FAR
19.602: Certificate of Competency |
Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
New
Because SBA, not our Office, has conclusive authority to
determine a small business firm's responsibility, we
generally will not review the SBA's refusal or decision to
issue a [Certificate of Competency] COC. Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. §
21.5(b)(2); Integrity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., B-283094.2, May
3, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 67 at 3. The exceptions, which GAO
will interpret narrowly out of deference to the role of
the SBA in this area, are protests that show possible bad
faith on the part of government officials, or that present
allegations that the SBA failed to follow its own
published regulations or failed to consider vital
information bearing on the firm's responsibility due to
the manner in which the information was presented to or
withheld from the SBA by the procuring agency. 4 C.F.R. §
21.5(b)(2).
Where, as here, an offeror protests the issuance of a COC
to a competitor on the ground that the SBA failed to
consider "vital information" bearing on a firm's
responsibility, we will consider the protest only where
the solicitation contains definitive responsibility
criteria and the issue raised concerns the competitor's
compliance with those criteria. Integrity Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., supra.
MPC recognizes this narrow exception and contends that the
following RFP provision establishes definitive
responsibility criteria:
CONTRACTOR RESPONSIBILITY AND
ELIGIBILITY FOR AWARD . . .
(a) The Government may award up to
two (2) contracts to the offerors that:
(1) submits [sic] the lowest
evaluated offer if award is based on price only, or
the offer that provides the best value to the
Government if factors in addition to price are
identified elsewhere in this solicitation; and
(2) submits [sic] a bid or proposal that meets all
the material requirements of this solicitiation, and
(3) meets [sic] all the responsibility criteria at
FAR 9.104.
(b) To make sure that you meet the
responsibility criteria at FAR 9.104 we may:
(1) arrange a visit to your plant and
perform a preaward survey;
(2) ask you to provide financial, technical,
production, or managerial background information.
(c) If you don't provide us with the
data we ask for within 7 days from the date you
receive our request, or if you refuse to have us visit
your facility, we may determine you nonresponsible.
(d) If we visit your facility, please make sure that
you have current certified financial statements and
other data relevant to your bid or proposal available
for our team to review.
Supp. Protest at 2; RFP at 104
(emphasis in original). According to MPC, by explicitly
incorporating a reference to section 9.104, the
solicitation "made the enumerated requirements of FAR
9.104" definitive responsibility criteria. Protester's
Comments at 6.
We disagree with the protester that this provision
establishes definitive responsibility criteria.
Solicitation provisions such as the one above establish
performance requirements that must be satisfied by the
successful offeror during contract performance and do not
affect the award decision, except as a matter of a
contractor's general responsibility. See, e.g., HBC Mgmt.
Servs., Inc., B-407585, Jan. 14, 2013, 2013 CPD ¶ 32 at 4.
Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and
objective standards designed to measure a prospective
contractor's ability to perform the contract.
Reyna-Capital Joint Venture, B-408541, Nov. 1, 2013, 2013
CPD ¶ 253 at 2. Here, as DLA and SBA both point out, the
provision above only identifies the FAR's general
responsibility standards and do not identify specific and
objective standards. COS/MOL at 4-5; SBA's Comments at 4.
While traditional responsibility factors may be used as
technical evaluation criteria in a negotiated procurement
when the agency's needs warrant a comparative evaluation
of those areas, here the RFP did not include technical
evaluation factors. RFP at 103-5; see, e.g., Hughes
Georgia, Inc., B-272526, Oct. 21, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 151 at
5. Moreover, offerors were not required to submit
technical proposals or specific information regarding past
performance or experience that could be objectively
measured. See RFP at 96-105. Rather, the RFP, by its plain
terms, afforded the contracting officer discretion to
request a pre-award survey, including financial,
technical, production, or managerial information in that
regard. Id. at 104.
MPC's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. For
example, MPC contends that the provision above was
intended to limit which offerors were eligible to compete
for the procurement. Protester's Comments at 6. However,
the provision did not require offerors to submit any
information in order to compete. See, e.g., Action Serv.
Corp., B-246413, B-246413.2, Mar. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 267
at 3-4 (denying protest of a small business'
responsibility determination where no submissions were
requested or contemplated to establish compliance with the
RFP criteria in question). Furthermore, contrary to MPC's
assertion, the RFP was not amended to "explicitly"
incorporate the reference to FAR section 9.104. See
Protester's Comments at 7. Instead, the record shows that
the RFP, as originally issued, incorporated the same FAR
reference, in the same solicitation provision. Compare RFP
(original version) at 103, with RFP Amend. 2 at 2, and RFP
(conformed version) at 4-5, 104.
Here, because we find that the RFP did not include
definitive responsibility criteria, we will not consider
the protester's allegation that SBA did not take into
account "vital information" bearing on NAFTI's
responsibility when issuing a COC. Integrity Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., supra (noting that our Office will not consider
protest that SBA failed to consider vital information in
issuing a COC, where the alleged vital information does
not concern awardee's compliance with a definitive
responsibility criterion). Accordingly, we have no reason
to question SBA's issuance of a COC to NAFTI.
In any event, even if MPC were correct (it is not) that
the RFP provision above establishes definitive
responsibility criteria, the protester's allegations still
do not meet the requirements for invoking our jurisdiction
to review SBA's issuance of a COC. In this respect, the
protester has not shown that the alleged error by SBA in
issuing the COC was caused by DLA's failure to adequately
inform the SBA of the information. E. F. Felt Co., Inc.,
B-289295, Feb. 5, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 37 at 4. The record
here reveals that, in referring her nonresponsibility
determination to the SBA for review, the contracting
officer provided SBA a copy of her nonresponsibility
determination, the solicitation (including all
amendments), NAFTI's proposal, the abstract of offers,
DCMA's survey report, and various technical data,
including specifications for the fuel bladders. AR, Tab 8,
DLA Referral Letter to SBA, at 1-2; CO's Decl. ¶ 6
We thus agree with DLA that the "protester has not
identified any information that was wrongfully withheld
from SBA, nor any information that was presented in a
misleading or inaccurate way. [MPC] simply do[es] not
agree with the results of the [pre-award survey] or the
methodology followed in compiling the information . . . ."
