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Although today few decisions resort
to legislative history to interpret the provisions of the
Contract Disputes Act of 1979, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613, this is a
matter of happenstance, and it occurs only because case law has
by now resolved many concerns, including, for example, concerns
about claim certification, or about just which claims are
subject to the Contract Disputes Act. Indeed, use of
legislative history to determine congressional intent is an
entirely familiar process—recent examples include Dalton
v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 120 F.3d 1249, 1252 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (maritime contract) and Boeing Petroleum Services,
Inc. v. Watkins, 935 F.2d 1260, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (party
designation). But the Federal Acquisition Regulation is no
more clear than the provisions of the Contract Disputes Act
(indeed, I argue that because the Federal Acquisition Regulation
contains more detailed requirements, there is a greater need for
a thorough understanding of its provisions), and yet there are
only a few cases in which tribunals have thought to use the rich
legislative history of the Federal Acquisition Regulation that
is presented in Federal Acquisition Circulars. So here I
argue for routine use of this legislative history, that is, the
guidance already presented in the Federal Acquisition Circulars.
Where is this guidance, you
ask? Just take a look at one of the Federal Acquisition
Circulars. For our analysis here, we’ll look at Federal
Acquisition Circular 97-02, the “FAR Part 15 Rewrite,”
a final rule that makes fundamental changes in the competitive
negotiations process. Looking at Federal Acquisition
Circular 97-02, you’ll find a précis, followed by a “Final
Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis.” While there is
helpful information in the précis, it is the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Act Analysis that is the most important.
Your understanding of this later
point requires a bit of a detour. First, recall that one
of the fundamental principles of the Administrative Procedure
Act is the requirement that rules such as those contained in the
Federal Acquisition Regulation must be offered for public
comment, that public comments are to be considered, and that
only then are final rules to be published, published together
with a “a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose.” 5
U.S.C. § 553(c). Next, look at the eponymous
Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 601-612. Here, at 5
U.S.C. § 604, is the statutory requirement for a Final
Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis. Turn to subparagraph
(a) of this section, and you’ll see that there are five,
detailed requirements for the content of each Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis:
(1) a succinct statement of the
need for, and objectives of, the rule;
(2) a summary of the
significant issues raised by the public comments, of agency
assessment of these issues, and of any changes made as a
result;
(3) a description of, and an
estimate as to the number of, the small businesses to which
the rule will apply;
(4) a description of the
projected compliance requirements of the rule, particularly
including compliance requirements for small businesses; and
(5) a description of the steps
taken to minimize any significant economic impact on small
businesses, including a statement of the reasons for selecting
the alternative(s) adopted.
Id.
If you’ll look back at Federal
Acquisition Circular 97-02, you’ll find an extensive
discussion for each of these detailed content requirements. The
discussions for items numbers (1), (2), and (5) are here the
most informative. Read on: read the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Ramey
v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239, 124546 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which
holds that this sort of material is “powerful extrinsic
evidence,” “strong support” of the original intent of a
regulation.
Now to sum up: (a) I’ve shown
you an example of the rich history of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation that is presented in the Federal Acquisition
Circulars, and (b) I’ve given you a case, binding precedent,
which explains that this rich history must inform any inquiry
into a particular application of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation. So, have I made my point?
Think about it. If I have
your attention, then let me explain the problem that stems from
ignoring this legislative history.
Consider Federal Acquisition
Regulation 15.306(d)(1), newly issued with the FAR Part 15
Rewrite, which requires that the contracting officer conduct
discussions with each offeror within the competitive range, if
award will not be made on initial proposals, and here look at
subsection (d)(3) of this regulation, as it was first issued:
The contracting officer shall
. . . indicate to, or discuss with, each offeror still being
considered for award, significant weaknesses, deficiencies,
and other aspects of its proposal (such as cost, price,
technical approach, past performance, and terms and
conditions) that could, in the opinion of the contracting
officer, be altered or explained to enhance materially the
proposal’s potential for award.
