The protester argues that the awardee’s product does not
meet the technical requirements of the solicitations and
the awardee should therefore be ineligible for award.
Protest B-415897 at 2-3. Specifically, the protester
argues in the alternative that: (1) “effectiveness” in the
medical context has a recognized meaning, and the reports
from peer-reviewed studies provided by the awardee do not
indicate that the awardee’s product is effective in this
technical sense; and (2) even using the ordinary sense of
the word “effectiveness,” the peer-reviewed studies
provided by the awardee do not actually support the
effectiveness of the awardee’s product. Id.
First, the protester argues that the medical community
distinguishes between “efficacy” and “effectiveness” of
products, where “efficacy” describes the ability of a
product to produce the expected result under ideal or
laboratory conditions, while “effectiveness” instead
refers to the ability of a product to produce an effect in
“real world” clinical settings. Id. The awardee’s
peer-reviewed studies, the protester argues, only show, at
best, results in a laboratory setting (i.e. the efficacy
of the product), but do not show the effectiveness of the
awardee’s product as required by the solicitation. Id.
Additionally, the protester contends that it was
unreasonable for the agency to rely on a definition of the
term other than the industry standard meaning, and argues
that our Office has come to the same conclusion in our
prior cases. Protester’s Comments at 2 (citing Nautica
Int’l, Inc., B‑254428, Dec. 15, 1993, 93-2 CPD ¶ 321).
Furthermore, the protester argues that, even if a lay
definition of effectiveness is used, the peer-reviewed
journal article provided by the awardee does not support
the effectiveness of its product because, among other
things: (1) the study did not separate data reported for
the two UV disinfection systems tested; (2) the tested UV
disinfection systems struggled to fully disinfect large
concentrations of organisms in protein suspensions; and
(3) the reported results do not show a statistically
significant effect in reducing CD, one of the pathogens
for which the solicitation required proof of
effectiveness. Id. at 3-5.
The agency replies that it applied a reasonable,
common-sense definition of the term “effectiveness,” which
was not otherwise defined in the solicitations. MOL at 6.
Further, the agency contends that the study in question
showed that the use of the awardee’s product reduced the
number of CD, MRSA, and VRE organisms. Id. The agency
additionally argues that the study Steriliz provided
showed effectiveness even in the technical sense advanced
by the protester, and that the studies relied on by the
protester do not use the terms efficacy and effectiveness
in a manner consistent with the protester’s suggested
definition. Id. at 7-8
An agency’s technical evaluation is primarily a matter
within the contracting agency’s discretion, since the
agency is responsible for defining its needs and the best
method of accommodating them. Computer Sciences Corp.,
B-409386.2, B-409386.3, Jan. 8, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 34 at
3-4; Highmark Medicare Servs., Inc., et al., B-401062.5 et
al., Oct. 29, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 285 at 12. Where there is
some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of a term used
in stating the solicitation’s requirements, the
application by agency evaluators of a common sense
definition, based upon the agency’s general needs as
reflected in the solicitation, is reasonable. See Dennis
Marceron, B-270253, Feb. 21, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 107 at 2-3;
Anadigicom Corp., B-235349, Aug. 18, 1989, 89‑2 CPD ¶ 151
at 3.
In this case, the agency’s application of the ordinary
meaning of “effectiveness” is unobjectionable. In the
absence of a definition in the solicitations, the agency’s
view that a product is effective when it reduces the
numbers of CD, MRSA, and VRE organisms is reasonable. The
instant case is clearly distinguishable from our cases
concluding that the agency must use an industry-standard
definition of a term, primarily because, as the protester
concedes, the term “effectiveness” is not uniformly
defined even within the specialist community. Compare
Nautica Int’l, Inc., supra at 2-3 (concluding agency erred
when deviating from a generally understood, standard
definition of “boat length,” embodied in Coast Guard
regulations and endorsed by National Marine Manufacturers’
Association) with Anadigicom Corp., supra at 3 (concluding
agency was reasonable in applying a common sense
definition of a “standard” telephone handset where there
was no accepted industry standard definition of the term).
The protester has provided no authority which would compel
the use of its proposed definition, and has not
demonstrated that the agency’s reading of the term is
unreasonable or inconsistent with the solicitations. See
Stinger Ghaffarian Techs., Inc., B‑411041.2 et al., Apr.
29, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 266.
The protester’s collateral argument that, even taking an
ordinary reading of the term “effectiveness,” the provided
peer-reviewed study does not actually support the
effectiveness of the protester’s product is similarly
without merit. The study provided by the awardee indicates
that it evaluated two UV disinfection systems (including
the awardee’s UV disinfection device) for “effectiveness
in reducing” MRSA, VRA, and CD. AR, Tab 7 at 45. The study
concluded that the UVC-emitting machines it evaluated
“effectively reduce patient room contamination with MRSA,
VRE, and CD over and above manual cleaning when used
sequentially.” Id. at 48-49.
Here, the solicitations indicated that effectiveness would
be assessed through review of studies in peer-reviewed
journals. RFQ VA250-17-Q-0746 at 5; Amendments to RFQ
VA250-17-Q-0774 at 4. Accordingly, the agency believed
that it could reasonably rely on the conclusions of
published peer-reviewed studies in making procurement
decisions, and the agency’s technical reviewers, who
possessed significant medical expertise, exercised their
medical judgment in choosing to rely on the study Steriliz
provided. While the agency’s reliance appears
reasonable--the peer-reviewed study concluded that the
Steriliz system was effective in reducing CD, MRSA, and
VRE organisms--as we have previously explained, it is not
the role of our Office to question an agency’s medical
judgment, and we decline to do so here. See
GlaxoSmithKline, B‑291822, Apr. 7, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 77 at
4-5 (concluding that, among other things, an agency’s
methods for evaluating medical information and the
significance given by the agency to medical information
involve the agency’s medical judgment and policies, which
are inappropriate for review under our bid protest
function); Knit-Rite, Inc., B‑293088.3. Aug. 5, 2004, 2004
CPD ¶ 159 (concluding that where an evaluation is based on
medical judgments of evaluators with substantial expertise
in the field, our Office will not question such medical
judgments in the absence of a showing that the evaluation
was unfairly administered). (Xenex
Disinfection Services, LLC B-415897, B-415898: Apr 17,
2018)
Our Office has explained that offerors are obligated to
advise agencies of material changes in proposed key
staffing, even after submission of proposals. General
Revenue Corp., et al., B-414220.2 et al., March 27, 2017,
2017 CPD ¶ 106 at 22. Additionally, when a solicitation
(such as this one) requires resumes for key personnel, the
resumes form a material requirement of the solicitation.
Pioneering Evolution, LLC, B-412016, B-412016.2, Dec. 8,
2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 385 at 8. When the agency is notified of
the withdrawal of a key person, it has two options: either
evaluate the proposal as submitted, where the proposal
would be rejected as technically unacceptable for failing
to meet a material requirement, or open discussions to
permit the offeror to amend its proposal. General Revenue
Corp., supra. According to the agency, however, the
language in the RFP afforded it a third option in this
case. We disagree.
Specifically, the agency argues that the terms of the
instant RFP permitted offerors to substitute key
personnel, including the center director, at any time. The
agency further maintains that allowing offerors to do so
does not constitute discussions. DOL argues that this
situation differs from prior situations considered by our
Office because the RFP for this procurement contained an
explicit requirement that offerors notify the agency if
any of their proposed key personnel become unavailable.
The agency's argument is based on the following language:
Offerors must notify the [c]ontracting
[o]fficer in writing of any change in the availability
of proposed key personnel when the change in status
occurs, at any point in the procurement process.
RFP at 88. The agency contends that
the notification requirement contains an implicit
requirement for offerors to substitute key personnel when
making their notification. Supp. AR at 9. Specifically,
the agency explains:
When a proposed person becomes
unavailable, the offeror must notify the [a]gency. But
the obligation does not end there. For the notice to
have any meaning, the offeror must also offer up a
substitute person for that position. That person will
then be evaluated for suitability against the RFP's
requirements for that position, even if it is late in
the procurement.
Supp. AR at 8. Thus, according to the
agency, it did not conduct improper discussions, but
simply allowed MTC to make a late key personnel
substitution as permitted by the RFP. Supp. AR at 8.
In response, YWCA argues that the plain language of the
requirement does not support DOL's interpretation because
it is silent with regard to the submission of a proposal
revision substituting a new key person for one that has
become unavailable. Supp. Comments at 5. YWCA also
contends that DOL's interpretation would create a conflict
between the key personnel notification provision and the
provision dealing with late modifications because the late
modifications provision does not contain an exception for
the type of proposal modifications necessary to propose
new key personnel after the time specified for the receipt
of offers. Supp. Comments at 5. We agree.
Where a dispute exists as to a
solicitation's actual requirements, we will first examine
the plain language of the solicitation. Intelsat General
Corporation, B-412097, B-412097.2, Dec. 23, 2015, 2016 CPD
¶ 30 at 8. Where a protester and an agency disagree over
the meaning of solicitation language, we will resolve the
matter by reading the solicitation as a whole and in a
manner that gives effect to all of its provisions; to be
reasonable, and therefore valid, an interpretation must be
consistent with the solicitation when read as a whole and
in a reasonable manner. Id.
The plain language at issue here, on its face, creates
nothing more than an obligation for an offeror to provide
notification if proposed key personnel become unavailable.
Moreover, if we were to adopt DOL's interpretation of the
notification provision, the notification requirement would
be in conflict with the provision prohibiting late
modifications, which does not include an exception for the
receipt of late modifications when a key person becomes
unavailable. See RFP at 96-97. In sum, we do not find the
agency's interpretation to be reasonable, and we conclude
that the notification requirement in the solicitation did
not implicitly grant special permission for offerors to
make late modifications regarding key personnel.
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
solicitation could reasonably be read to permit offerors
to make late substitutions of key personnel, the agency's
decision to allow MTC to submit a late modification to its
proposal would still have been tantamount to the conduct
of discussions. Submission of key personnel resumes after
receipt of final proposals constitutes discussions, not
clarifications, because without the resumes, the proposal
would omit material information required by the RFP.
Pioneering Evolution, LLC, supra. When an agency conducts
discussions with one offeror, it must conduct discussions
with all offerors in the competitive range. SRA Int'l,
Inc., supra. at 5. Here, we find the agency's conduct of
discussions with only one offeror constituted unequal and
therefore improper discussions. (YWCA
of Greater Los Angeles B-414596, B-414596.2,
B-414596.3: Jul 24, 2017)
Glock contends that the Army was obligated to award at
least two base contracts, and was similarly required to
complete the section H testing, prior to selecting a
single awardee. Glock Comments at 1-11. In contrast, the
agency argues that the section M provision allowing award
of “up to three” base contracts permitted an award of a
single contract at that stage, and that it has the
discretion to not conduct the section H testing,
evaluation, and final selection. MOL/COSF at 16-17.
Where a protester and agency disagree over the meaning of
solicitation language, we will resolve the matter by
reading the solicitation as a whole and in a manner that
gives effect to all of its provisions; to be reasonable,
and therefore valid, an interpretation must be consistent
with the solicitation when read as a whole and in a
reasonable manner. Intelsat Gen. Corp., B-412097,
B-412097.2, Dec. 23, 2015, 2016 CPD ¶ 30 at 8; C & S
Corp., B-411725, Oct. 7, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 311 at 3;
Alliance Tech. Servs., Inc., B-410307, B-410307.3, Dec. 1,
2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 345 at 3. Where a dispute exists as to a
solicitation’s actual requirements, we will first examine
the plain language of the solicitation. Intelsat, supra;
Point Blank Enters., Inc., B-411839, B-411839.2, Nov. 4,
2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 345 at 3.
Section M allows the Army to “make up to three (3) base
awards.” RFP at 387. Those “base awards” are limited,
however, to the purchase of “the Weapons System Component
Package requirements in accordance with CLIN [0]001 of the
base contract and Statement of Work [SoW] C.3.1 . . . .”
Id.; id. at 296, ¶ H.3.1. After receiving a base contract
award, offerors (now contractors) may downwardly adjust
their prices and update their proposed license rights. Id.
at 295, ¶¶ H.1.1.1, H.1.1.4. Evaluated prices will consist
of all CLINs except CLINs 0001 and 0002, which were
previously ordered. Id. at 295. Next, “[t]he Government
will then make a final down-selection to a single
contractor by following the evaluation procedures
contained in section H of this RFP.” Id. at 2.
The agency relies on the section M term permitting “up to
three (3) base awards” in order to justify the award of a
single base contract. MOL/COSF 16-17. The protester
contends that awarding fewer than two base contracts is
inconsistent with sections H and M, which, it alleges,
clearly anticipate further evaluation prior to the
selection of a single contractor for MHS production. Glock
Comments, Apr. 10, 2017, at 7. We think that the most
reasonable interpretation of the solicitation is that the
Army is permitted to award only one base contract.
Although section M expressed the agency’s plan to award
one, two or three contracts, this expression cannot
reasonably be read as creating a legal requirement for
multiple awards. See Canadian Commercial Corp./Liftking
Indus., Inc., B-282334 et al., June 30, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶
11 at 3, 9 (phrase “up to two contracts” did not obligate
the agency to make two awards); Global Readiness Enters.,
B-284714, May, 30, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 97 at 5 (phrase “up to
three (3) awards” did not obligate the agency to make
three awards). In this regard, giving effect to all
provisions of the solicitation, a reasonable reading is
that the RFP language regarding multiple awards is
permissive and does not exclude award of a single
contract. In sum, the Army was not required to make a
second base award to satisfy the terms of the RFP. (Glock,
Inc. B-414401: Jun 5, 2017)
In its protest, Al Raha challenges the proposed parts
ranges, claiming that the Air Force’s failure to specify
which NSNs will be included in which ranges renders the
Air Force’s requirements too vague and undefined for
offerors to compete on a common basis. Protest at 19-23.
