We are now at the point
where we have the proper type of negotiator fully prepared to sit down at
the table, look his counterparts across the table in the eye and go to
work. He has his team beside him and the signals are his to call.
At this point the negotiator should be aware that the
proper conduct of the actual negotiations requires that he do certain
things and not do certain other things.
A—THINGS TO DO
(a) THE NEGOTIATOR MUST KEEP CLEARLY IN MIND AT ALL
TIMES THE OVERALL OBJECTIVES OF THE NEGOTIATION.
He must never for a moment lose sight of these overall
objectives, no matter what individual point is being discussed at a given
time. He must realize that the overall objective can only be achieved by
fitting together decisions reached on many different points and like a
jig-saw puzzle, these separate decisions must later fit into place to
round out the agreement.
As quarterback, the negotiator must guide the team in both
substance and procedure and he must constantly be aware of how much
negotiating latitude he has left on each individual point, as well as the
cumulative latitude remaining.
(b) THE NEGOTIATOR WILL FIRST ATTEMPT TO SELL THE
OTHER SIDE THE PLAN OR PROCEDURE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
THAT HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN WORKED OUT.
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Additionally, he will try to set up a schedule of
sessions, reach general agreement on a target date for conclusion and also
carry out his previously made plans to assure that all present fully
understand the objectives, general scope, etc., of the negotiations. The
reader may wonder why I continue to stress this point of making sure that
the other side does fully understand the scope of the negotiations. The
reader may wonder why I continue to stress this point of making sure that
the other side does fully understand the scope of the negotiations. I do
so because you would be surprised how many times the other side
will—especially if they are unhappy about the way things are going—try to
say that they have been misled, that they never really understood what the
objective was, and in general will attempt to make it appear as though you
are taking advantage of them.
I once made this mistake in negotiating with a foreign
country and it took two months to get the talks back on the track.
Unlike government contract negotiations, where it is not
unusual to find a corporation president negotiating with a GS-12
government negotiator, in negotiations between the United States and
foreign countries—whether bi-lateral or multilateral—the foreign countries
will have a negotiator of equivalent rank as the United States
negotiator. Thus, if a Second or Third Secretary represents the United
States, so will a like Secretary show up to represent the other country or
countries.
This is precisely what happened in the country where I
made my mistake. Although the negotiations had a top priority and I was
the negotiator, our status was downgraded by the Ambassador sending a
Secretary to represent him. The important people in the foreign country
who had to approve the agreement, such as the Minister of Finance,
Minister of Defense, etc., stayed away from the meeting because no one of
comparable position from our side thought it important enough to attend
and discuss basic objectives, etc.
I had tried to get our ranking military man in the area
and an important Ambassador to sit in on the first meeting but the local
Embassy thought this unnecessary. Later in the negotiations, our
counterparts stalled on basic issues and told us their superiors did not
understand what we were trying to accomplish. We almost literally had to
start over and have the military man spell out to their high
34
officials our objectives, intentions, etc., which he
should have done at the first meeting two months earlier.
This taught me a lesson I never forget, namely, be sure to
take all the time necessary and insist upon having those present when
negotiations are started and insist upon having those present when
negotiations are started to insure that all who need to get the word,
actually do get it.
(c) DETERMINE THE AUTHORITY OF YOUR OPPOSITE NUMBERS.
If you find that you have more authority than the other
side, your plan of presentation may need alteration.
Remember, if you are at the table ready, willing and able
to negotiate—not just discuss or consult—you will be most unwise to assume
the other side has similar authority. Never go through your points and
positions, even superficially, and then find out they really had no
authority to actually negotiate at all.
In instances where I learned at the outset that the other
side came only to talk and get information, I have found it very effective
to simply close the meeting and tell the other side we would resume when
they come prepared to negotiate. Here again should be pointed out
the great difference between discussions, conferences, etc., and
negotiations.
The best way to find this out is to be straightforward and
ask—there is no use being coy about it. You must find out if you are
dealing only with those people across the table or with other people not
at the table. I always have made it a point to question the other
side, on their authority to negotiate rather than merely discuss.
You obviously must be very careful how fast you tip your
hand in a genuine negotiation and you certainly do not want to be foolish
enough to tip it to persons who are only present to relay and report what
you say. When you find that you are being second guessed by persons
not at the table and with whom you cannot negotiate in person, you must—if
you choose to continue—make allowance in your presentation for the
influence these 'back home' negotiators will have on the outcome. If
you are not at the table with no authority to
35
make decisions yourself, you
should be realistic enough to expect the other side to likewise take into
account your own phantom negotiators.