Federal Acquisition Regulation
15.306(d)(3) (emphasis added). What might this have meant
to the framers of the FAR Part 15 Rewrite? (This language has
since been changed, and now it is clear that contracting
officers are only “encouraged”
to discuss other aspects of particular competitive proposals
that could “be altered or explained to enhance materially the
proposal’s potential for award.”)
Had a tribunal concerned with the
scope of the discussion obligation in the newly minted Federal
Acquisition Regulation 15.306(d)(3) looked to the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis that is contained in Federal
Acquisition Circular 97-02, it would have learned that the
framers of the FAR Part 15 rewrite intended to “infuse
innovative techniques into the source selection process” so as
“facilitate the acquisition of best value products and
services” (content requirement (1)). Such a tribunal
would have learned that one of the steps taken to minimize
significant economic impact on small businesses (content
requirement (5)) was to enlarge the scope of the discussion
obligation:
In response to public comments,
the second proposed rule requires a more robust
exchange of information during discussions. The language requires
the Government to identify, in addition to significant
weaknesses and deficiencies, other aspects of an offeror’s
proposal that could be enhanced materially to improve the
offeror’s potential for award. This change should
benefit all offerors, including small businesses, because it
permits offerors to develop a better understanding of the
Government’s evaluation of their proposal, and permits them
to optimize their potential for award.
Federal
Acquisition Circular 97-02,
62 Fed. Reg. 51229 (1997).
But this didn’t happen.
Instead, in Du
& Associates, Inc., B-280283.3, Dec. 22nd,
1998, the General Accounting Office ignored the legislative
history of the FAR Part 15 Rewrite, and decided that it was not
“the intention of the rewrite to limit the contracting
officer’s discretion in this manner.” Id., at 7.
What? What about the explicit, contrary language in the
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis?
Thus the problem: is it the
FAR Council that sets the policies expressed in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, or is it the General Accounting
Office? I don’t think that the General Accounting Office
intends to set federal procurement policy, but because Du
did not consider the legislative history of Federal Acquisition
Regulation 15.306(d)(3) that is set out in Federal Acquisition
Circular 97-02, it is not too much of a stretch to suppose that
the General Accounting Office, an arm of the Legislative Branch,
is a de facto policymaking institution for the Executive
Branch.
A better approach, when applying
the Federal Acquisition Regulation to particular matters, is to
look to its legislative history, particularly, as in Du,
when dealing with significant changes to existing policy.
Just this happened in ManTech Telecommunications and
Information Systems Corp. v. United States and Lockheed Martin
Services, Inc., 49 Fed. Cl. 57, 60-63 (2001). At issue
there were reopened discussions as a result of a prior,
successful protest. The Army proposed to convene another
round of discussions so as to enable correction of demonstrated
weaknesses unrevealed in a previous technical evaluation.
The successful protester
complained to the Court that doing so would amount to
“technical leveling.” This is a shibboleth previously
contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, but, try as you
might, you’ll find nothing about it in the FAR Part 15
Rewrite. The ManTech court looked, however, to the
legislative history, the Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
contained in Federal Acquisition Circular 97-02, and, doing so,
found that the omission of the concept of “technical
leveling” was purposeful, was part of an overall scheme to
enhance best value through multiple rounds of discussions
enabling proposal enhancements. ManTech was
recently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, without a published opinion.
This affirmance is not an
endorsement of looking to legislative history, but neither is
there now a need to correct an unclear acquisition regulation as
was clearly necessary as a result of Du. Had the
Court not properly regarded the legislative history of the FAR
Part 15 Rewrite, ManTech could have resulted in the same
sort of difficulty.
Whether or not the scope of the
discussion obligation is enlarged is not the only problem that
stems from ignoring the legislative history of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, particularly, the legislative history of
the FAR Part 15 Rewrite. Next, we’ll look at the ability
vel non of offerors to address adverse past performance
information before it can be used in a source selection.
It needs to be understood that
I’m speaking here about past performance information that is
submitted by offerors, and gathered by agencies, both on a
one-time basis, for source selection purposes. Guidance
for systematic collection and maintenance of past performance
information (which includes an opportunity to comment) is set
out in Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart
42.15, “Contractor Performance Information.”
Guidance for the ad hoc past performance evaluations
that I’m concerned with here is set out in Federal Acquisition
Regulation Subpart
15.3, “Source Selection.”