Al Raha notes that the prices of catalog parts
corresponding to the NSNs vary widely, from a low of $0.01
for a lock washer to a high of $136,776.88 for a deflector
assembly. Id. at 22. Additionally, the anticipated annual
requirement for NSNs varies from a low of 1 part to a high
of 42,552 parts. Protester’s Comments at 9. Because
offerors are required to propose on a fixed-price
incentive basis for any mix of NSNs, this disparity in
prices and part quantities could result in widely varying
cost exposure, especially in the 0-7000 part range. Id. at
8. For example, Al Raha notes that if an offeror is called
on to supply the 7,000 most expensive NSNs, the parts
would range in cost from $136,776.88 to $28.88, while the
7,000 least expensive would range from $7.77 to $0.01. Id.
at 9.
Al Raha argues that the Air Force has provided inadequate
guidance to offerors concerning the potential mix of NSNs
to be priced into each range, requiring offerors to make
“blind guesses.” Protester’s Comments at 10. According to
Al Raha this vagueness, combined with the proposed
evaluation criteria, encourages offerors to play the
“lowball pricing game,” which will disadvantage offerors
making more realistic proposals, and differs significantly
from previous support contracts, which have been priced
based on fixed, unit prices for each NSN. Id. at 12-13.
Protester argues, in sum, that the RFP’s pricing
requirements are so vague and undefined as to prevent
offerors from competing on a common basis, and that the
agency has failed to provide any additional guidance that
would clarify the issue. Protester’s Comments at 12. In
response, the agency argues that it has provided all the
information available to it, and, in fact, generated
additional data to help guide offerors. Contracting
Officer’s Statement of Facts at 15 and Agency Memorandum
of Law at 4. Furthermore, the Air Force notes that it has
included “over and above” provisions in the contract that
allow for a switch to cost-based pricing if the quantity
of parts required increases significantly, and that these
provisions help to provide additional clarity for the
offerors concerning the requirements. See Contracting
Officer’s Statement of Facts at 25-28.
As a general rule, a solicitation must be drafted in a
fashion that enables offerors to intelligently prepare
their proposals and must be sufficiently free from
ambiguity so that offerors may compete on a common basis.
Raymond Express Int’l, B-409872.2, Nov. 6, 2014, 2014 CPD
¶ 317 at 9. However, there is no requirement that a
competition be based on specifications drafted in such
detail as to completely eliminate all risk or remove every
uncertainty from the mind of every prospective offeror; to
the contrary, an agency may provide for a competition that
imposes maximum risks on the contractor and minimum
burdens on the agency, provided the solicitation contains
sufficient information for offerors to compete
intelligently and on equal terms. Phoenix Environmental
Design, Inc., B-411746, Oct. 14, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 319 at
3.
In this case, we conclude that the RFP provides adequate
detail for offerors to compete intelligently on equal
terms. The agency has provided a catalog listing all
18,168 NSNs to be priced under CLIN 0001 with estimated
annual requirements for each stock item, and has provided
prices for approximately 98% of the items. See RFP,
Catalog Appendix. While an offeror cannot know which
mixture of NSNs it may be called upon to supply in any
given task order, the offeror does know: the universe of
items it may be called upon to supply; the quantity of
items likely to be needed for any given NSN over the
course of a year; and, for the vast majority of items,
what the items will cost. Id. This information can be used
to estimate the offeror’s likely total cost exposure and,
to some extent, the likelihood that any given NSN will be
needed in any given month based on the annual expected
quantity. Additionally, the RFP includes “over and above”
clauses that allow for a switch to cost-reimbursable
pricing if the quantity of parts exceeds the established
value for the period by more than 5%, which allows an
offeror to better estimate its worst‑case potential cost
exposure. [4] See Contracting Officer’s Statement of Facts
at 26-27.
Al Raha is correct that the RFP’s proposed pricing
structure allows for significant variation in an offeror’s
potential cost exposure, but the agency has provided
sufficient information to apprise prospective offerors of
the nature and approximate scope of that risk. Put another
way, the fact that Al Raha is capable of identifying both
the worst-case and best-case sampling of NSNs from
information provided in the RFP reinforces the fact that
adequate information is available to offerors to
understand the agency’s requirements and to compete
intelligently and on equal terms. An offeror playing the
“low-ball pricing game” would do so at its peril when the
data provided in the RFP makes it clear that there is
substantial risk in doing so.
In support of its contention that the proposal is
impermissibly vague, Al Raha relies primarily on our prior
decision in Global Technical Systems, B-411230.2,
September 9, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 335, but this reliance is
misplaced. Protester’s Comments at 10. In Global Technical
Systems, the solicitation required that offerors propose a
detailed labor mix for a collective 100,000 hours of
engineering services, but provided only a vague
description of the actual engineering services required.
Global Technical Systems, supra at 17-19. That fact
pattern, however, is the reverse of the instant case;
here, the government has provided a detailed catalog that
minutely outlines the universe of parts that an offeror
will be called on to provide under the fixed-price CLIN.[5]
While, the government does not know when and in what
amount those parts will be needed, it has provided
estimated annual requirements for all catalog items, and
included “over and above” provisions in the RFP allowing
for a switch to cost-reimbursable pricing in the event
that requirements significantly exceed those estimates.
As noted above, the agency is not required to eliminate
all risk or remove every uncertainty, and, in fact, may
impose maximum risks on the contractor and minimum burdens
on the agency, provided the solicitation contains
sufficient information for offerors to compete
intelligently and on equal terms. Phoenix Environmental
Design, Inc., supra at 3. In this case, the agency’s
provision of a detailed parts catalog with estimated
annual quantities provides adequate information for
offerors to understand the agency’s requirements and to
compete intelligently and on equal terms. In this context,
we conclude that the fact that the
RFP contemplates task orders with an unknown composition
of NSNs is not a lack of definition in the solicitation,
but rather an expressly identified element of risk that
the agency may reasonably shift to the offeror. (Al
Raha Group for Technical Services B-412963.3: Sep 19,
2016)
[company’s operations specifications] OpSpec
ACHI contends that offerors were required to have all of
their proposed aircraft on their OpSpecs at the time of
proposal submission, and argues that Erickson’s proposal
should have been found unacceptable because its heavy-lift
helicopters were not listed on its OpSpec. In response,
the agency argues that it would have been unreasonable to
expect offerors to have the heavy-lift helicopters on
their OpSpecs at the time of proposal submission because
the agency would not be in a position to exercise the
option requiring heavy-lift helicopters until one or two
years after the base period, if at all. Supp. AR, at 6.
According to the agency, such a requirement would exceed
the agency’s requirements. Id. Where, as here, a dispute
exists as to the actual meaning of an RFP provision, we
will read the RFP as a whole and in a manner giving effect
to all of its provisions in determining which
interpretation is reasonable. SRA International, Inc.,
B-408624, B-408624.2, Nov. 25, 2013, 2013 CPD ¶ 275 at
7-8. Based on our review of the RFPs and of the record, we
find no basis to conclude that the agency’s interpretation
of the solicitations, and its evaluation of proposals in
this regard, was unreasonable.
As noted above, § L‑3.2.1(i) required each offeror to
furnish, among other documentation, a contractor-specific
OpSpec showing that proposed aircraft are authorized to
conduct operations under 14 CFR part 135 and certified for
and fully capable of operating in instrument
meteorological conditions per sections C‑2.8, C‑3.3 and
C‑11.2.6. For the FAA to add an aircraft to an aircraft
operator’s OpSpec, the operator must own or possess a
current lease for the aircraft, Supp. AR, Attachment 3,
Declaration of Cmdr. Petras, at 1-2, and the solicitation
here provided for the possibility that an offeror might
not own or possess an aircraft at the time of proposal
submission by allowing offerors to provide proof of a
binding agreement to purchase/charter aircraft if awarded
the contract. RFPs, at § L‑3.2.1. Consistent with that
possibility, the solicitation allows a contractor to
revise and update its OpSpec throughout the performance
period. We think that when these sections are read
together, it is clear that the agency did not intend to
require that all proposed aircraft be listed on the
offeror’s OpSpec at the time of proposal submission, but
rather intended to allow offerors to enter into leases for
aircraft, and to update their OpSpecs to add the leased
aircraft to their listing of authorized aircraft, after
award.
Binding Obligation
ACHI also argues that Erickson should have been found
technically unacceptable because it did not meet the
requirement to provide proof of ownership or a binding
agreement to purchase/charter aircraft if awarded the
contract. In this regard, both Erickson and ACHI proposed
to enter into leases to satisfy the requirements for
heavy-lift helicopters if they were awarded the contracts.
ACHI, however, contends that it provided detailed lease
agreements for the four [DELETED] aircraft that it
proposed in submission one, while Erickson only provided
“speculative and futuristic agreements” regarding its
proposed [DELETED] heavy-lift helicopters. Comments on AR,
at 5. In response, the agency argues, and the record
reflects, that the agreements provided by ACHI in both of
its proposals fall short of the “detailed lease
agreements” it claims to have provided, and, similar to
what was provided by Erickson, provide nothing more than
evidence of ACHI’s capability to lease heavy-lift
helicopters from another company in the future. Supp. AR,
at 4.
According to the agency, both parties provided information
that was sufficient to satisfy the evaluators, despite the
fact that they did not provide what might generally be
considered “binding agreements.” In this regard, the
agency argues that the solicitation only required a
showing that an offeror would be able to meet the
requirements in sections C‑3.3 and C‑11.2.6. Supp. AR, at
2. The agency also contends that the term “binding
agreement,” when used in the aviation industry, and in the
context of contracting for aviation detachment services,
is understood to require evidence of capability to enter
into a binding agreement before performance. Supp. AR,
Attachment 3, Declaration of Cmdr. Petras, at 1.
As discussed above, where, as here, a dispute exists as to
the actual meaning of an RFP provision, we will read the
RFP as a whole and in a manner giving effect to all of its
provisions in determining which interpretation is
reasonable. SRA International, Inc., supra. In this
instance, it is clear that the agency did not require
offerors to have ownership or be in possession of the
aircraft proposed at the time of proposal submission, such
that something less than an actual lease agreement could
satisfy the solicitation submission requirements. As
discussed above, such an understanding is consistent with
the requirements related to OpSpecs, which allowed for
updates and revisions. Because the agency was looking for
information other than proof of ownership or a fully
executed lease agreement, it was not unreasonable for the
agency to find that information related to potential
future leases or purchases of proposed aircraft was
sufficient. Moreover, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the agency’s finding in this regard could be
considered a waiver of a requirement, the agency
effectively waived the requirement for both the protester
and awardee; as a result, there is no basis for our Office
to find that the protester was prejudiced by the agency’s
action. Geo-Seis Helicopters, Inc., supra, at 3 (no
prejudice shown where agency found letter of intent to
purchase a helicopter acceptable and neither vendor
provided proof of ownership or binding purchase agreement
as required). Competitive prejudice is an essential
element of every viable protest, and we will not sustain a
protest where a record does not establish prejudice. Id.
The protest is denied. (Air
Center Helicopters, Inc. B-412789, B-412789.3,
B-412790, B-412790.3: Jun 2, 2016) (pdf)
Next, DRS argues that the Army’s evaluation of the
awardee’s proposed transition plan was inconsistent with
the terms of the RTEP, which the protester contends
required offerors to provide full operational performance
starting on the first day of the task order. Supp. Protest
at 13-18. As such, the protester asserts that the agency
should have found LMIS’s proposed transition plan
unacceptable, since it did not provide for full staffing
and performance until the [DELETED] day of the task order.
Id. at 18. In support of its contention, the protester
notes that the PWS provided that the successful
“contractor shall provide a plan to seamlessly transition
work from the incumbent contractor immediately.” AR, Tab
11, PWS, at 2. DRS takes the position that the term
“immediately” indicated that the awardee must provide all
of the required services at the start of performance.
Supp. Protest at 14-15. We find DRS’s interpretation
unreasonable, as it is at odds with the RTEP’s requirement
that offerors propose a phase-in plan detailing how they
would “take over from the incumbent contractor ensuring
minimal disruption of operations.” RTEP at 2. In short, if
full, immediate performance were required under the RTEP,
the Army would not have requested firms to submit a
transition plan in the first place. Rather, when read in
context, we agree with the agency that the term
“immediately” simply indicated that the successful
contractor was to begin the transition of work
immediately, not that full performance was required on day
one. INFICON, Inc., B-410502, Jan. 5, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 24
at 4 (denying protest where protester's interpretation of
solicitation was not consistent with relevant provisions
when read in context).
The protester also argues that the Army unreasonably
failed to take into account that under the awardee’s
proposed transition plan, the agency would be required to
pay its incumbent contractors to continue performance.
Protester’s Supp. Comments at 21-27. As discussed above,
under the awardee’s proposal, LMIS would not begin full
operational performance until the [DELETED] day of the
base period, which in turn resulted in a LOE reduction of
[DELETED] hours. AR, Tab 31, LMIS Technical Proposal, at
53. The protester contends--and the agency does not
dispute--that the Army would need its incumbent
contractors to continue to perform during LMIS’s proposed
transition period in order to continue operational
performance. Protester’s Supp. Comments at 21-24. By
contrast, under DRS’s proposal, the incumbents would serve
as subcontractors and provide full operational performance
starting on the first day of the task order. Id. Citing
our decision in L-3 Communications Titan Corp., B-299317
et al., March 29, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 66 at 11-13, DRS argues
that the Army’s selection decision was irrational, as it
was based on cost savings resulting from LMIS’s transition
plan, which will in fact result in no real savings to the
agency. Protester’s Supp. Comments at 26.