(d) IF THE NEGOTIATION IS
WITH FOREIGN INDIVIDUALS OR COUNTRIES, ALWAYS TRY TO SEND YOUR NOTES,
POSITION PAPERS, DRAFT AGREEMENTS, ETC., TO THEM IN BOTH ENGLISH AND
THEIR OWN LANGUAGE.
Not only do you greatly
accelerate the progress of the negotiation by so doing, but in no other
way can you be assured that the other side understands precisely what you
want them to understand. Many of our words translate into different
meanings in other languages and misunderstandings can be avoided in this
manner.
Ideally, this should work both ways.
When I was negotiating abroad it was the practice of our Embassies to only
send notes, etc., to their counterparts in English. Naturally the
countries reciprocated and sent their messages to us in their own
language. In one large country, when a reply we had been waiting for was
received in the local language, I immediately asked that it be translated
by the official Embassy translator but was told that there was no such
person. (This was also the case in other countries.) I then asked for a
translation that we could rely upon as accurate, so the First Secretary
translated the message. One of my assistants knew the local language and
he said the translation was not accurate. So the Minister took a turn at
it and he came up with still different meanings, so around we went with no
official translation possible.
One of our very able military men in another country always followed the
practice of sending his messages to his counterparts in both languages and
he had outstanding success in his dealings with the foreign country
involved.
A related point is, always have at the negotiating table at least one
person who is conversant enough with the foreign language to understand
reactions and what the other side are saying to each
36
other concerning points under discussion. These reactions, if known, can
be most helpful.
Even though you have a capable interpreter at the table, it is suggested
that you determine at the outset how many members on the opposing team
speak or understand English. The best way to so ascertain is to ask them.
If you know that they understand what you are saying in English, you may
save the interpreter’s time and be better able to judge reactions. I have
found that foreign negotiating teams will withhold their knowledge of
English and prefer to wait for the translation, even though they
understood exactly what you said in English.
I recall asking the foreign negotiating team in one country how many
understood English and not one person said a word. After suitable evidence
of disbelief, I renewed the question and asked for a show of hands. Very
reluctantly,almost every hand at the table went up and I knew where I
stood on the language question in that country. The request was a
reasonable one, so I pressed it—if I had taken the first answer they would
have known I was not a skeptic—or a good negotiator.
(e) PROCEED TO NEGOTIATE
YOUR VARIOUS POINTS IN SUCH A WAY THAT ANY CONCESSION YOU MAKE ON YOUR
FLEXIBLE OR ‘GIVE’ POINTS WILL BRING YOU CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON YOUR
LESS FLEXIBLE OR ‘MUST’ POINTS.
Exactly in what order you
table your various points and positions will depend a great deal upon the
sagacity and ability of those across the table from you. Your initial get
acquainted session or sessions may help you decide this question. You may,
for example, find your counterparts entirely receptive to the general
objectives and principles you have outlined, in which event you might take
a calculated risk and give them a complete draft agreement to study.
If, on the other hand, it is clear to you from these preliminary sessions,
that you are in for a hard nose negotiation, you have some real planning
to do.
37
Basically, what you must
avoid, is negotiating all your ‘give’ points and then find yourself left
with only ‘must’ points containing little or no flexibility. A proper
tying together of your ‘must’ and ‘give’ points could prevent this from
happening.
Let us assume you had ten points to negotiate. If the other side did not
object, you might find it advantageous to try and take up one points at a
time and reach agreement on that point before proceeding to the others.
In this way, you may avoid indicating your maximum and minimum positions
on all ten points and you could conserve your overall flexibility
reservoir. Additionally, you could shift positions to your advantage on
remaining points if this piecemeal approach were used.
Another method is to go over all of your ten points rather superficially,
stopping after each one to ask the other side of they agree. Many
untrained individuals who attempt to negotiate, and who desire to be well
liked, will nod their assent to points as they are brought up, without
getting anything in return for their agreement.
If, however, your opposition has ten points they are seeking, you must
never indicate in any way how you feel on any one point until or unless
all ten points and positions are on the table. You must afford yourself
the opportunity to relate all ten positions to each other and to the
overall objective before making any comment or commitment. Moreover, this
procedure keeps inviolate a cardinal rule of negotiating that one should
never grant any concession, no matter how small, without attempting to get
something in return.