The only explicit requirement to
give offerors an opportunity to address adverse past performance
information before it can affect the outcome of a competition is
in Federal Acquisition Regulation 15.306(b)(1)(i), which
provides that if a competitive range is to be established, then
“communications shall address adverse past
performance information to which an offeror has not had a prior
opportunity to respond.” (Emphasis added). But there is
also a possibility of confusion, since if a contracting officer
decides to make an award on initial proposals, then there is not
an absolute requirement to give offerors an opportunity to
address adverse past performance information:
If award will be made without
conducting discussions, offerors may be [not shall
be] given the opportunity to clarify certain aspects of
proposals (e.g., the relevance of an offeror’s past
performance information and adverse past performance
information to which the offeror has not previously had an
opportunity to respond) or to resolve minor or clerical
errors.
Federal
Acquisition Regulation 15.306(a)(2)
(emphasis added).
Only if a tribunal looks to the
legislative history of the FAR Part 15 Rewrite will it become
clear that the FAR Council must have intended that in any event,
e.g., whether an award is made on initial proposals, or whether
an award is made after a competitive range determination,
followed by discussions, will offerors be given an opportunity
to respond to adverse past performance information to which they
have not had a previous opportunity to respond. Here
again, this legislative history is set out in a step taken to
minimize significant economic impact on small businesses
(content requirement (5) of the five requirements for each Final
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis):
We revised the final rule to
require that offerors, including small entities, shall be
granted the opportunity to explain situations that contributed
to an adverse past performance rating to which they have not
had a previous opportunity to respond before such ratings can
be the determining factor for exclusion from the competitive
range. These revisions, together with the requirement to
discuss all deficiencies and significant weaknesses with those
offerors in the competitive range, ensure that past
performance to which an offeror has not had the opportunity to
respond will be addressed any time it can affect the outcome
of an acquisition.
Federal
Acquisition Circular 97-02,
62 Fed. Reg. 51228 (1997) (emphasis added).
Now does it come as a surprise
that the General Accounting Office ignores this legislative
history as well?
In Rohmann
Services, Inc., B-280154.2, Nov. 16th,
1998, at 8-9, per the General Accounting Office, the offeror was
“aware of much of that information,” and the General
Accounting Office refused to hold Federal Acquisition Regulation
15.306(a)(2) as a mandatory requirement, notwithstanding the
clear, contrary language in Federal Acquisition Circular
97-02. See
also Inland Service Corp., B-282272, June 21st,
1999, at 4-5 (offeror was aware of the specific deficiencies
claimed, had contested them, and was pursuing a contract claim).
The General Accounting Office
later elaborated on this departure from the legislative history,
the guidance set out in Federal Acquisition Circular 97-02:
With regard specifically to
clarifications concerning adverse past performance information
to which the offeror has not previously had an opportunity to
respond, we think that, for the exercise of discretion to be
reasonable, the contracting officer must give the offeror an
opportunity to respond where there clearly is a reason to
question the validity of the past performance information, for
example, where there are obvious inconsistencies between a
reference’s narrative comments and the actual ratings the
reference gives the offeror. In the absence of such
a clear basis to question the past performance information, we
think that, short of acting in bad faith, the contracting
officer reasonably may decide not to ask for clarifications.
A.
G. Cullen Construction, Inc.,
B-284049.2, Feb. 22nd, 2000, at 5 (emphasis added).
So for those protests that are
adjudicated in the General Accounting Office, we have the ipse
dixit of that arm of Congress, instead of guidance for the
Executive branch formulated by the FAR Council.
This is not unlike the blind
people sent to see an elephant—they were unable to see the
whole of it, that which appears upon an examination of
legislative history, this the guidance issued by the FAR Council
in the Federal Acquisition Circular, guidance issued in
compliance with the dictates of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5
U.S.C. § 553(c), and guidance issued in compliance with a
mandatory Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis, 5
U.S.C. § 604.
It’s wrong. It’s time
to use the legislative history of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation, time to find answers in FAR Council guidance, not
the imagination of the General Accounting Office.
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