In response, the Army contends that the protester’s
argument is an untimely challenge to the evaluation scheme
of the RTEP, as it was not raised prior to the
solicitation’s closing date. Supp. Memorandum of Law, at
12-13.
In L-3 Communications, a case with facts analogous to
those at issue here, the incumbent protester and awardee
proposed different levels of effort for the transition
period, with the awardee’s proposal resulting in higher
out-of-contract costs to the government than the
incumbent’s proposal. L-3 Commc’ns Titan Corp., supra at
11. The agency’s evaluation scheme, however, did not
account for the offerors’ materially different approaches
to transition. Id. at 13. As such, we found that the
evaluation scheme was not rational or reasonable, as it
did not support a meaningful comparison and discrimination
between the two proposals. Id. at 13. In L-3
Communications, however, we declined to address the
agency’s contention that the protester’s argument was an
untimely challenge to the terms of the solicitation, as we
sustained the protest on two other grounds. Id. at 13,
n.18.
In the instant protest, we find the protester’s argument
that the agency erred in failing to consider the relative
costs of the offerors’ different transition approaches to
be untimely. As discussed above, the RTEP made clear that
there would be “no work stoppage as a result of [the]
award,” but also directed offerors to propose a phase-in
plan. AR, Tab 11, PWS, at 2; RTEP at 2-3. Moreover, the
RTEP provided no indication that the agency would consider
out-of-contract costs resulting from firms’ transition
plans as part of its cost evaluation. RTEP at 7-8. Rather,
the solicitation simply indicated that the agency would
calculate an offeror’s total evaluated cost using the
information provided in the firm’s cost proposal, subject
to any cost realism adjustments. Id. at 7. As such, DRS
should have recognized that while it was proposing full
performance at the start of the task order, other offerors
could propose a transition period with a lower LOE, and
that the agency’s evaluation scheme would not capture the
government’s costs resulting from the incumbent
contractors’ continued performance. Thus, under 4 C.F.R. §
21.2(a)(1), DRS’s argument is an untimely challenge to the
terms of the solicitation. See Cherokee Elecs. Corp.,
B-240659, Dec. 10, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 467 at 3 (“[S]ince it
was obvious that the RFP, requesting fixed-price
proposals, did not contemplate the consideration of
transition costs, [the protester] should have filed any
protest that such costs must be considered prior to the
closing date for receipt of proposals.”); see also
FirstLine Transp. Sec., Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl.
359, 385-390 (2011) (“Because [the protester] did not
protest the price evaluation scheme in the RFP before the
submission deadline, it cannot now complain that the
out-of-contract costs for [the awardee’s] transition
period were not considered in the evaluation of [the
awardee’s] price proposal.”). As discussed below, however,
we find this situation is appropriate for the use of the
significant issue exception to our timeliness rules. 4
C.F.R. § 21.2(c).
While our Bid Protest Regulations provide that protests
based upon alleged improprieties in a solicitation that
are apparent prior to closing shall be filed prior to
closing, 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1), our Regulations also
provide that GAO may consider an untimely protest that
raises issues significant to the procurement system. 4
C.F.R. § 21.2(c). In this regard, what constitutes a
significant issue is to be decided on a case-by-case
basis. Pyxis Corp., B-282469, B-282469.2, July 15, 1999,
99-2 CPD ¶ 18 at 4. We generally regard a significant
issue as one of widespread interest to the procurement
community and that has not been previously decided.
Satilla Rural Elec. Membership Corp., B-238187, May 7,
1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 456 at 3. The issue here--whether an
agency’s evaluation scheme is reasonable where it fails to
fairly account for offerors’ differing transition
approaches--is one which we did not squarely address in
L-3 Communications given our resolution of the case on
other grounds, and is one that can be expected to arise in
future procurements for service contracts where there is
an incumbent contractor competing with a non-incumbent.
Accordingly, we will address this basis of protest on the
merits.
It is a fundamental principle of government procurement
that a contracting agency must provide a common basis for
competition and may not disparately evaluate offerors with
regard to the same requirements. See, e.g., Lockheed
Martin Info. Sys., B-292836 et al., Dec. 18, 2003, 2003
CPD ¶ 230 at 11-12; Rockwell Elec. Commerce Corp.,
B-286201 et al., Dec. 14, 2000, 2001 CPD ¶ 65 at 5.
Likewise, while it is up to the agency to decide upon some
appropriate and reasonable method for evaluating offerors’
costs, an agency may not use an evaluation method that
produces a misleading result. See Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., B-294944.2, Jan. 18, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 16 at 4;
AirTrakTravel, et al., B-292101 et al., June 30, 2003,
2003 CPD ¶ 117 at 22. The method chosen must include some
reasonable basis for evaluating or comparing the relative
costs of proposals, so as to establish whether one
offeror’s proposal would be more or less costly than
another’s. AirTrakTravel, et al., supra.
Here, the solicitation established that there would be “no
work stoppage as a result of [the] award” and provided an
estimated LOE based on full staffing of the agency’s
requirements during the entire base period of performance.
AR, Tab 11, PWS, at 2; RTEP, attach. 2, at 3. This is
exactly what DRS proposed and included in its cost
proposal--full staffing from the first day of the task
order. AR, Tab 25, Technical Evaluation Report, at 6-7. In
contrast, LMIS proposed a transition period, also
consistent with the solicitation, that reduced the
agency’s LOE by more than [DELETED] hours, as it would not
be providing full operational performance during the
[DELETED] of the base period. AR, Tab 31, LMIS Technical
Proposal, at 54-55. The Army does not dispute that under
LMIS’s transition plan, the agency would be required to
pay its incumbent contractors to continue performance
during the transition period in order to prevent a
stoppage of work. See Supp. Agency Legal Memorandum, exh.
1, Declaration of FOFH Director, at 2 (describing how
agency expected LMIS to hire incumbent employees during
phase-in period, “as mission allows”). Thus, by failing to
account for these disparities in the offerors’ proposals,
the RTEP’s evaluation scheme did not provide for an
apples-to-apples comparison, and effectively penalized
offerors that proposed to provide full contract
performance sooner than those offerors with a more
prolonged transition period. See L-3 Communications Titan
Corp., supra at 11-13; see also FirstLine, 100 Fed. Cl. at
387. Accordingly, we find that the agency’s award decision
was not reasonable or rational. (DRS
Technical Services, Inc. B-411573.2, B-411573.3: Nov
9, 2015) (pdf)
GTS also contends that the solicitation is unreasonably
vague and ambiguous regarding the requirement for
engineering services, thus preventing offerors from
competing on a common basis. In this regard, the protester
notes that the solicitation contains contract line items (CLINs)
for 100,000 hours of engineering services, and requires
offerors to propose a labor mix, but does not contain
information essential for offerors to formulate an
acceptable labor mix or labor rates. Protest at 3-4.
As set forth above, the RFP requires that offerors
“propose a labor mix with supporting rationale for
engineering services as described in Section C. . . [and]
provide job descriptions for each proposed labor
category.” RFP at 176. However, the description of these
services in Section C provides only a vague outline of the
requirement, which is shown here in its entirety:
ENGINEERING SERVICES CLINs 0009 (if
exercised, 1009, 2009, 3009, and 4009) - If ordered, the
Contractor shall provide engineering services (ES),
conduct engineering studies, provide engineering
analysis and trade-off studies, and/or support
engineering changes as directed by the Government.
Contractor shall provide any travel, incidental material
consumed, and/or subcontractor effort necessary in the
performance of the required ES. The specific tasks shall
be defined in each Delivery Order.
RFP at 55. Further, the solicitation
requires that, in proposing rates for these general
engineering services, “[a]ny travel, incidental material
consumed, other direct costs (ODCs) and/or subcontractor
effort associated with the performance of this effort
shall be included in the proposed man-hour rate.” Id. at
50; see also AR, Tab 30, Questions and Answers, at 2 (“The
costs for travel, incidental material consumed, [and]
subcontracted effort shall be included in the offeror’s
proposed hour rate”).
When the agency received questions from potential offerors
regarding these services, it refused to provide any
additional information. See, e.g., AR, Tab 30, Questions
and Answers, at 4. In this regard, one offeror asked:
“Please provide guidance as to which labor categories are
desired, and provide additional details on what tasks are
required for Engineering Services.” Id. The agency,
however, did not furnish any additional information,
answering instead that: “The Offerors shall propose the
labor categories necessary to succes[s]ful[l]y complete
the tasks iden[ti]fied for the statement of line items
0009, 1009, 2009, 3009, and 4009.” Id.[12] However, each
of these CLINs described the requirement only as
“Engineering Services,” and contained references to a
“note” informing offerors that “[l]abor hours for each
task shall be established through negotiation in each
delivery order via a Government-provided Statement of Work
(SOW).” RFP at 50; see, e.g., id. at 20.
GTS contends that the lack of any meaningful description
of the types of engineering services required or the goals
to be achieved, coupled with the fact that award under the
solicitation is to be made to the lowest-priced,
technically acceptable proposal, RFP at 191, will
encourage offerors to propose unrealistic labor mixes in
order to achieve the lowest possible price; according to
the protester, offerors who do not “play the lowball
pricing game” will be disadvantaged for proposing what
they believe to be a more realistic labor mix. Protest at
45. In any event, the protester argues that, given the
current dearth of information regarding the engineering
services requirement, offerors will be forced to make
“wild guesses” in proposing engineering services costs.
Id.
As a general rule, a solicitation must be drafted in a
fashion that enables offerors to intelligently prepare
their proposals and must be sufficiently free from
ambiguity so that offerors may compete on a common basis.
Raymond Express Int’l, B‑409872.2, Nov. 6, 2014, 2014 CPD
¶ 317 at 9. That is, offerors must be given sufficient
detail to allow them to compete intelligently and on a
relatively equal basis; the agency’s description of its
needs must be free from ambiguity and describe the
agency’s minimum needs accurately. See Haworth, Inc.;
Knoll N. Am., Inc., B‑256702.2, B‑256702.3, Sept. 9, 1994,
94-2 CPD ¶ 98 at 5.
The solicitation’s requirement for engineering services
does not meet this standard. Although Offerors were
required to “propose a detailed labor mix,” RFP at 176,
the RFP’s vague description of the engineering services
required did not provide offerors with a sufficient
description of the work to be performed or the results to
be achieved on which to base their proposed labor mix. In
this regard, the solicitation’s description stated only
that the engineering services could include tasks such as
providing engineering analysis, conducting studies
“and/or” supporting engineering changes. RFP at 55.
The agency argues that, when the statement of work
outlines the work to be performed, the agency is not
required to prescribe a particular labor mix or level of
effort--rather, agencies may require offerors to propose
the appropriate labor mix and level of effort to achieve
the identified goals. AR at 35-39. However, while an
agency may require offerors to propose the labor mix and
level of effort appropriate for performing the work
required under the solicitation, the solicitation must
provide a sufficiently detailed description of the work to
be performed or the goals to be achieved to allow offerors
to intelligently propose a labor mix and level of effort.
Here, the solicitation contains no description, beyond the
vague requirement to provide analysis, conduct studies
and/or support engineering changes, of the type of work to
be performed or the goals to be achieved. As a result,
offerors had no basis on which to formulate their proposed
labor mix under this lowest-priced technically acceptable
procurement. Therefore, we sustain the protest on this
basis. (Global Technical
Systems B-411230.2: Sep 9, 2015) (pdf)
Prosperity argues that the agency's evaluation criteria
lack a rational basis because they fail to account for
cost savings associated with remaining in the protester's
buildings. Protests at 6. The protester asserts that the
flaw in the agency's methodology for calculating present
value is that it "does not include the option of
subtracting the value of the [Tenant Improvement
allowance] TIA from an offeror's present value evaluation,
should it exceed the tenant agency's requirements, which
would most certainly be the case for the incumbent lessor,
or otherwise crediting the incumbent lessor . . . for
existing improvements." Id. As such, Prosperity argues
that the RLPs do not provide a sufficient basis for
determining whether one offeror's proposal is more or less
costly to the government because they fail to consider the
actual cost to meet the agency's tenant and security
improvement requirements. Protests at 7. Our review of the
record gives us no basis to question the agency's
evaluation criteria.
Agencies are required to consider the cost to the
government in evaluating competitive proposals. Health
Servs. Int'l, Inc.; Apex Envtl., Inc., B-247433,
B‑247433.2, June 5, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 493 at 3-4. While it
is up to the agency to decide upon an appropriate and
reasonable method for proposal evaluation, it may not use
an evaluation method that produces a misleading result.
Id. at 4. The method chosen must include some reasonable
basis for evaluating or comparing the relative costs of
proposals, so as to establish whether one offeror's
proposal would be more or less costly than another's.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., B‑283939, Jan. 27, 2000, 2000
CPD ¶ 19 at 4-5. Moreover, while as a general rule,
agencies are not required to structure acquisitions in
order to neutralize the competitive advantage of an
incumbent, agencies may nonetheless use an evaluation
method that attempts to foster competition by increasing
the feasibility of a proposal being submitted by
non-incumbent offerors. See Int'l Computaprint Corp.,
B-207466, Nov. 15, 1982, 82-2 CPD ¶ 440 at 3.
GSA responds that the [requests for lease proposals] RLPs
are not defective and provide all information needed to
make informed offers. Contracting Officer's Statement at
2. The agency explains that it chose this procurement
method because the specific requirements were not known at
the time the RLPs were issued, the actual costs of tenant
improvements are not known exactly until after award, and
may even continue to change after award because the tenant
agency has the right to change its build-out after award.
