) REMOVAL OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS FROM PILOT PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Defense shall remove a major weapon system from the pilot program if—
(i) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS IN PILOT PROGRAM.—
(j) ANNUAL REPORT.—
(k) MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘major weapon system’’ means a weapon system that is treatable as a major system under section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code. |
Pilot program on time-certain
development in acquisition of major weapon systems (sec. 812)
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 811) that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program on the use of time-certain development in the acquisition of major weapon systems. The House bill contained no similar provision. The House recedes with a clarifying amendment that would place limitations on the number of major weapon systems included in the pilot program. |
Senate Armed Services Committee Report 109-254 |
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Pilot program on time-certain development in acquisition of major
weapon systems (sec. 811)
The committee recommends a provision that would authorize the Secretary of Defense to carry out a pilot program on the use of time-certain development in the acquisition of major weapon systems. In a January 2006 report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the assessment panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project concluded that the Department of Defense's failure to appropriately balance technology maturity, system capability, cost, and program risk before undertaking major defense acquisition programs has led to products that `take tens of years to deliver and cost far more than originally estimated.' The panel concluded that a shift to time-certain development, with schedule as a key performance parameter, would help the Department address these problems. The report stated that: Time Certain Development enforces evolutionary acquisition by making time the focus of the up front requirement statement. Capabilities should be upgraded over time as technologies mature and operational requirements become clearer. Time Certain Development differs from prior attempts at valuing time to market, such as evolutionary acquisition and spiral development in that a maximum number of years is mandated, the start and end dates are defined, and the driving processes (requirements, budget, source selection, etc.) are revamped to support it.' The committee concurs with the panel's recommendation that a disciplined approach to time-certain development should help reduce program risk, resulting in a less costly and time-consuming process for the acquisition of major weapon systems. The committee also notes that the DAPA panel recommended that the military departments be authorized to create management reserves to support stable program funding by using expiring funds budgeted for termination liability to reduce the impact of unexpected technical upsets during program execution. The committee does not believe that there is sufficient discipline in the Department's budget, requirements, and acquisition processes to support the authorization of such accounts. However, this provision would authorize the establishment of a more limited special reserve account, similar to the accounts recommended by the DAPA panel, but limited to major weapon systems that are included in the pilot program for time-certain development under this section.
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