Obviously, we are still talking about a pure negotiation as distinguished
from the kind of negotiation where a negotiator asks for and receives a
contractor’s detailed bid or proposal to do a job and then has an
abundance of time to study, analyze and possibly take exception to the
written proposal.
(f) TRY TO OBTAIN AND
MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE.
This is a great deal like a
pitcher in a baseball game who always tries not to get behind the batter
on balls and strikes. When he gets three balls and no strikes on a batter,
he is on the defensive and so
38
will a negotiator be unless he
obtains the initiative and keeps it.
Even with sound positions and logical reasons why they should be agreed
to, a good negotiator will need other assets at the table to maintain the
initiative and reach his objective. Keep in mind, we now have human
beings trying to outthink and outmaneuver other human beings and two of
the very finest tools a negotiator can use at the table to obtain his
points, are psychology and a good sense of humor. Both can be used
effectively to provide a much needed “change of pace” during the
negotiations, which technique will frequently keep the other side ‘off
balance’.
Normally, a man devoid of a sense of humor is somewhat unattractive, but
such a man is more of a liability than an asset when found conducting a
negotiation. A good negotiator knows that he can take his mission and
objective with deadly seriousness without taking himself too seriously.
Thus, a good negotiator knows that at the table there is a time and place
during the negotiations for all manner and degrees of normal human behavior,
ranging from extreme courtesy, and a ‘kill ‘em with kindness attitude’ on
the one hand, to firm threats to call off the negotiations on the other.
In between these extremes must be jokes and a sense of humor displayed to
lighten the climate when it becomes too tense. It should be clearly
understood that what we are now talking about is tactics, not ethics.
During the negotiations you will also have the right psychological
opportunity to make use of the information on the other side that your
previous research has developed, and it should be always used to maximum
advantage to help keep the other side off balance. This can include
embarrassment of the other side if necessary to score.
Well I recall conducting negotiations with tough old shipbuilders who
would come to the table and commence the negotiation by calling everyone
on our side connected with the negotiations, everything under the sun. If
we got angry, this made them happy. If I answered them in like manner
using choicer invectives, they would smile, settle down, and get on with
the negotiation.
I have been told by a highly respected man who used to be a trouble
shooter for President Roosevelt during World War II, that
39
he learned by experience
whenever he had to negotiate with Sir Winston Churchill, the only way he
could ever come close to getting anything he wanted was to deliberately
set out to make Sir Winston angry. If this tactic was not employed,
the famous Churchillian spell enveloped my friend and the success of his
mission was jeopardized.
Even though one does not agree
with his beliefs, it is interesting to know the negotiation techniques of
China's Premier Chou En-Lai about whom hte following has been written:
CHOU'S CHARM CAN BE TURNED OFF
AS BY FAUCET . . .
Much of his career has been a
series of long-drawn-out negotiations, between Communist factions in China, with the Russians at Moscow, and with General Marshall. In the
course of these he was always imperturbable, almost never impatient.
Perhaps significantly, his villa for the Geneva meeting was leased for six
months.
The Chinese spokesman also can
be an actor, to suit his mood or purposes. If the tactic of the
moment is to be bellicose, he can be icy, harsh, unyielding, indignant.
If tactics are to be more friendly, then Chou sparkles. He is
lively, witty, laughs, tells anecdotes, becomes a charmingly agreeable
companion. But the charm can be turned off, as though by a faucet.
To keep the initiative,
remember that you are at the table with a kit of many negotiating tools
and you should use the right tool at the right time.
A thorough knowledge of your
opponents' background, record of performance, etc., may just enable you to
find the key to the success of your negotiation.
(g) HAVE A MEMBER
OF THE TEAM PREPARE MEMORANDA AFTER EACH NEGOTIATING SESSION OF EXACTLY
WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE SESSION.
Obviously, it is essential to
have for the record, accurate minutes of each contact with your opposite
members. You cannot possibly remember all that transpired during the
course of negotiations, and you must keep adequate records. Even if
you are at the table with
40
complete authority to complete
a contract or agreement, you still must have someone do this.
If you are at the negotiating
table with a foreign country on behalf of the United States, you will
always be under the general supervision of the Ambassador to that
country, even though you may have the technical responsibility for the
conduct of the negotiations. This will undoubtedly mean that at
least progress reports will have to be sent periodically to Washington and
if the entire negotiation is ad referendum and you have no authority to
decide anything, then regular and detailed reports must be made requesting
further advice.