Contracting Officer's Statement at 3-4; Supp. Contracting
Officer's Statement at 1-2. The agency also argues that
requiring offerors to use the provided allowances relieves
the government of having to inspect and value specific
existing improvements in each offered location and having
to develop individual construction cost estimates based on
individual building characteristics at multiple offered
locations. Contracting Officer's Statement at 3-4.
Finally, the agency argues that it structured the lease so
as to promote competition. Legal Memorandum at 4; Supp.
Contracting Officer's Statement at 5. In this regard, the
agency explains that incumbent landlords enjoy a
significant advantage in competing for follow-on leases
due to existing improvements obtained through government
investment. As a result of this advantage, the agency
explains, "it is a challenge to obtain competition in this
sort of procurement, and the incumbent, when it calculates
the rental rate it will offer for a follow-on lease,
naturally factors the advantages of incumbency into its
offer, so that the value of the government's investment in
the incumbent space is used by the incumbent to demand
higher rent than might otherwise [be] the case." Legal
Memorandum at 4. According to the agency, structuring the
lease as it has here encourages participation by
non-incumbent offerors, and encourages the incumbent to
offer rental rates closer to market rates. Id. at 4-5.
Our review of the record and the agency's rationale for
utilizing allowances rather than requiring offerors to
price proposals based on actual tenant improvement
requirements, gives us no basis to question the agency's
evaluation methodology. In this regard, we are provided no
basis to question the agency's assertion that it utilized
the specified allowances in part because the specific
requirements were not known at the time the RLPs were
issued. However, even if the requirements were known with
certainty we find GSA's evaluation methodology to be
unobjectionable as we conclude that GSA has structured the
subject solicitation in a manner that attempts to promote,
rather than stymie, competition. While the agency's chosen
method for leveling the playing field has the effect of
reducing or eliminating Prosperity's incumbent advantage,
we find that unobjectionable in view of GSA's broader
objective of fostering competition, which is consistent
with the overarching mandate of the Competition in
Contracting Act to obtain full and open competition for
the government's requirements. See New Mexico State
University, B-409566, June 16, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 228 at 4.
(Prosperity Metro Plaza of
Virginia, LLC B-411547, B-411548: Aug 21, 2015)
(pdf)
Olympus also protests that the solicitation only requires
a minimum of two custodians at each school for each of the
day and evening shifts, which, according to the protester,
is not a sufficient number of staff to perform the tasks
listed in the PWS. Olympus asserts that since the
solicitation defines an acceptable rating as meeting the
minimum requirements of the solicitation, an offeror
proposing this minimum staffing would be evaluated as
acceptable, and eligible for award, even though two
custodians per shift is, in the protester’s view,
inadequate. Protest at 9-10.
Olympus’ protest in this regard is based upon a
misinterpretation of the solicitation. In this regard, we
will resolve controversies over the meaning of a
solicitation by reading it as a whole and in a manner that
gives effect to all of its provisions; to be reasonable,
and therefore valid, an interpretation must be consistent
with the solicitation when read as a whole and in a
reasonable manner. Alluviam LLC, B‑297280, Dec. 15, 2005,
2005 CPD ¶ 223 at 2.
Olympus essentially argues that the agency has improperly
estimated the required custodial work under the PWS. Where
an agency establishes an estimate of its requirements in a
solicitation, the estimate must be established in good
faith, based on the best information available, and
accurately represent the agency’s anticipated needs. CW
Government Travel, Inc.‑‑Reconsideration, et al.,
B‑295530.2, et al., July 25, 2005, 2005 CPD ¶ 139 at 7.
Here, however, it is clear from the solicitation when read
as a whole that the agency was not setting forth in the
solicitation an estimate of required custodians, but is
instead simply indicating the minimum required staffing
for the proposal to receive further consideration. In this
regard, the agency explains that the stated minimum
staffing levels are required to perform the immediate
needs during the school day and evening shift, but this is
not the only staff the contractor is required to provide
to be acceptable. Agency Report at 6-7.
Further, nothing in the solicitation indicates that an
offeror proposing only two custodians for each of the
shifts without any regard to the work to be performed will
be rated acceptable. While the solicitation requires that
for each of the day and evening shifts the contractor must
provide a minimum of two custodial workers at each school,
PWS §§ 2.6.2.2, 2.6.2.3, the solicitation also sets out a
detailed list of tasks that the contractor must perform
(e.g., sweep and mop restroom floors) with the required
frequency; details regarding the square footage of the
various areas of the school (e.g., classrooms with
carpet); and additional relevant details (e.g., the number
of toilets). Offerors are required to propose a sufficient
number of trained custodial workers and laborers to
promptly perform the required work. PWS § 2.5.1.1.
Further, offerors are instructed to include a detailed
narrative of the offeror’s management approach which
discusses adequate manning, including the number of
employees by type, number of hours and schedules worked
for each type, sufficient oversight, and an effective
custodian work schedule and cleaning schedule to ensure
uninterrupted service. RFP at 5. Thus, while a proposal
will be rated unacceptable if it does not include at least
two custodians at each school per shift, the solicitation
requires that to be deemed acceptable, a proposal must
include a sufficient, detailed plan, including sufficient
personnel, to perform all of the requirements of the PWS
in a timely manner. (Olympus
Building Services, Inc. B-411474, B-411474.2,
B-411474.3: Jul 30, 2015) (pdf)
Lack of Information
First, the protester contends that the agency has not provided
vendors with sufficient information to prepare quotations.
Specifically, GMCS argues that in order for it to determine the
level of effort necessary to conduct the audits, and thus submit
a quotation, it must know the “[c]omplexity [c]ategory” assigned
to the agency by the incumbent auditor. Protest (Mar. 20, 2015)
at 2. In this regard, the protester explains that third‑party
EMS audits are subject to requirements and standards identified
in a document known as International Accreditation Forum (IAF)
Mandatory Document (MD) 5. See AR, Tab 9, IAF MD 5, at 5.
According to IAF MD 5, an auditor determines EMS audit durations
primarily based on two factors: the number of personnel at the
organization being audited and the complexity of the work being
performed by the organization. Id. at 7. With respect to the
complexity of the work being performed, IAF MD 5 identifies five
complexity categories--high, medium, low, limited, or “[s]pecial
[c]ases”--that auditors assign to organizations based, in part,
on the organization’s business sector. Id. at 17-20. GMCS
contends that it needs to know the complexity category assigned
to NUWCDIVNPT in order to determine the level of effort
necessary to perform the contract.
A solicitation must contain sufficient information to allow
offerors to compete intelligently and on an equal basis. See
Tennier Indus., Inc. , B-299624, July 12, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 129
at 2. However, there is no legal requirement that a solicitation
contain such detail to completely eliminate all risk or remove
all uncertainty from the mind of every prospective offeror.
Tennier Indus., Inc., supra; Triple P Servs., Inc., B-271629.3,
July 22, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 30 at 5 n.2.
Here, we find no basis to sustain the protester’s argument that
the Navy’s failure to provide the agency’s complexity category
prevents the firm from submitting a quotation. The Navy
maintains that it cannot disclose the complexity category
because it does not have that information. AR, Tab 4, Amendment
0002, at 2-3, Contracting Officer (CO) Statement (Apr. 17, 2015)
at 6. In this regard, the Navy’s predecessor contract did not
require that the auditor provide the organization’s complexity
category. See AR, Tab 13, Current Contract SOW, at 21‑24. The
agency explains that it cannot compel the incumbent auditor to
provide the agency’s complexity category, and any attempt to
obtain it will result in additional costs to the agency. CO
Supplement (May 11, 2015) at 2.
The Navy instead provided vendors with information about the
type of work performed at NUWCDIVNPT, so potential vendors could
make their own assessments about the complexity of these audits.
Specifically, in amendment 3, the agency advised vendors that
the business sector that “best aligns” with NUWCDIVNPT’s work
was “technical testing and laboratories.” AR, Tab 7, Amendment
0003, at 2. Pursuant to IAF MD 5, an organization that engages
in technical testing and laboratories is usually assigned a
medium complexity rating. See AR, Tab 9, IAF MD 5, at 18. In
addition, the agency informed vendors that the audits would be
limited to NUWCDIVNPT’s campus (which has approximately 5,000
employees), and provided the campus’ normal hours of operation;
the record shows that these elements inform audit durations
under IAF MD 5. See Id. at 7-8. The agency also disclosed the
dollar value of the prior EMS audit contract; identified the
minimum number of hours expected for each type of audit (based
on 14 years of prior audit history); and released a copy of the
most recent certificate of conformance issued to NUWCDIVNPT. RFQ
at 31-32; AR, Tab 6, Amendment 0001, at 2; Tab 4, Amendment
0002, at 2‑6; Tab 7, Amendment 0003, at 2-3; Tab 5, Certificate
of Conformance, at 1.
Moreover, although GMCS argues that it received complexity
category information under other solicitations for audit
services, the protester has not established that the absence of
NUWCDIVNPT’s complexity category, in this particular instance,
prevents the firm from competing intelligently and on a
relatively equal basis. This is especially true in light of the
other information provided to vendors by the agency.
In sum, because the Navy does not have the complexity category
information being requested by the protester, and because the
agency provided vendors with additional information about the
organization, we find that the RFQ, including information
disclosed in subsequent amendments, contains sufficient
information to allow vendors to compete intelligently. Although
the protester would have preferred that the agency provide
vendors with even more information, GMCS’s complaints fail to
provide a basis to sustain the protest. (Government
and Military Certification Systems, Inc. B-411261: Jun 26,
2015) (pdf)
In its protest,
Kingdomware argues that the RFQ did not accurately describe the
agency’s material specifications. Specifically, Kingdomware
complains that it was unreasonable for the agency not to define
the term “unlimited,” which, according to the protester, can be
defined “a number of different ways.” Protest at 2. In essence,
Kingdomware alleges that the term “unlimited” is ambiguous.
Where a request for quotations invites competition, vendors must
be given sufficient detail to allow them to compete
intelligently and on a relatively equal basis; the agency’s
description of its needs must be free from ambiguity and
describe the agency’s minimum needs accurately. Am. Overseas
Book Co., Inc., B-276675, July 10, 1997, 97-2 CPD ¶ 12 at 2; see
Richen Mgmt., LLC, B-406750, B-406850, July 31, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶
215 at 4. However there is no legal requirement that a
competition be based on specifications drafted in such detail as
to eliminate completely any risk for the contractor or that the
procuring agency remove all uncertainty from the mind of every
prospective offeror. Richen Mgmt., LLC, supra, at 3; Am.
Contract Servs., Inc., B-256196.2, B-256196.3, June 2, 1994,
94-1 CPD ¶ 342 at 2.
Here, we disagree with the protester that it was unreasonable
for the agency not to define the term “unlimited.” As explained
above, the RFQ detailed with specificity the notification
services and the various features sought by the agency. These
required features included the ability to send messages or
alerts without any restriction or constraint on the number of
recipients or the amount of messages or alerts that could be
sent. In this regard, the term “unlimited” indicated that the
agency required more than the ability to send a finite number of
messages/alerts, and the agency did not want a cap on the number
of recipients that would receive the alerts. See AHNTECH Inc.,
B-291998, Apr. 29, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 90 at 4 (GAO relies on plain
meaning of language to interpret a solicitation). Additionally,
the agency informed interested vendors that it expected more
than 15,000 contacts in the system at any one time. The agency
also made clear in the RFQ’s questions and answers that it did
not want per transaction pricing but wanted quotes for an
unlimited plan. Although Kingdomware argues that historical
information provides the firm a “solid basis” to prepare a
quote, Comments at 4, as noted above, the agency is not required
to remove all uncertainty from the mind of every prospective
vendor. See Dellew Corp., B-407159, Nov. 16, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶
341 at 5 (unobjectionable for agency not to disclose in
solicitation certain historical workload data). Finally, the
agency reports that “multiple” vendors submitted quotes for the
RFQ’s requirement. Contracting Officer Statement at 4. On this
record, we find that the agency provided sufficiently detailed
information to allow vendors to compete intelligently and on a
relatively equal basis under the RFQ.
The protest is denied. (Kingdomware
Technologies, B-407628, Jan 9, 2013) (pdf)
In its challenge
to the terms of the solicitation, the protester focuses on the
agency’s alleged failure to provide more specific information
regarding the potential requirement for simultaneous training
scenarios. In this regard, the protester asserts that “[w]ithout
better insight in the frequency of overlapping exercises, it is
virtually impossible to price the contract or to meet the Key
Personnel technical requirements for project managers and
alternative project managers.” Protest at 2. Katmai further
alleges that the incumbent contractors for each mobilization
training center would possess historical knowledge of the
frequency of simultaneous training scenarios, thus providing
them with an unfair competitive advantage. Id. at 5. As a
general rule, agencies must provide sufficient detail in a
solicitation to enable offerors to compete intelligently and on
a relatively equal basis. Crown Contract Servs., B-288573, Oct.
31, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 179 at 2. When an agency solicits offers
for a requirements contract on the basis of estimated
quantities, the agency must base its estimates on the best
information available. Inventory Accounting Serv., Inc.,
B-271483, July 23, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 35 at 2-3.
Here, the detailed estimates provided by the agency in the
solicitation, which are unchallenged by the protester, coupled
with the agency’s response to numerous questions from
prospective offerors, provides sufficient information to allow
offerors to compete intelligently and on a relatively equal
basis. Specifically, the solicitation includes detailed
estimates of the total number of labor hours for all
contemplated labor categories for each ordering period, detailed
descriptions of the training scenarios with estimated hours per
scenario, total number and type of role-player per scenario,
uniforms and equipment requirements for each scenario, and
estimated number of scenarios per ordering period. These
estimates provide a detailed picture of the overall scale and
magnitude of the agency’s requirements to be performed under the
contract.
