FAR CLAUSE 52.226-3 COMPLIANCE

I2 challenges the CO’s determination that RMH’s proposal was compliant with the requirement under FAR Clause 52.226-3 that the offeror “reside or primarily do business in the set-aside area.” The FAR Clause 52.226-3 locality requirement is satisfied where:

(c) An offeror is considered to be residing or primarily doing business in the set-aside area if, during the last twelve months--

(1) The offeror had its main operating office in the area; and

(2) That office generated at least half of the offeror's gross revenues and employed at least half of the offeror's permanent employees.

FAR Clause 52.226-3(c).

There is no basis in the record to question FEMA’s determination that RMH’s main operating office and principal business was in the set-aside area. As detailed above, the agency investigated this matter and found substantial information that showed that RMH resided and primarily did business in the set-aside area. None of the documents furnished by the protester demonstrates that RMH does not “reside or primarily do business in the set-aside area” as that requirement is defined above.

The protester, however, no longer asserts that the awardee is physically located outside the set-aside area, but rather asserts that the awardee does not exist as a Missouri corporation eligible to do business in the state and to receive award of the contract. Protest at 3; Comments at 1. The documents proffered by I2 include a “Business Entity Search” at the Missouri Secretary of State website that indicates that, although Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc. was in existence at least as early as 1997, it was dissolved in 2000. Protest at 2. I2 asserts, accordingly, “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc. does not exist” as it appears in pertinent documents, and is not eligible for award. Comments at 2.

We also find no merit to this argument. RMH clearly exists as a business entity; for example, RMH submitted a proposal and was registered as a fictitious name in Missouri on October 3, 2011 (as well as in 1996 and 2006). See Agency exhs. N, R. It is true, as noted by the protester, that “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc.,” the awardee indicated on the FedBizOpps award notice, and the business name listed in the CCR entry, no longer exists as an incorporated entity registered with the Missouri Secretary of State. In this regard, available state documents indicate that Riley’s Mobile Home’s, Inc. was dissolved in 2000. However, the agency correctly notes that RMH submitted its proposal as a sole proprietorship. Supp. AR at 3. In fact, RMH’s proposal, which does not reference “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc.,” is signed by “William Riley” for “Riley’s Mobil Homes.” RMH Proposal, Business Proposal, at 4. Likewise, while the relevant CCR entry lists “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc.” as the entity’s business name, it describes the entity as a “Sole Proprietorship” rather than as a “Corporate Entity,” and lists the “Mailing Name” as “William Riley.” Agency exh. N. Similarly, “RILEY'S MOBILE HOMES INC” is listed as a “sole proprietorship,” with the indication “William Riley, Owner,” and not as a “Corporate entity,” in its Online Representations and Certifications Application (ORCA).

In sum, notwithstanding the reference in the award notice to “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc.,” we accept the agency’s explanation that it treated “Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc.” as a fictitious business name for the sole proprietorship to which it made award. Supp. AR, Apr. 24, 2012, at 3. In any case, we have held that the name of an offeror need not be exactly the same in all of the offer documents when information readily available to the agency reasonably establishes that the differently-identified entities are in fact the same concern. Trandes Corp., B-271662, Aug. 2, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 57 at 2. Here, there is no reasonable concern that the Riley’s Mobile Homes that submitted a proposal is an entity different from the Riley’s Mobile Homes, Inc. listed in the award notice.  (Intelligent Investments, Inc., B-406347,B-406347.2, Apr 27, 2012)  (pdf)