It is very essential that you
as the negotiator attempt to persuade the United States Ambassador or his
staff to permit you to draft the messages reporting on the negotiations
you are conducting. As the negotiator you should have the complete
feel of the negotiations better than any Embassy staff person who has been
assigned to sit with you at the table and thus your account of what is
being done is what Washington should receive.
Unfortunately, this is easier
said than done. In one country where I was the negotiator for the
United States at the table, I did request and received permission to draw
up the first drafts of what I thought should be reported. The First
Secretary, who had been assigned to sit with us, would review these first
drafts and much to my surprise would delete portions which I considered
substantive. I naturally remonstrated with this Secretary and asked
him how the Department in Washington would ever know what actually was
going on in the negotiations, unless we told them in those reports.
To my utter amazement, this
Secretary told me that he was writing private letters to his friend on the
country desk in the Department and that he would cover the deleted
portions of the reports in these letters. I asked him if I could see
these letters to his friend and the answer was negative.
Whether the proper officials
in Washington ever did learn what they should have officially known, I
will never know, but I do know they never got this information through the
official Embassy messages that I saw go out.
41
I think this experience is
sufficient to get home my point that the negotiator attempt to draft the
messages reporting on the negotiations he is conducting.
B—THINGS NOT TO DO
(a) THE MOST
IMPORTANT NOT TO DO IS DISCUSS OR REVEAL YOUR NEGOTIATING POINTS AND
POSITIONS TO ANYONE OUTSIDE OF THOSE WHO ABSOLUTELY NEED TO KNOW THEM.
To the extent that you permit
your negotiating positions to become known, you have weakened your case
and helped the other side.
This principle requires
renewed emphasis today. In a negotiation involving a contract,
either on behalf of industry or the government, anyone who would reveal
ultimate positions, areas and degrees of flexibility, etc., to the other
side would be fired. Such a thing is simply unthinkable and
everyone—including the press and the public—knows it and have learned not
to expect such information.
Similarly, when a
Congressional committee or a joint Conference committee is in Executive
Session negotiating differences, no one expects either side to give out
their detailed positions and negotiable concessions. Here again, the
public and the press know this information is not available and they do
not expect to get it.
In the field of foreign
affairs, where international negotiations are highly sensitive, the exact
same rules should apply. We have a President charged with the
responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, and we should rely
upon him to tell us and the world what we should know, when he thinks we
should know it.
For some strange reason,
however, segments of the press and certain columnists seem to feel that no
matter how highly classified the subject matter of an international
negotiation may be, they have a right to know and print exactly what our
negotiating positions are, how far we will go, what, if any, our fallback
positions are and in short, every bit of information that should be kept
top secret until and even during the negotiations.
Why we in the United States
should keep our government contract negotiations and our legislative
executive sessions secret, and then
42
be expected to tell the world
what our negotiating positions are on the most sensitive foreign relations
issues that could be the cause of another war, is beyond comprehension.
No other country in the world
indulges the practice of divulging their important international
negotiating positions and neither should we. Obviously, there are
such things as trial balloons or planted leaks, to test reactions, but
these are done by design, not just because a reporter or columnist wants
to write a story.
Last October, Prime Minister
MacMillan was debating on the floor of the House of Commons the German
question, and when asked by a member of the opposition for "a definite
statement of the plans, policies and proposals for a negotiated settlement
which the Government would put forward," Mr. MacMillan stated, "I can
imagine nothing so foolish as to do that at this moment."
The time may come during the
negotiations when you are convinced the essential elements of good faith
and/or flexibility are missing, at which time, in order to make the record
clear, you should give out your positions and why the negotiation has
reached an impasse, but a public discussion of your positions prematurely
cannot possible serve a useful purpose.
Thus, I would always instruct
everyone on the team and all others in the know, to never discuss the
negotiations or points connected therewith with anyone at any
time—particularly at parties given by the other side—unless by design you
are 'planting a seed'.
I made the mistake on one
occasion of briefing our own Embassy staff in a country on just what my
points were in connection with a negotiation I was conducting, with the
maximum and minimum positions on each one. The very next day at the
table the other side insisted upon all my minimum positions, which it was
apparent to me they knew.