Moreover, the record confirms, as the agency argues, that the
solicitation describes the roles and responsibilities for the
project manager position. Specifically, the RFP establishes that
the project manager will be “a full time, on-site project
manager who shall be responsible for the overall management and
coordination of the contract upon receipt of a task order” and
the project manager or alternate “shall be available between the
hours of 7:30 - 4:30.” RFP amend. 1, PWS at 4. In essence,
offerors must provide one project manager for each site, Fort
Dix and Camp Shelby. Thus, notwithstanding the protester’s
assertion to the contrary, there is no ambiguity with respect to
staffing of the project manager position since staffing for this
position is independent of the number of scenarios ordered, or
whether the scenarios are ordered simultaneously.
We do, however, recognize that the solicitation creates some
risk where offerors have to anticipate “occasionally” performing
scenarios simultaneously. This introduces an undefined variable
that likely will affect offerors’ staffing for positions other
than that of the project manager, and the offerors’ pricing
strategies. However, the mere presence of risk in a solicitation
does not make the solicitation inappropriate or improper. It is
within the discretion of an agency to offer for competition a
proposed contract that imposes maximum risks on the contractor
and minimum burdens on the agency, and an offeror should account
for this in formulating its proposal. JRS Mgmt., B-402650.2,
June 25, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 147 at 5; TN-KY Contractors,
B-291997.2, May 5, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 91 at 3. There is no
requirement that a competition be based on specifications
drafted in such detail as to completely eliminate all risk or
remove every uncertainty from the mind of every prospective
offeror. Abba Int’l, Inc. et al., B-311225.4, Feb. 2, 2009, 2009
CPD ¶ 28 at 7; AirTrak Travel et al., B-292101 et al., June 30,
2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 117 at 4. Risk is inherent in most types of
contracts, and firms must use their professional expertise and
business judgment in anticipating a variety of influences
affecting performance costs. JRS Mgmt., supra; AirTrak Travel et
al., supra. Based on the record before us, where the
solicitation provides extensive and detailed estimates regarding
the overall scale and magnitude of the agency’s requirements, we
conclude that the risk associated with the possible “occasional”
requirement for overlapping scenarios, does not expose an
offeror, such as Katmai, to an unacceptable or undue risk, or
undermine the ability of offerors to compete intelligently and
on a relatively equal basis. (Katmai
Information Technologies, LLC, B-406885, Sep 20, 2012)
(pdf)
DNO also protests
that the solicitation does not provide estimated quantities for
each produce item. Protest at 8-9; Supp. Protest at 3. The
protester argues that, without estimated quantities, the agency
“cannot reasonably ascertain the actual likely price of each
offeror’s proposal, or, therefore, the relative price amongst
the offerors (e.g., even where one offeror offers lower prices
for one product, the agency will not be able to compare the
relative prices of the offerors without estimating the overall
quantities to be ordered between and among products).” Supp.
Comments at 13.
The agency responds that it is impossible to include an estimate
of its needs in the RFP because of the procurement strategy used
and the nature of the pilot program. See AR at 21. In this
regard, the agency states that the pilot program provides
schools with an optional method to obtain fresh produce but that
schools are not obligated to use the pilot program. See id. The
agency adds that whether or not any orders are placed against a
particular contract is entirely dependent on the contractor’s
marketing efforts and the schools own decision-making. Id.
According to the agency, USDA intends to award contracts to all
offerors that can demonstrate an acceptable level of compliance
with the evaluation factors and that propose reasonable prices.
Id. at 22. In this respect, the agency states that pricing under
each contract will change on a monthly basis to allow for an
economic price adjustment and, as a result, the vendor offering
the lowest overall price for each produce item can change
monthly. Id. The agency also points out that it has already
received three offers, suggesting that other offerors found
information in the RFP to be adequate for preparation of
proposals. Id. at 23.
Agencies are required to consider cost or price to the
government in evaluating competitive proposals. 41 U.S.C. §
3306(c)(1)(B) (2011); see Kathpal Tech., Inc.; Computer &
Hi-Tech Mgmt., Inc., B-283137.3 et al., Dec. 30, 1999, 2000 CPD
¶ 6 at 9. While it is up to the agency to decide upon some
appropriate, reasonable method for proposal evaluation, the
method chosen must include some reasonable basis for evaluating
or comparing the relative costs of proposals, so as to establish
whether one offeror’s proposal would be more or less costly than
another’s. See Aalco Forwarding, Inc., et al., B-277241.15, Mar.
11, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 87 at 11. Where estimates are not
reasonably available, an agency may establish a notional
estimate, consistent with the RFP requirements, to provide a
common basis for comparing the relative costs of the proposals.
See High-Point Schaer, B-242616, B-242616.2, May 28, 1991, 91-1
CPD ¶ 509 at 6-8.
Here, we agree with DNO that the solicitation fails to provide
sufficient information to allow a common basis for evaluating
offerors’ proposed prices. The RFP informs offerors that awards
would be made on a cost/technical tradeoff basis. See RFP at 133
(evaluation factors, including price, identified in descending
order of importance). In this regard, the solicitation also
provides for a qualitative evaluation of the non-price factors.
See id. at 134-35. Although the solicitation requests unit
pricing from the offerors, the RFP does not identify what each
unit reflects or against what quantity the proposed unit prices
would be applied to determine an evaluated price for each
offeror. Absent such information (which, as noted above, may be
notional in the absence of better estimates), the agency has no
meaningful way to evaluate the offerors’ prices to determine
their relative standing.
In its report, USDA states that it does not intend to make its
award determinations on a cost/technical tradeoff basis. Rather,
the agency states that it intends to award contracts to all
offerors that can demonstrate an acceptable level of compliance
with the evaluation factors and that propose reasonable prices.
AR at 22. In essence, the agency contends that it will make
awards without qualitatively comparing the merits of the
offerors’ technical and price proposals. This, however, is not
consistent with the basis for award stated in the RFP. It is a
fundamental principle of federal procurement law that a
contracting agency must treat all offerors equally and evaluate
their proposals evenhandedly against the solicitation’s
requirements and evaluation criteria. Brican Inc., B-402602,
June 17, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 141 at 4. (DNO
Inc., B-406256,B-406256.2, Mar 22, 2012) (pdf)
InfraMap asserts that the RFP is flawed because the workload
estimates fail to provide an accurate basis on which to
calculate future work. Specifically, it argues that, in light of
the magnitude of the upcoming electric cable burial work to be
performed, the agency’s instruction simply to anticipate an
annual 10% increase in excavation permits fails to adequately
convey the magnitude of the likely work under the contract.
As a general rule, a contracting agency must give sufficient
detail in a solicitation to enable bidders to compete
intelligently and on a relatively equal basis. Crown Contract
Servs., B-288573,Oct. 31, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 179at 2. When an
agency solicits offers for a requirements contract on the basis
of estimated quantities, the agency must base its estimates on
the best information available. While the estimates need not be
absolutely correct, the estimated quantities must be reasonably
accurate representations of anticipated needs. Inventory
Accounting Serv., Inc., B-271483, July 23, 1996, 96-2CPD ¶ 35
at2-3.
Here, the record shows that the agency’s estimates are not based
on the best information available. With regard to the upcoming
electric cable burial work, the agency states that it does not
expect that the workload will vary significantly from current
RFP estimates. Decl. 2 of Chief Engineer, at 1. In this regard,
the agency maintains that the “workload generated under the [UPP]
is considered to be similar in kind to the process of how
excavationpermits are issued under the multiple award minor
construction contracts; designed, planned, scheduled and
executed.” Id. at 3. Accordingly, while the agency included the
10% annual increase, based on the agency’s projection “of a
gradual increase over the 2010 level,” Decl. 2 of Chief Engineer
at 3, the Chief Engineer acknowledges that the “10% factor was
not based on any indication that the workload would in fact
increase.” Id. Indeed, the 10% annual increase offerors were to
assume under the solicitation isthe same escalation percentage
the agency used in the last solicitation for these services in
2005. RFP No. W91ZLK-06-D-0002 at 20.
The record, however, shows that the agency’s assumption of a 10%
escalation rate, without any supporting analysis, failed to
account for information indicating the likelihood of a more
significant increase in workload. In this regard, we note that
while the agency included the 10% escalation rate to account for
potential increases in the number of permits, the actual
increase under the prior contract from year to year ranged from
17%to 19%, well above the assumed future growth. Aberdeen Annual
Permit Data Printout. Although the agency states that it reduced
the 2010 baseline permit numbers to account for the completion
of a Defense Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) effort at
Aberdeen, the agency has not shown the extent to which the
3-year BRAC effort may have been responsible for the higher than
10% increases during the 5-year prior UUL contract. On the
contrary, it appears that the number of permits may not have
decreased with the completion of the BRAC work; rather, in the 2
months since completion of the BRAC work, and before
commencement of any electric cable burial work, the number of
permits increased relative to the 2010 monthly numbers reported
in the RFP--from 85 permits in September 2010 to 97 in September
2011 (an 14.1% increase), and from 88 permits in October 2010 to
110 in October 2011 (an 25% increase). Decl. 1 of InfraMap
President ¶ 7. While the agency suggests that the variations in
monthly permits are such that any particular month’s number is
of limited significance, Decl. 2 of Chief Engineer at 3, we
think that, at a minimum, the above information available to the
agency suggests that the 10% annual escalation figure includes
little or no allowance for new, significant additional workload.
The record, however, indicates that just such new, significant
additional workload is likely as a result of the electric cable
burial work under the electrical privatization contract. In this
regard, the agency estimates that approximately 30 miles of
electrical line will need to be buried each year. Decl. 2 of
Chief Engineer, at 2.
While the agency asserts that the electric cable burial work
will result in only an additional 45 permits per year, or
approximately 2/3 mile of excavation for each permit, the agency
has not explained how it arrived at the estimate of 45 annual
permits attributable to electric cable burial, and the
historical data strongly suggests that the estimate is
significantly understated. In this regard, the agency’s
assumption of approximately 2/3 mile of excavation for each
permit appears inconsistent with InfraMap’s overall reported
experience over 15 years as the incumbent contractor at
Aberdeen, during which time each permit covered from 100 feet to
1,000 feet, and some permits would expire, requiring
reprocessing. Decl. 1 of InfraMap President, Dec. 12, 2011,
¶6.d; Decl. 2 of InfraMap President, Dec. 29, 2011, ¶ 14. The
agency’s assumption also appears inconsistent with InfraMap’s
specific experience processing digging permits, under a separate
contract at Aberdeen, for a 22-month BRAC-related project (known
as I3MP) for the installation of 20 miles of underground
ductwork for a comprehensive network of communication lines
servicing Aberdeen and the Edgewood Area. As reported by the
agency, I3MP involved 137 permits, Decl. 3 of Chief Engineer at
2, which represents approximately 6.85 permits per mile. Thus,
as noted by InfraMap, if this number of permits per mile under
the I3MP effort were applied to the 30 miles of electric cable
burial work per year that the agency expects, the result would
be more than 200 permits per year, well above the 45 permits
estimated by the agency.
The agency reports that the
significance of any individual permit depends on the nature and
timing of the work involved; according to the agency, a “project
close to an existing building, intersecting more than one
utility, or intersecting utilities in multiple locations will be
more difficult than one traversing open fields with no known
utilities.” Decl. 3 of Chief Engineer at 2-3. While the agency
asserts that the electric cable burial work will be
“meaningfully different” from that under the I3MP contract, with
the accelerated I3MP project including work on communication
lines close to buildings on the installation, id., the
electrical distribution system to be buried presumably likewise
runs to each of the same buildings as the communications lines
under the I3MP contract and thus likewise would appear to
involve work in “congested areas.” In any case, the agency has
offered no analysis showing that the expected electric cable
burial work will be sufficiently different in character from the
I3MP effort, requiring significantly less underground utilities
location work per mile of excavation, such that the agency could
reasonably discount what appears to be very relevant workload
metrics from the I3MP excavations.
In sum, the record shows that the
agency estimates of future underground utilities location work
did not reasonably account for the significant workload to be
expected in connection with electric cable burial under the
utility privatization contract, and thus did not reflect a
reasonably accurate representation of the agency’s anticipated
needs. Since offerors are required to propose an annual fixed
price for all UUL work, the RFP’s failure to provide reasonably
accurate estimates deprived InfraMap and other offerors of the
information required to assess the likely cost to perform the
contract requirements. Accordingly, we sustain the protest on
this basis. (InfraMap Corp.,
B-405167.6, Feb 6, 2012) (pdf)
As relevant here, the wheelchairs must comply with the design,
performance, identification, labeling, instructions, warnings,
and disclosure provisions of RESNA standard WC‑19, Wheelchairs
Used as Seats in Motor Vehicles. RFP at 82-85. Similar to
relevant requirements for automobile seatbelts and child safety
seats, WC-19 standards require that wheelchairs have, among
other things, anchored belts and secure attachment points so
that the wheelchair is properly secured and the user is properly
restrained when seated on the wheelchair while riding, for
example, on a public bus. See id. at 85‑86; Agency Report (AR),
Tab 4, RESNA's Position on Wheelchairs Used as Seats in Motor
Vehicles, at 6.
With regard to the wheelchairs' transportability, the RFP
requires that each wheelchair type be transportable using a lift
and vehicle hitch attached to a user's private car. See RFP at
6. More specifically, the CPW must be transportable using a
Class 2 passenger vehicle hitch, and the SPW must be
transportable using a Class 3 passenger vehicle hitch. Id.
