2. Application of FAR Definitions
In applying the definitions set forth in
the FAR, “the ‘acid test for deciding whether discussions have
been held is whether it can be said that an offeror was provided
the opportunity to revise or modify its proposal.’” Davis Boat
Works, Inc. v. United States, 111 Fed. Cl. 342, 353 (2013)
(quoting Linc Gov’t Servs., 96 Fed. Cl. at 717); see also Info.
Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen discussions are opened, bidders have
the opportunity to revise their proposals.”). Rivada contends
that the exchanges that took place before the competitive range
was established in this case, including the oral presentations,
amounted to discussions because the exchanges were “extensive”
and because, according to Rivada, the agency “allowed the
offerors to offer changes to their proposals.” See Pl.’s Mem. at
22. The Court finds Rivada’s arguments unpersuasive.
First, the extensive nature of the
exchanges does not, in the Court’s view, transform them into
discussions. The procurement itself was complex and involved
technical matters. Indeed, the government’s acquisition plan
described the procurement as “unique” and “unprecedented.” AR
Tab 28 at 678, 685. Further, the multi-phased evaluation process
clearly contemplated that the evaluation would include a series
of exchanges before the agency established a competitive range.
Thus, the government informed offerors that it would provide
them with “feedback” when it evaluated their capability
statements in the procurement’s first phase, and that the
feedback would “identif[y] [the] strengths and/or weaknesses”
noted in those statements. Id. Tab 30 at 1436. Further, as part
of its detailed evaluation of the proposals, the government
stated that it might consider “oral presentations and/or
technical demonstrations or other discussions.” Id. at 1437.
Therefore, given the unusual nature of the procurement, the
large volume of exchanges does not indicate that the agency
engaged in discussions.13
Second, the exchanges were not intended
to, and in fact did not provide the offerors an opportunity to
revise their proposals. Indeed, the record shows that the
agency’s intent—to which the Court grants weight in determining
how the oral presentations should be characterized—was to not
accept revisions until after it established a competitive range.
Thus, when it requested information from the parties, the
government consistently disclaimed any intent to accept revised
proposals. See, e.g., id. Tab 63 at 9010, 9022, 9056, 9077,
9232, 9298, 9423; id. Tab 64 at 9671, 9734, 9797, 9920. The
government’s internal communications also show that it sought to
ensure that the oral presentations would not stray beyond the
bounds of communications under FAR 15.306(b) and into
discussions. See id. Tab 63 at 9220–23 (email stating that the
agency “need[ed] to ensure that any documentation that [Rivada]
submit[s]” in the course of the oral presentation “does not
amend, update, or revise their original proposal submission,”
and quoting FAR 15.306(b)).
Further, as AT&T points out, language in
the agency’s instructions regarding the oral presentations
closely tracked the language of FAR 15.306(b). See id. at 9216;
id. Tab 64 at 9717 (informing the parties that “communications
[would] be necessary in order to enhance FirstNet’s
understanding of the proposal[s], allow reasonable
interpretation of the proposed solution[s], and facilitate the
evaluation process”; and that the communications “may be
considered in rating the proposal[s] for the purpose of
establishing the competitive range,” but would not “be used to
cure proposal deficiencies or material omissions, materially
alter the technical or cost elements, impact the overall value
proposition of the proposal, and/or revise the proposal”). Thus,
the agency clearly did not intend to allow the offerors to
revise their proposals through the exchanges and oral
communications that occurred during the detailed evaluation
phase.
The content of the exchanges also shows
that the agency used the exchanges only in service of performing
a baseline assessment of the proposals as received, against
which future, targeted revisions might occur. As the government
points out, the vast majority of the agency’s questions were
straightforward requests for technical information about
ambiguities or gaps in the offerors’ proposals. See Def.’s Resp.
at 31. Rivada, however, points to isolated questions that asked
the offerors to “talk about” certain aspects of their proposals.
See Pl.’s Mem. at 22 (citing AR Tab 58 at 8685, 8700, and AR Tab
62 at 8965, 8968). Despite this locution, the questions Rivada
identifies all sought information about the parties’ proposals
as they existed. That is, the agency did not ask the offerors to
supply new information from outside the four corners of their
proposals. See AR Tab 58 at 8685 (“[T]alk about the proposed
sequence and timing . . . pursuant to Rivada’s proposed
Integrated Master Schedule[.]”); id. at 8700 (“Based on your
proposed solution, talk about . . . . :”); id. Tab 62 at 8965
(“Please talk about your current rationale . . . .”); id. at
8968 (“[T]alk about AT&T’s proposed resource strategy . . . .”)
(all emphasis added).
Rivada also charges the agency with
allowing AT&T to revise its proposal in response to two
questions related to its proposed Band 14 coverage. See Pl.’s
Mem. at 22–23. It is apparent to the Court, however, that the
agency asked these questions to permit it to resolve an
ambiguity in AT&T’s proposal about the geographic extent of
AT&T’s proposed network. See AR Tab 62 at 8936–37 (requesting a
clarification regarding how AT&T calculated the land area that
would be covered by Band 14); id. at 8956 (noting a discrepancy
between AT&T’s Band 14 map and its description of the extent of
its Band 14 coverage). Specifically, the ESRI and MapInfo files
AT&T submitted with its proposal showed that AT&T’s Band 14
coverage would extend to [ . . . ]. See id. at 8936–38. In its
technical response, however, AT&T stated that figure at [ . . .
]. See id.
AT&T responses to the agency’s questions
explained that the discrepancy resulted from its inadvertent
failure to account in its technical response for [ . . . ] that
were included in its maps. See id.; see also id. at 8956. Rivada
contends that AT&T’s responses “reflect[ed] changes to its
proposal to add information it failed to include in its proposal
originally.” Pl.’s Mem. at 23 (emphasis omitted). But as the
Federal Circuit has observed, “[a]ny meaningful clarification .
. . . require[s] the provision of information,” and there is “no
requirement” that the information provided “not be essential for
evaluation of the proposal.” Info. Tech., 316 F.3d at 1323; see
also Office Depot, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 517,
543–44 (2010). Here, AT&T’s responses simply made clear that the
omission of the [ . . . ] from one part of its proposal caused
the internal inconsistency identified by the agency. The agency
thus did not seek a proposal revision; nor did AT&T provide one.
Finally, Rivada claims that the agency
also permitted it to revise its own proposal before establishing
the competitive range. Pl.’s Mem. at 24–25. Specifically, it
contends that the agency’s evaluators changed their initial
determinations about two aspects of Rivada’s proposal following
its oral presentation: its proposed Local Control solution and
its proposed Public Safety Entity Home Page. See id. The record
shows, however, that the information Rivada provided clarified
the intent of its original proposal, rather than revising it.
See AR Tab 56 at 2:10:13–2:11:25 (Rivada explaining during its
oral presentation that [ . . . ]); id. Tab 67 at 10113 (noting
that Rivada’s oral presentation clarified that it had proposed [
. . . ]).
Because the agency neither intended to
accept proposal revisions nor permitted the offerors to revise
their proposals, its exchanges with the offerors did not amount
to discussions. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the agency
engaged only in communications with the offerors, not
discussions. (Rivada Mercury,
LLC v. U. S. and AT&T Corp., No. 16-1559C, March 31, 2017) |