(b) NEVER MAKE
CONCESSIONS TO YOUR OPPOSITION WITHOUT GETTING SOMETHING IN RETURN.
ALWAYS TIE YOUR CONCESSIONS TO SOMETHING YOU WANT.
A negotiator always knows—or
should know—how much latitude
43
he has on each point, and what
his cumulative negotiating latitude amounts to. He must not permit
this reservoir to be tapped or depleted without getting something in
return. This rule should apply to even the most insignificant
appearing point the other side seeks.
(c) DO NOT TRY
TO DRIVE TOO HARD A BARGAIN
This is sometimes a great
temptation for a negotiator, but whether he is negotiating in private
industry, or on behalf of the government with foreign countries or
government contractors, he should try and avoid making this mistake.
The only qualification to this rule is that if a person is negotiating on
behalf of the United States and he errs, he should err on the side of the
United States.
Unfortunately, experience has
shown me that it is not always possible to obtain a contract or an
agreement that you are proud of an one that can be termed completely fair
and reasonable to both sides. As we have already seen, a good
negotiator will always start his negotiation on each point by asking for
more than he actually will accept. Only a very naive man would start
by asking for all his rock bottom terms.
What sometimes happens is that
the other side will accept and settle on the first position you have
tabled, leaving you sitting there knowing you could and would have settled
for less. When this has happened to me, I immediately suspect that I
have made a mistake in my home work, but this is not necessarily the case.
The way to rationalize this
sort of situation is to recall that before coming to the table you should
have tested all points and positions—maximums and minimums—to see if they
were fair and reasonable to both sides. Having done this you
should not feel too sorry for the other side, especially if United States
taxpayers' money is involved. You have not taken advantage of your
friends across the table if your previous testing was proper.
In addition to not permitting
an unfair agreement to be made, you can never allow a mistake to be
accepted by the other side and finalized in a contract or agreement.
If you negotiate a knowingly unfair contract or agreement or one
containing mistakes and walk away from the table leaving the consequences
to be faced by others,
44
you have done a very poor job indeed.
All that you have done is leave latent discontent, hard feelings and
disputes behind, and as the negotiator you will never live it down.
(d) DO NOT TRY TO INGRATIATE
YOURSELF TO THE OTHER SIDE OR BECOME WELL LIKED AND POPULAR DURING THE
NEGOTIATION.
We have touched on this point when
considering who should negotiate but it is so important that it will bear
reiteration. Negotiation is a business, not a sport or pastime and
as previously stated, I am convinced that as a negotiator's popularity
index goes up with those with whom he is negotiating, his effectiveness
goes down.
Genuine respect and friendly relations are
all that a good negotiator should cultivate. If you have these, you
need have no fear concerning your future relationship with your friends
across the table. If you try to become well liked by the other side,
you probably will end up without even their respect as a negotiator.
(e) NEVER PERMIT MORE THAN
ONE PERSON ON YOUR TEAM TALK AT ONE TIME ON A POINT.
You must make full use of all your team
members, but if you want them to talk you should call on them. As
stated previously, the team approach to a negotiation can only achieve
maximum results if strict discipline is maintained by the head of the
team, the negotiator.
I have been at the negotiating table
attempting to develop a point in a methodical, painstaking manner, and had
a team member speak up and cut the ground out from under my approach.
This must not be permitted to happen. Members can send notes to the
team captain if something is omitted or needs clarification, and, if
necessary in extreme cases, they can suggest brief intermission or
recess in order to confer. Even this type of activity, however,
should be kept to a minimum because too much of it may indicate to the
opposition that something just mentioned may be a vulnerable area.
(f) NEVER ARGUE OR DISAGREE
AMONG YOURSELVES AT THE TABLE.
45
It is possible that as a diversionary
tactic you may wish to deliberately put on an act at the table, but as
with all such tactics, it must be well planned and executed, or it can
backfire.
(g) NEVER DISCUS THE TERMS OF
ONE BILATERAL CONTRACT OR AGREEMENT WITH ANOTHER CONTRACTOR OR COUNTRY.
If the negotiation is multilateral, this
rule may not be applicable, but you should realize that countries or
contractors will always try and ascertain the most favorable terms you may
have previously negotiated, so they can get at least equal treatment.
Basically, every bilateral negotiation must
stand on its own feet, except for such things as clauses required by law.,
etc. You will be asked the direct question regarding other
negotiations and their outcome and the best way to answer the question is
by stating categorically that you will not discuss other agreements or
contracts.