(sections deleted)
Pride Mobility contends that
there is a "serious design conflict" in the RFP's requirement
that wheelchairs be both transportable by a hitch and meet WC-19
safety standards, arguing that these requirements are "mutually
exclusive." Protest at 2; Comments at 1. The protester
maintains that transportability using a hitch requires a design
emphasis on decreasing a wheelchair's overall weight, while
compliance with the WC-19 safety standards (which the protester
describes as crash worthiness) requires a design emphasis on
increasing a wheelchair's overall weight. See id. In this
respect, the protester provides data regarding maximum weight
loads for various car models and contends that the wheelchairs
cannot exceed a certain weight given the added weight of the
vehicle hitch and wheelchair lift. See Comments at 2-5. For
example, according to the protester, the required CPW must weigh
less than 300 pounds to ensure that it can be safely transported
using a passenger vehicle equipped with a Class 2 hitch. Id. at
5.
The VA asserts that Pride Mobility's protest reflects only its
disagreement with the wheelchair specifications. AR at 6. In
this respect, the agency maintains that the protester has
presented no evidence that the safety and transportability
requirements are mutually exclusive and the agency points out
that in response to the RFP it has received a number of offers
that can presumably meet the specifications. See AR at 6-7. The
agency also argues that it can properly specify requirements
based on the needs of veterans and that its medical judgments in
that regard are entitled to deference. See id. at 8-10, citing,
inter alia, GlaxoSmithKline, B-291822, Apr. 7, 2003, 2003 CPD
para. 77 at 5 (matters involving agency medical judgments and
policies are inappropriate for review under GAO's bid protest
function). According to the agency, veterans often transport
their power wheelchairs using an external hitch and wheelchair
lift attached to personal cars, but in other circumstances
veterans are transported in public and other vehicles while
seated in a wheelchair. Declaration of Prosthetics Clinical
Coordinator, at 2. Moreover, the agency states that the RFP's
specifications were developed by a team of VA subject matter
experts, including physical and occupational therapists,
psychiatrists, and technical, prosthetics, and sensory aid
specialists, as well as representatives for patient safety and
from veteran service organizations. See Contracting Officer's
Statement at 1.
A contracting agency has the discretion to determine its needs
and the best method to accommodate them and the responsibility
for drafting proper specifications that reflect the government's
needs is the contracting agency's. JRS Mgmt., B-402650.2, June
25, 2010, 2010 CPD para. 147 at 3; Instrument Control Serv.,
Inc.; Science & Mgmt Resources, Inc., B-289660, B-289660.2, Apr.
15, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 66 at 6. However, those needs must be
specified in a manner designed to achieve full and open
competition. Exec Plaza, LLC, B-400107, B‑400107.2, Aug. 1,
2008, 2008 CPD para. 143 at 5. Where a protester alleges that
performance is impossible, we will not substitute our judgment
for that of the agency or sustain the protest in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that the specifications are in
fact impossible to meet or unduly restrict competition. Cardion
Elec., B-218566, Aug. 15, 1985, 85-2 CPD para. 172 at 8;
Instrument Control, supra. Where a requirement reflects an
agency's minimum needs, the fact that the protester will be
unable to meet the requirement does not establish an
impropriety. John F. Kenefick Photogrammetric Consultant, Inc.,
B‑238384, May 4, 1990, 90-1 CPD para. 452 at 5.
The protester here has not shown that the VA's requirement for
wheelchairs that are both transportable by a hitch and meet
specified safety standards is unreasonable. Moreover, the
protester fails to provide any clear and convincing evidence
that the RFP's wheelchair specifications are, in fact,
impossible to meet. For example, although the protester provides
data regarding maximum weight loads and contends that the
required CPW must weigh less than 300 pounds, the protester
provides absolutely no evidence showing that an offeror could
not, in fact, meet such a weight requirement. Indeed, the
protester concedes that wheelchair lifts vary in weight and
lifting capacity, and does not otherwise dispute the agency's
assertion that there are commercially available, WC-19 compliant
wheelchairs--including models sold by the protester itself--that
are within wheelchair weight limits. See Comments at 5.
Although Pride Mobility disagrees with the VA's judgment
concerning its wheelchair requirement and how to accommodate
veterans' needs, the protester has not showed that the agency's
requirements are unreasonable or impossible to meet. See Cardion
Elec., supra; Instrument Control, supra. A protester's mere
disagreement with the agency's judgment concerning the agency's
needs and how to accommodate them does not show that the
agency's judgment is unreasonable. Exec Plaza, LLC, supra. This
is especially true in procurements such as this which involve an
agency's judgment as to its medical needs. CardioMetrix,
B‑242678, B-242678.2, May 17, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 477 at 2.
(Pride Mobility Products Corporation,
B-405371, October 25, 2011) (pdf)
Excessive Risk
As indicated above, CWT asserts that various solicitation
provisions impose excessive risk on the ETS2 contractor. Protest
at 35. The objectionable provisions, according to CWT, include
those requiring the ETS2 contractor, throughout the term of the
contract, to update the ETS2 system to comply with changes in
federal IT security regulations and policy, and changes in
federal travel regulations and policy, at no additional cost to
the government. Protest at 13-15, 18-19, 35. CWT objects on the
same basis to certain provisions that require compliance with
federal IT security standards and that require accommodation of
various customer agency functions. Id. at 16, 21-22, 28-32,
35-36. CWT similarly objects to provisions regarding
compatibility with emerging mobile platforms and the alignment
of the ETS2 system with the FEA framework. Id. at 17, 20, 36. In
CWT's view, these groups of provisions potentially involve "an
unlimited number of unknown updates and refreshments to the[]
ETS2 System, at a fixed price." Id. at 35. CWT asserts that
because the nature and extent of future updates is uncertain,
the ETS2 contractor is faced with "an unreasonable risk of
loss." Id. As a related ground of protest, CWT objects to the
term of the contemplated contract, which is fifteen years,
including options. Id. at 23, 35.
In its report to our Office, the agency responds that the first
group of challenged provisions reflects the agency's decision to
"shift the risk for changes that will be necessary to remain
current in two primary areas; IT security and Federal travel
policy." Memo. of Law at 6. The agency explains that it adopted
this strategy after concluding that "the administrative burden
of dealing with requests for price adjustments [in connection
with ETS1] was eating into the savings and efficiencies that
ETS1 was established to facilitate." Id. at 6; see also Supp.
Contracting Officer's Statement para. 2. The agency acknowledges
that this strategy involves a risk of higher pricing, but
asserts that this risk is mitigated by the likelihood that the
potential offerors in this procurement have a high level of
sophistication as to the formulation of pricing. Memo. of Law at
7, 9. In this regard, the agency asserts that "[t]he
sophisticated contractors that provide end-to-end travel
management services in the commercial sector have to 'stay
current' in the course of performing those contracts, and are in
a position, based on their expertise, to 'price' that risk into
their proposals." Id. at 6; see also Supp. Contracting Officer's
Statement para. 4 (describing specific ETS2 market research
indicating that potential ETS2 offerors or team members
typically incorporate research and development costs into their
pricing). The agency further asserts that offerors can mitigate
risk by applying historical trends regarding the number and
significance of changes in federal IT security policy and
federal travel policy when they develop their pricing. Memo. of
Law at 7. Finally, the agency argues that the solicitation
mitigates risk by permitting price adjustments for
"unforeseeable major changes in market conditions." Contracting
Officer's Statement para. 46 (citing RFP sect. D.41).
With respect to the protester's objection to solicitation
provisions regarding compliance with federal IT security
standards, the agency asserts that it "expects offerors to price
said compliance into [the] transaction fee over the life of the
contract." Id. para. 63. The agency maintains that many of the
federal standards in question align with commercial security
standards. Id. para. 65. The agency also points out that the
provisions at issue reflect the necessity that the agency itself
comply with the security standards in question. Id.
Regarding the solicitation provisions that require the ETS2
system to support various customer agency functions, the agency
suggests that the risk to offerors is reduced because the
solicitation encourages offerors to offer an ETS2 system that is
"configurable," meaning a system in which updates are made
through changes to "business rules and policy" rather than
through custom software development. Id. para. 58. The agency
states that it understands that certain system integration
activities related to customer agency functions "may be more
costly for some vendors," but maintains that meeting customer
agency needs is a "key component of ETS2." Id. paras. 59, 61.
As for the provisions regarding ETS2 system alignment with the
FEA framework, the agency asserts that several pertinent
industry standards are consistent the FEA framework. Id. para.
62. The agency defends the solicitation provision regarding ETS2
system compatibility with emerging mobile platforms on grounds
that the provision is an SOW objective, and therefore is not a
mandatory requirement. Id. para. 66. Finally, the agency
explains that consistent with GSA Acquisition Manual sect.
517.204(c), the contracting officer sought and obtained approval
from the head of the contracting authority to exceed the 5-year
limitation on service contracts found at FAR sect. 17.204(c).
Id. para. 42; see also AR, Tab 46, Determination and Finding to
Exceed Five‑Year Performance Limitation for ETS2 RFP. The agency
also asserts that commercial contracts of similar complexity as
ETS2 typically involve terms of 15 years or longer. Contracting
Officer's Statement para. 42.
In its comments on the agency report, the protester renews its
arguments that solicitation imposes excessive risk on the ETS2
contractor. Comments at 29-36; see also Comments at 6-7, 9-10,
17-29. At base, the protester's position remains that the
provisions at issue improperly "require the Contractors to
estimate the future costs and investment necessary to meet
undefined demands for the next fifteen years." Id. at 30-31.
The mere presence of risk in a solicitation does not make the
solicitation inappropriate or improper. It is within the
administrative discretion of an agency to offer for competition
a proposed contract that imposes maximum risks on the contractor
and minimum burdens on the agency, and an offeror should account
for this in formulating its proposal. JRS Mgmt., B-402650.2,
June 25, 2010, 2010 CPD para. 147 at 5; TN-KY Contractors,
B-291997.2, May 5, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 91 at 3. There is no
requirement that a competition be based on specifications
drafted in such detail as to completely eliminate all risk or
remove every uncertainty from the mind of every prospective
offeror. Abba Int'l, Inc. et al., B-311225.4, Feb. 2, 2009, 2009
CPD para. 28 at 7; AirTrak Travel et al., B-292101 et al., June
30, 2003, 2003 CPD para. 117 at 14. Risk is inherent in most
type of contracts, especially fixed-price contracts, and firms
must use their professional expertise and business judgment in
anticipating a variety of influences affecting performance
costs. JRS Mgmt., supra; AirTrak Travel et al, supra.
While we appreciate that the solicitation here imposes risk on
the contractor by requiring pricing to include the cost of
updating the ETS2 system over a potentially lengthy term, we do
not find, on the record before us, that the solicitation exposes
offerors to unacceptable or undue risk. CWT has identified
certain system updates for which there may be uncertainty
regarding the required effort or cost. CWT, however, has not
shown that offerors cannot minimize the risk attendant to such
uncertainty through, among other things, the measures suggested
by the agency. Nor has CWT shown that there is a significant
likelihood that the cost of complying with the solicitation
provisions in question will greatly exceed that which can be
reasonably anticipated. The protester also has not shown that
the solicitation places no limit on the required work. To the
contrary, there are distinct parameters around the scope of
work; e.g., offerors must update the ETS2 system to comply with
changes within a distinct set of federal regulations and
policies and must conform the system to support a number of
distinct customer agency functions. In this regard, the
solicitation provides offerors with adequate information to
factor risk into pricing using business judgment.
Moreover, the solicitation permits offerors to account for risk
by escalating their pricing in each of the three 4-year option
periods, see RFP sections B.2.1, B.2.2, and by permitting the
negotiation of price adjustments in the event of "unforeseeable"
changes in market conditions. Id. sect. D.41. Finally, the
agency is willing to accept the risk of higher prices because it
expects a reduction in the administrative burden of negotiating
change orders for ETS2 system updates. The agency's decision to
accept this risk is not improper. See Braswell Servs. Group,
Inc., B-278521, Feb. 9, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 49 at 5 n.6. CWT's
protest regarding the solicitation's alleged imposition of
excessive risk is denied. (CWTSatoTravel,
B-404479.2, April 22, 2011) (pdf)
JRS also protests
the Navy's amendment of the RFQ's schedule of supplies and
services, arguing that the solicitation should provide a second
CLIN for the additional hours (up to 5 percent of the overall
contract hours) that the sail loft instructor may be required to
work. JRS contends that without another CLIN for these
additional hours there would be no way for the vendor to charge
the agency for any additional hours performed. Protest at 3. The
Navy responds that it expects vendors to account for the
possibility of the additional hours when pricing their
quotations.
We find no basis to object to the agency's request that vendors
provide sail loft instructor pricing under a single CLIN.
Although the risk that additional hours (up to 5 percent of the
overall contract hours) may be required, the imposition of risk
on an offeror or vendor does not make the solicitation
inappropriate or improper. It is within the discretion of an
agency to offer for competition a proposed contract that imposes
maximum risks upon the contractor and minimum burdens on the
agency, and an offeror should account for this in formulating
its proposal. TN-KY Contractors, B-291997.2, May 5, 2003, 2003
CPD para. 91 at 3. Risk is inherent in most type of contracts,
especially fixed-price contracts, and firms must use their
professional expertise and business judgment in anticipating a
variety of influences affecting performance costs. See Sea-Land
Serv., Inc., B-278404.2, Feb. 9, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 47 at 11.
Here, the RFQ provides sufficient information upon which firms
can price their quotations and does not have an unlimited scope
of work. (JRS Management,
B-402650.2, June 25, 2010) (pdf)
Quantico's
protest essentially raises one issue--that the RFQ improperly
fails to specify with precision what is meant by the size
designations of small, medium, large, extra large, and XX large.