(h) NEVER BLUFF ON A POINT
UNLESS YOU ARE PREPARED TO HAVE YOUR BLUFF CALLED.
A good negotiator, like a good poker
player, has a sixth sense or a feel for bluffing but if he once gets caught in
a bluff, his future effectiveness is impaired.
An integral part of this no-bluff rule, is,
if and when you make a mistake—and the negotiator will never be born who
will not make some—the likelihood is your opponents know it and you would
be well advised to admit your mistake.
I have found it best, after a mistake, to
frankly admit it, correct it and move ahead, rather than try to be
devious and explain it away in some specious manner. My basic
philosophy on this point is that the average man admires and respects
another man who can say, "Sorry, I'm wrong."
(i) NEVER TRY TO KNOW ALL THE
ANSWERS YOURSELF.
Some negotiators feel their position
requires them to have all the answers. Remember, you have a capable
team sitting with you and you should utilize their services.
Moreover, when a question is asked
46
and you do not know the answer, admit you
do not, but say that you will get the necessary information. Here
again is a situation where you can gain genuine respect by candidly
admitting you do not know the answer.
For some strange reason, many men,
especially those in my own profession, are incapable of admitting they do
not know an answer and will always try to improvise some sort of answer.
(j) NEVER GO INTO A METING
UNPREPARED.
A very important element of this rule
involves the situation where you are in a session discussing points on the
agenda for which you were prepared and you conclude these points earlier
than expected. Sometimes the other side will suggest continuing the
session to discuss other points which you are not prepared to discuss.
Do not allow yourself to be talked or
trapped into proceeding on unprepared points. Adjourn the meeting
until you are fully prepared.
There is no substitute for hard and
thorough home work in preparation for a negotiation. I have had
negotiators from foreign countries tell me that we in this country have a
reputation of doing our preparation for a negotiation on the plane enroute.
Additionally, I have seen negotiations where a foreign country's
negotiators came with packing cases of prepared data, while the Americans
went with briefcases.
Obviously, weight of documents is not a
sound criteria for judging preparation, but it is an indication.
Negotiations, like anything else, require many hours of time and
preparation to back up one hour of actual time at the table.
(k) NEVER PERMIT YOURSELF TO
GET SMUG AND FEEL THAT YOU HAVE A POINT, A CONTRACT OR AN AGREEMENT IN
THE BAG.
The only time you can relax and enjoy a
letdown, is when the contract or agreement is signed, and not before.
(l) NEVER BE SURPRISED TO FIND
THAT YOUR OPPONENTS ARE GOING OVER YOUR HEAD TO SOMEONE ELSE IN AN ATTEMPT
TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATION.
47
This may upset you the first
time you learn of its being done, but do not let it bother you because it
is all part of negotiating—and you may have to do it yourself some day.
(m) NEVER TREAT
OR TALK TO PERSONS ACROSS THE TABLE AS THOUGH THEY WERE INFERIOR.
I have seen both civilian and
military negotiators conduct themselves in dealings with former occupied
country representatives in a manner which gave a clear impression of
superiority and even arrogance. This sort of treatment is not
conducive to long range amicable relationships and must be avoided.
In the international field, I
believe there is a basic humility which must attach to any negotiator who
is representing the United States in foreign negotiations. I use the
word "humility" advisedly because it seems to me to describe a
characteristic that must be present when dealing with foreign countries on
behalf of our country. Do not infer, when I stress fairness and
humility in foreign negotiations that these are intended as substitutes or
alternatives to being businesslike, firm, and making the very best
possible agreement on behalf of the United States. Remember
this, most of the countries you may deal with have centuries of history
and negotiating experience behind them. Foreign countries have
great national pride, an understandable sensitivity concerning their
sovereignty, and a great body of custom and usage that has been built up
through the centuries. All of these factors must be understood,
respected, and considered in any negotiation, but they need not
minimize nor alter a sound, common sense, businesslike approach to any
question under negotiation. Such an approach will, I assure you,
gain a healthy respect from them if handled with humility and
understanding.
(n) ANALYZE AND
UNDERSTAND THE TYPE OF PERSON WITH WHOM YOU ARE DEALING.
The negotiator must realize
that it is rarely possible to treat any two men in precisely the same
manner. Thus, a good negotiator will always do his utmost to understand
the type of individual across the table from him and vary approach and
treatment accordingly.
48