In this regard, Quantico contends that there is no single
industry standard for shirt sizes, and that a sample of only two
large-sized shirts will not allow the Marine Corps to determine
whether vendors are offering comparably-sized products.
In response, the Marine Corps argues that it has adequately
stated its needs in the context of a purchase of commercial
items. While the agency acknowledges that it uses size
specifications for short- and long-sleeved T-shirts, it contends
it is not required to do so here. The Marine Corps explains that
in the case of short- and long-sleeved T-shirts, those shirts
are part of the visible uniform, making a high degree of
consistency important. The agency explained that it decided not
to specify sizes in this procurement because it places a higher
priority on the flame-resistant function, than on uniformity of
sizes.
The Marine Corps also points out that T‑shirts intended for
Marines to wear during physical fitness activities and under
their daily uniforms might be sized differently than a
flame-resistant base-layer garment, like long-sleeved FROG
shirts. That is, T‑shirts are expected to be looser-fitting,
while flame-resistant FROG shirts are intended to be worn under
the layers of a combat uniform, and thus, may be closer-fitting.
Agency Report at 2. The Marine Corps rejects any connection
between using size measurements in procuring T-shirts, while not
doing so in procuring FROG shirts, and rejects Quantico's claim
that one competitor's large shirt is sized smaller than the
T-shirt size standards used by the Marine Corps. Agency Report
at 7.
Finally, the Marine Corps explains that in all three of its
recent purchases of FROG shirts (of which two were the brand
that Quantico challenges as undersized), the solicitation left
the sizes undefined, and the Marine Corps is satisfied with the
results of those procurements. Agency Report at 9. The Marine
Corps summarizes its judgment as follows:
In order to receive the best product available [the Marine
Corps] in its best technical judgment, determined that
inserting numeric size dimensions . . . would unnecessarily
limit a prospective offeror's ability to offer the best
product to meet the Marine Corps requirement.
Agency Report at 2-3.
In reply, Quantico argues that the Marine Corps will not obtain
sufficient information from vendors to allow the agency to
compare quotations, and notes that even retail stores resort to
setting size standards for their products. Protester's Comments
at 6‑8. Quantico also argues that even if the large-sized sample
shirts show similar sizing among vendors, the Marine Corps will
not know whether other sizes are consistent with previous
purchases of long-sleeved FROG shirts. Protester's Comments at
10. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the agency
was not required to include detailed size specifications in this
solicitation.
The FSS program, directed and managed by the General Services
Administration, gives federal agencies a simplified process for
obtaining commonly used commercial supplies and services.
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.402(a). In
preparing specifications for commercial item procurements,
contracting officers are encouraged to "describe the type of
product . . . and explain how the agency intends to use the
product . . . in terms of function to be performed, performance
requirement or essential physical characteristics." FAR sect.
12.202(b). A key element of efforts to increase purchases of
commercial products is stating requirements in broad functional
or performance terms, rather than using detailed military
specifications. Wincor Mgmt. Group, Inc., B-278925, Apr.
10, 1998, 98‑1 CPD para. 106 at 2‑3. While we will consider a
protest that a solicitation lacks sufficient detail for vendors
to compete intelligently, and on a common basis, for an order,
the level of detail needed in a commercial item specification is
a matter left largely to the judgment of agency contracting
officials. Adventure Tech, Inc., B-253520, Sept. 29,
1993, 93-2 CPD para. 202 at 5 (denying protest that IFB for rain
jackets in sizes "large, medium, and small" was defective
because sizes were not defined); see also Adventure Tech,
Inc.‑‑Recons. & Entitlement to Costs, B‑253520.2,
B-253520.3, Feb. 9, 1994, 94‑1 CPD para. 105 at 3.
We recognize that the approach taken by the Marine Corps here
generates some risk. By not specifying what it means by each of
the stated sizes in this solicitation, the agency risks that
some vendors might attempt to cut corners on shirt sizes to save
money on fabric costs, and thus undercut their competition.
There is also some risk that the agency might receive shirt
sizes that do not meet its (unstated) expectations. On the other
hand, we also recognize that this procurement is limited to
companies that already hold FSS contracts, so that the Marine
Corps might reasonably expect that it will receive quotations
for products that are acceptable in the commercial marketplace.
In our view, the risk here is consistent with--and appropriate
in light of--longstanding Congressional direction that agencies
should take advantage of the commercial marketplace, and avoid
creating detailed specifications for commercial goods. 10 U.S.C.
sect. 2377 (2000); see also S. Rep. No. 103-258, at 5 (1994), as
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2566 (“The purchase of
proven products such as commercial . . . items can . . . reduce
the need for detailed design specifications or expensive product
testing”). Here, there is an existing commercial market for
these shirts, and the Marine Corps has experience in purchasing
(directly or indirectly) almost 250,000 such shirts in the
recent past without incident.
In short, we cannot conclude that the agency was required to
impose size specifications on the vendors of these flame
resistant shirts. We also think that Quantico has not
established that the lack of size specifications in the RFQ
impairs vendors from competing intelligently, and on a common
basis, for this Marine Corps requirement. See Adventure Tech,
Inc.‑‑Recons. & Entitlement to Costs, supra. (Quantico
Arms & Tactical Supply, Inc., B-400391, September 19, 2008)
(pdf)
The crux of BAE's
protest is based on its interpretation of the term "Contractor's
facility." BAE contends that the use of the term "Contractor's
facility" in describing where the work had to be performed, as
well as the location and place of performance, precluded the use
of a government-owned drydocking facility. In support of this
argument, BAE argues that the use of the possessive case denoted
ownership, which required the drydocking facility to be
contractor-owned. In this connection, BAE cites the definitions
of "Federally-controlled facilities" and government property
contained in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sections 2.101
and 45.101. Section 2.101 defines federally-controlled
facilities as including federally owned buildings or leased
space and section 45.101 defines government property as all
property owned or leased by the government. BAE argues that
these definitions indicate that the Navy's graving dock, which
is a government-owned facility, cannot be considered a
"Contractor's facility," which BAE asserts was required to be
used to perform the work under the IFB, and that Puglia's bid,
based on the use of this government-owned facility, is
nonresponsive.
The Coast Guard responds that the term "Contractor's facility"
in the various provisions of the IFB only identified the
location of contract performance and does not denote or suggest
facility ownership. In fact, according to the Coast Guard, the
San Diego Naval Station Graving Dock was one of the facilities
that the Coast Guard, during the pre-solicitation stage,
contemplated would be proposed under the solicitation because it
is a Coast Guard-certified facility approved for work on this
class cutter, and that there are only a limited number of
useable drydock facilities that meet the IFB's geographical
restrictions.
Where a dispute exists as to the meaning of the IFB's terms, our
Office resolves the matter by reading the IFB as a whole and in
a manner that gives effect to all the IFB's provisions. D & L
Constr. Co., Inc., B-279132, May 11, 1998, 98-1 CPD para. 136 at
4. To be reasonable, an interpretation of the IFB language must
be consistent with the IFB when read as a whole. Id. We will not
read a provision restrictively where it is not clear from the
solicitation that such a restrictive interpretation was intended
by the agency. Sturm, Ruger & Co., B-250555, Feb. 2, 1993, 93-1
CPD para. 92 at 5.
Based on our review of the IFB as a whole, we find that BAE's
restrictive interpretation of the term "Contractor's facility"
under this IFB as requiring a contractor-owned facility and
prohibiting a government-owned facility is not reasonable. We
agree with the Coast Guard that the term "Contractor's
facility," as used in the IFB, merely denotes the drydock
facility where the contractor will perform the work and that the
use of the term contractor in the possessive in these provisions
is recognizing nothing more than the possessive relationship
between the contractor and the facility it was proposing. In
this regard, the IFB is devoid of any language making ownership
of the drydock a prerequisite to performing the work, nor does
it specifically exclude the use of government-owned facilities.
In the absence of a specific requirement for contractor
ownership of the drydocking facilities or a prohibition on using
government-owed drydocking facilities, there is no basis to
conclude that the possessive nature of the term "Contractor's
facility" requires that the drydock facilities be contractor
owned or precludes the use of government-owned drydock
facilities. Thus, neither the general definition of federally
controlled property in FAR sect. 2.201 nor the definition in FAR
sect. 45.101, which only applies when the procuring agency is
providing property under the contract, are relevant here, since
neither regulation defines Contractor's facility or property,
and the drydock is not being provided to the contractor by the
Coast Guard under the contract. Since the IFB did not make
contractor ownership of the drydock a material term, Puglia’s
bid was responsive since it took no exception to the IFB.
BAE nevertheless argues that the bid was conditioned on the Navy
making the drydock facility available to Puglia under the
contract, and that the record reflects that Puglia did not have
approval of its use agreement with the Navy until June 4, which
was after contract award. The timing of the approval of Puglia's
agreement with the Navy to use its drydock has no effect on the
responsiveness of Puglia's bid, which bound Puglia to perform
the work at that facility. Rather, this is a matter that could
affect Puglia's ability to perform in accordance with its bid,
that is, its responsibility or to the administration of the
contract, which under the circumstances is not appropriate for
our review. In this regard, we note that Puglia has in fact
performed the contract at the Navy facility. See Aviation
Specialists, Inc; Aviation Enters., Inc., B-218597; B-218597.2,
Aug 15, 1985, 85-2 CPD para. 174 at 2. (BAE
Systems San Diego Ship Repair, B-400350, September 22, 2008)
(pdf)
Here, as stated further below, although we cannot find that this
solicitation for security guard services is a model of clarity
regarding the agency's overall training requirements for the
guards, we believe that, when read as a whole, the requirements
are sufficiently clear to have allowed AMS to prepare its price
proposal. Initially, although AMS asserts that a chart of
training requirements included in the RFP is inconsistent with
the training requirements set out elsewhere in the RFP, the
record does not support the protester’s contention. Although the
RFP provides that all security guards working under this
contract must take the training specified in the chart, there is
no indication that the chart was intended or presented as a
definitive and complete list of the numerous training
requirements listed throughout the RFP. Instead, as discussed
below, the solicitation must be read as a whole to assess the
full extent of the training required here, including the
requirements of exhibits 4A through 4F. While the protester
asserts that the RFP’s training chart failed to list the number
of hours for chemical agent spray training (one training subject
listed under exhibit 4E), the RFP, as noted above, specifically
advised that the contractor was to decide how many hours would
be necessary for each training topic. The omission of an
estimate of hours for chemical agent spray training topic in no
way prevented the protester from making that determination of
hours for chemical agent spray training based on its own
knowledge, experience, research, and business judgment.
Additionally, while, as the protester points out, the RFP
training chart also failed to include exhibit 4C’s
government-provided training hours, the solicitation makes clear
that such training was mandatory under exhibit 4C. In short, we
do not agree with the protester that the chart in any way
created a material inconsistency in the RFP that prevented
intelligent preparation of a proposal under the solicitation. As
to the protester’s other specific allegations--for instance,
that the RFP is flawed for not listing baton equipment, under
the RFP, the contractor was responsible for providing all
equipment to perform the services required under this
solicitation, including baton training; in our view, this would
reasonably include the cost of the batons. Lastly, regarding the
protester’s contention that the requirement of 40 hours of
annual refresher weapons training under exhibit 4F appears
inconsistent with the RFP’s general provision that no specific
additional training is required for the guards’ annual
requalification, we agree that the solicitation is not a model
of clarity concerning what “specific additional training” is
referred to in the provision. Exhibit 4F, however, specifically
requires no less than 40 hours of training using the course at
exhibit 4E. Consequently, in our view, the solicitation’s
notation that no specific additional training is required can
only refer to the fact that, in light of the mandatory training
of exhibit 4F, no training for requalification beyond that
referenced in exhibit 4F is required by the RFP. (AMS
Group, B-299369, April 12, 2007) (pdf)
The principal issue in this case concerns a matter of statutory
interpretation, specifically, whether the RFP, which provides
for the award of a 6-year contract, violates 31 U.S.C. sect.
5114(c).[7] It is well established that “when the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts--at least
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd--is to
enforce it according to its terms.” Hartford Underwriters Ins.
Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 147 L. Ed. 2d
1, 120 S. Ct. 1942 (2000). See Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language is plain and admits of
no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not
arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no
discussion.”). We believe that the plain language of section
5114(c) resolves the protest here. The relevant portion of
section 5114(c) expressly provides that the BEP may enter into a
contract “for a period of not more than four years” for the
manufacture of currency paper. The RFP provides for the award of
a currency paper contract with a total period of 6 years. The
BEP argues that while the RFP allows for the award of contract
for a period of 6 years, such an award does not violate section
5114(c) because the manufacturing period of such a contract
would be limited to 4 years, and that the additional 2 years are
merely a mobilization period, rather than a manufacturing
period. The agency’s argument, however, does not comport with
the limiting language of section 5114(c), which modifies the
length of the contract period, not the period of any specific
activity under the contract. The phrase in section 5114(c)--“to
manufacture distinctive paper for United States currency and
securities”--simply describes the type of contract whose term is
limited to a 4-year period. (Crane &
Company, Inc., B-297398, January 18, 2006) (pdf)
The agency’s actions were unobjectionable; the RFP requirements
remained the same throughout the procurement, so there was no
need for the agency to amend the solicitation. The RFP clearly
required compliance with state regulations that made it
“necessary to produce and sustain a five foot difference between
the depth of waste and the water table.” PWS sect. 6.2.3. Shaw
does not dispute the clarity of this requirement. Thereafter,
while, as Shaw alleges, the agency responded to various
questions regarding the requirement, all of its answers were
consistent with the RFP. For example, Shaw asked if “the
performance standard [was] regulator approval or sustaining a 5
foot difference.” RFP, amend. 8, at 7, Question No. 25. The
agency responded that the “performance standard [was] to meet
the requirements in Title 27.” Id., Answer No. 25. The agency
addressed other offerors’ questions similarly, by either
referring offerors to the Question 25 response, or otherwise
calling for the contractor to meet the regulatory requirements
in Title 27. Id., Question/Answer Nos. 75-76. Nothing in these
responses, calling for compliance with Title 27 as a whole,
indicated that the otherwise clearly stated 5‑foot requirement
had been relaxed. Although the regulatory provisions dealing
with closure of landfills (sections 20080 and 20950) do not
mention the 5-foot requirement, this silence did not serve to
relax the requirement which, again, was clearly stated in the
RFP. There is nothing inherently inconsistent in requiring the
5‑foot separation to meet the section 20950 requirement to
minimize infiltration of water into waste, and the section
20080(b) allowance of the use of alternative methods that afford
“equivalent protection against water quality impairment.” 27 CCR
sect. 20080(b)(2)(B). Shaw therefore had no reasonable basis to
believe that the agency had modified the PWS to eliminate the
5‑foot separation requirement, and it follows that there was no
basis for the agency subsequently to advise Shaw that the
requirement was reinstated. Since Shaw’s alternative approach
did not address the separation requirement, its proposal was
reasonably rejected as technically unacceptable. (Shaw
Environmental, Inc., B-297294, December 2, 2005) (pdf)
Here, in bidding f.a.s. Tacoma, OPC offered delivery of the
requested commodity at a location listed in the KC-362, as
specifically authorized by the terms of the invitation. However,
OPC lacked a critical piece of information necessary for it to
compete intelligently and on an equal basis--that acceptance of
its offer depended on receipt by the agency of a transportation
bid matching its delivery location, in a solicitation for
freight bids that was being conducted roughly concurrently with
the procurement for the potato flakes. OPC thus bid f.a.s.
Tacoma without the knowledge that it risked being ineligible for
award if the transportation solicitation did not produce a
corresponding transportation bid. The agency's failure to alert
offerors to this potentially fatal pitfall meant that OPC lacked
sufficient information to bid intelligently on this invitation;
that is, had OPC known about the risk that its offer might not
be considered depending on the outcome of the solicitation for
transportation bids, it might have offered delivery to other
locations (for example, to its plant location, as did the other
offerors), or decided not to compete at all. (Oregon
Potato Company, B-294839, December 27, 2004) (pdf)
Notwithstanding the contracting officers reasons for not
amending the RFQ, we think it is clear from the record that the
RFQ did not clearly convey the Armys staffing requirements.
Although the contracting officer stated, as quoted above, that
she expected to receive technical and price quotations for eight
positions only, with the additional personnel being addressed
only in the technical portion of each quotation, we believe the
RFQ did not make this distinction. [10] As described above, the
RFQ solicited staff over and above the eight core positions and,
as evidenced by the quotations of all four vendors, all of them
understood that the RFQ required additional support. In this
regard, the vendors--albeit to varying degrees--quoted prices
for these additional personnel, since there was nothing in the
RFQ that even suggested that the vendors were not supposed to
price the additional support. In fact, the RFQ stated that
vendors should provide a spreadsheet listing all labor
categories, hourly rates, and extended labor costs. RFQ 15.5.
If, as the contracting officer now argues, the RFQ was intended
to seek prices for only the eight core positions, then the RFQ
did not reasonably convey this intent. Where an agency invites
firms to submit quotations, it has an obligation to describe its
needs accurately, so that all vendors may compete on a common
basis. Nautica Intl, Inc. , B-254428, Dec. 15, 1993, 93-2 CPD
321 at 5. GSAs failure to accurately reflect in the RFQ the
Armys perceived need for only eight positions, in our view,
created confusion among the competitors and uncertainty about
the total cost of each vendors approach. This lack of clarity in
the RFQ led to a flawed evaluation. Since each vendor addressed
the additional support differently, the contracting officer had
no way to meaningfully compare the total cost of each vendors
quotation to the other quotations. Thus, the contracting officer
eliminated from consideration Alions quotation based on its
excessively high price, which included the additional support
that was required under the terms of the RFQ. The contracting
officers decision was improper, absent a determination by the
contracting officer that Alions total price was unreasonable in
light of its technical approach. In short, here, the contracting
officer never meaningfully evaluated the total prices quoted by
Alion and the other vendors in the context of their proposed
technical approaches to meet all of the RFQ requirements, but,
rather, based the evaluation on the eight core positions only.
We conclude that the contracting officers actions were
unreasonable. See Symplicity Corp. , B-291902, Apr. 29, 2003,
2003 CPD 89 at 7 (agency must meaningfully assess total cost to
government when evaluating quotations). (Alion
Science & Technology Corporation, B-294159; B-294159.2,
September 10, 2004) (pdf)
When a dispute exists as to the meaning of a solicitation
requirement, our Office will resolve the matter by reading the
solicitation as a whole and in a manner that gives effect to all
the provisions of the solicitation. Energy Maint. Corp.,
B-223328, Aug. 27, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 234 at 4. Here, RAM’s
proposal reflected the RFP as clarified. Specifically, the RFP
as clarified defined the requested core staffing in a manner
that indicated a desire for a reduced operational component. In
instructing offerors “to propose the costs for providing a CORE
staff responsible for maintenance of the equipment and other
management requirements,” “to propose a CORE group to handle
maintenance,” and to address how they “will ramp up with an
adequate number of operators when needed,” the RFP indicated
that the core staffing should be based on the maintenance
requirement, with any additional staffing required for
operations to come from surge staffing. RFP, amend. No. 0002,
Question and Answer Nos. 58, 63. Further, although not binding
on the agency, the contracting officer’s statements during the
site visit‑‑instructing offerors to reduce costs by bidding on a
core group of full-time employees, with the capability to obtain
additional personnel during surge requirements, and raising the
possibility that significantly lower staffing might be
acceptable‑‑reinforced this direction. COS, Sept. 29, 2003, at
1, 6. We conclude that RAM’s proposal to meet the solicitation’s
maintenance requirements with a core staff, and to meet
additional operational missions by providing additional
maintenance operators, as needed, from a pool of surge
employees, was consistent with the RFP. In these circumstances,
TSMO’s assignment of weaknesses to RAM’s proposal on account of
its reduced core staffing, reliance on surge staffing for some
operational requirements, and attempt to mitigate the directed
staffing reduction by extensive cross-training, was
unreasonable, and we sustain RAM’s protest on this basis. (Research
Analysis & Maintenance, Inc.; Westar Aerospace & Defense Group,
Inc., B-292587.4; B-292587.5; B-292587.6; B-292587.7;
B‑292587.8, November 17, 2003) (pdf)
Under Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 16.202, an agency
properly may solicit on a fixed-price basis if performance
uncertainties can be identified and reasonable estimates of
their cost impact can be made, and the contractor is willing to
accept a fixed price representing assumption of the risks
involved. Here, we believe that the agency has made every
reasonable effort to identify and disclose the performance
uncertainties associated with this procurement. Moreover, as
noted by the agency, travel services have traditionally been
procured on a fixed-priced basis, a wealth of information was
provided to offerors, and offerors could factor in the risk of
the DTS in their proposed fees. Also, we believe a significant
portion of the risk complained of by the protesters was
addressed by certain equitable adjustment provisions in the RFP,
including amendment No. 0011, as discussed in more detail below.
Although the protesters suggest that it would be more
appropriate to negotiate the DTS‑related services with each
contractor on a cost basis after award to adequately insulate
the protesters from the risks of the DTS, there is no
requirement for the agency to take this approach. There are
considerable problems associated with noncompetitively
negotiating, evaluating and monitoring small business costs in
an industry whose fees are generally fixed-price. Moreover, the
agency advises that a major element of transitioning to an
automated process requires the agency to establish contracts
with CTOs that cover both the traditional services and the new
automated DTS services, and to mix the traditional and automated
services to meet the full spectrum of DoD's requirements. See
Agency Report, DTS/PMO Statement, at 4. While we are mindful, as
the protesters note, that miscalculating risk can be detrimental
to small businesses, it is, as noted above, within the ambit of
an agency's administrative discretion to solicit offers for a
contract imposing maximum risk upon the contractor and minimum
burdens upon the government. National Customer Eng'g, supra. We
therefore find no basis to find that the agency has imposed
undue risk on the offerors or question the agency's decision to
use a fixed‑price contract here. (AirTrak
Travel etal., B-292101; B-292101.2; B-292101.3; B-292101.4;
B-292101.5, June 30, 2003) (pdf)
The mere presence of risk in a solicitation does not make the
solicitation inappropriate or improper. It is within the ambit
of administrative discretion for an agency to offer for
competition a proposed contract that imposes maximum risks upon
the contractor and minimum burdens on the agency, and an offeror
should account for this in formulating its proposal. Instrument
Control Serv., Inc.; Science & Mgmt. Res., Inc., B-289660,
B-289660.2, Apr. 15, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 66 at 7; Clifford La
Tourelle, B-271505, June 5, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 270 at 3. Here, the
protester has not demonstrated that the allocation of risk is
unreasonable. Contrary to the protester's contentions, the
work here is not unlimited, but is restricted to grass cutting
and grounds maintenance of specified areas and acreage for
specified durations within specified height requirements. [3]
The RFP also includes maps of the cutting areas, and provided
contractors with the opportunity to visit the site to inspect
the type of grass and vegetation growing. In our view, the RFP
provides sufficient information for offerors to intelligently
formulate their prices. (TN-KY Contractors,
B-291997.2, May 5, 2003) (pdf)
Risks
are inherent in procurements, and an agency may properly impose
substantial risk upon the contractor, even where the risk in
question is financial in nature. Bean Dredging Corp., B-239952,
Oct. 12, 1990, 90-2 CPD ¶ 286 at 3. There is no legal
requirement that a solicitation be drafted so as to eliminate
all performance uncertainties; the mere presence of risk does
not render a solicitation improper. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc.,
B-278521, Feb. 9, 1998, 98-1 CPD ¶ 49 at 3. Thus, offerors are
reasonably expected to use their professional expertise and
business judgment in anticipating risks and computing their
offers. McDermott Shipyards, Division of McDermott, Inc.,
B-237049, Jan. 29, 1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 121 at 7. In this regard, a
procuring agency must provide sufficient information in a
solicitation to enable offerors to compete intelligently and on
a relatively equal basis. Braswell Servs. Group, Inc., supra at
3. (Flight
Safety International, B-290595, August 2, 2002) (pdf)
Where estimates are provided in a
solicitation, there is no requirement that they be absolutely
correct; rather they must be based on the best information
available and present a reasonably accurate representation of
the agency's anticipated actual needs. Service Technicians,
Inc., B-249329.2, Nov. 12, 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 342 at 2.
(Crown
Contract Services, B-288573, October 31, 2001) (pdf)
The issue originally raised by the
protester-- whether it should have received credit for
experience in special use areas-- in fact turns on whether the
RFP adequately indicated that the contractor would be called on
to provide specialized maintenance and repair work of the type
now said by the agency to be required at the DEA, EPA, and FBI
laboratories. If the solicitation, reasonably read, did not so
indicate, the agency could not reasonably deny credit to the
protester for lack of such experience without first amending the
RFP to advise that such services would be required. As Page 6 B-
285127 discussed below, we conclude that the RFP did not place
offerors on notice that they would be required to perform
specialized maintenance and repair work. A procuring agency must
provide sufficient information in a solicitation to enable
offerors to compete intelligently and on a relatively equal
basis. J& J Maintenance, Inc., B- 272166, July 29, 1996, 96-
2 CPD para. 56 at 3. An agency can accomplish this by furnishing
offerors with sufficiently detailed information in the
solicitation or, to the extent the agency is unable to furnish
the necessary level of detail, by giving offerors the
opportunity to obtain such information on their own through site
visits. (Meridian
Management Corporation, B-285127, July 19, 2000) (pdf))
Solicitations must contain
sufficient information to enable bidders to compete
intelligently and on a relatively equal basis. RMS Indus.,
B-248678, Aug. 14, 1992, 92-2 CPD para. 109 at 2. There is no
requirement, however, that a solicitation be drafted so as to
eliminate all possible risk to the contractor. Id. An agency may
properly impose substantial risk upon the contractor and minimal
risk upon itself, and offerors reasonably are expected to use
their professional expertise and business judgment in
anticipating risks and preparing their offers. AT&T Corp.,
B-270841 et al., May 1, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 237 at 8. Here, the
risk imposed on offerors appears to affect all offerors equally
and all offerors are capable of taking those risks into account
in preparing their proposals; ARAMARK, as the incumbent, is most
familiar with the recent historical pattern and in this respect
should be particularly able to calculate the risk factor in
preparing its proposal. It is proper for agencies to impose
reasonable risks on contractors in order to limit the burdens on
the government. International Creative and Training, Ltd.,
B-245379, Jan. 6, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 26 at 5. Under the
actual-count system, offerors bear a risk that fewer students
than anticipated may avail themselves of the food and that the
contractor will be able to bill the government for only that
smaller number of meals. If that risk did not fall on the
contractor, the government would bear it: that is, either the
contractor risks incurring costs for meals that are not served,
or the government risks paying for meals in excess of the actual
number served. It is within FLETC's discretion, in the exercise
of its business judgment, to impose those risks, which ARAMARK
has not shown to be unreasonable. (ARAMARK
Services, Inc., B-282232.2, June 18, 1999)
|