COS/MOL at 6. MPC's disagreement with the survey
assessment does not establish that DLA's presentation of
information to the SBA was inaccurate, incomplete, or
misleading. Vetsummit, LLC, B-405187, Aug. 29, 2011, 2011
CPD ¶ 172 at 4 (denying protest where the protester's
arguments reflect only its disagreement with the agency's
assessment, which is inadequate to invoke our Office's
limited jurisdiction to review SBA's COC determination);
LCPtracker, Inc.; eMars, Inc., B-410752.3 et al., Sept. 3,
2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 279 at 7 (denying protest of the issuance
of a COC where the procuring agency provided SBA with
virtually all potentially relevant information in its
possession). (MPC
Containment Systems, LLC B-416188.2: Jul 23, 2018)
Sea Box primarily argues that Sea Box’s alleged failure to
submit documentation indicating that its product had
previously been certified or accredited to operate at a
minimum security level of secret relates to Sea Box’s
responsibility. Sea Box further contends that such
concerns relating to its responsibility should have been
referred to the SBA. The agency, however, argues that the
rejection of Sea Box’s proposal was not based on Sea Box’s
responsibility, but was instead based on whether Sea Box’s
product met the salient characteristics in the RFP. AR at
2. We agree with the agency.
As an initial matter, we note that the record provides no
basis for us to question the agency’s finding that Sea Box
failed to provide the required
certification/accreditation. While Sea Box provides a
number of explanations for the failure to include the
required documentation, it does not assert that it
provided the documentation. For example, Sea Box argues
that such a certification/accreditation could only be
obtained after the final installation of the RSS. Comments
at 8. Sea Box also argues that stipulations in the
proposal asserting that its product would meet the salient
characteristics established in the RFP should have been
sufficient to satisfy the agency’s requirements. Comments
at 5-7. Both of these arguments amount to untimely
challenges to the terms of the solicitation, and provide
no basis to question the agency’s determination that Sea
Box failed to provide the required
certification/accreditation in its proposal.
As for the protester’s contention that the agency was
required to refer Sea Box’s unacceptable proposal to the
SBA, we disagree. Where an agency finds the proposal of a
small business to be unacceptable under a
responsibility-related factor, that is, a factor
pertaining to its ability to perform, such as whether it
has adequate corporate experience or production equipment
and facilities, the determination is essentially one of
nonresponsibility, meaning that referral to the SBA, which
has the ultimate authority to determine the responsibility
of small business concerns, is required. Tyonek Worldwide
Servs., Inc.; DigiFlight, Inc., B-409326 et al., Mar. 11,
2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 97 at 12. Where an agency rejects a
proposal as technically unacceptable on the basis of
factors not related to responsibility, however, referral
to the SBA is not required. Id. Likewise, where an agency
rejects a proposal as technically unacceptable on the
basis of a factor that is arguably responsibility related,
but the finding of unacceptability is based on the
offeror’s failure to submit specific documentation
required by the solicitation, referral to the SBA is not
required. AttainX, Inc.; FreeAlliance.com, LLC.,
B‑413104.5, B-413104.6, Nov. 10, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 330 at
5.
Here, we are not persuaded that a requirement for
documentation that an offeror’s product has previously
received a particular security accreditation is
responsibility related, since the requirement does not
pertain to the offeror’s ability to perform. Moreover, the
facts here show that the protester’s proposal was rejected
as technically unacceptable because the protester failed
to provide required documentation, meaning that referral
to the SBA was not required.
The protester also argues that the agency should have
provided Sea Box with notice when its proposal was removed
from further consideration, as required by Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) §15.503(a)(1). Instead, the
protester was notified that its proposal had been found
unacceptable after award. According to the protester, such
notice would have permitted it to file its protest with
our Office earlier. Comments at 14. This protest ground
does not provide a basis to sustain the protest because
the protester has not demonstrated prejudice.
Prejudice is an essential element of every viable protest,
and we will not sustain a protest where it is clear from
the record that a protester suffered no prejudice as a
result of an agency evaluation error. Investment Mgmt.
Enter., B-410762, B‑410762.2, Feb. 9, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 77
at 4. Where the protester fails to demonstrate that, but
for the agency’s actions, it would have had a substantial
chance of receiving the award, there is no basis for
finding prejudice. Id. Here, whether Sea Box challenged
the agency’s finding that its proposal was unacceptable
while evaluations were ongoing or after award, the fact
remains that the agency reasonably found Sea Box’s
proposal to be unacceptable and thus ineligible for award.
Accordingly, Sea Box was not prejudiced by the delay.
Additionally, the protester complains that the agency
failed to provide pre-award notice of the award to
Tribalco under FAR §15.503(a)(2)(i), which prevented Sea
Box from challenging Tribalco’s small business status
prior to award. Comments at 13. Because Sea Box had been
properly eliminated from the competition, however, Sea Box
would not have been an interested party to challenge
Tribalco’s status even if it had been provided with a
pre-award notice. See 13 C.F.R. §121.1001.
The protest is denied. (Sea
Box, Inc. B-414742: Sep 6, 2017)
CRS contends that the agency’s exclusion of its proposal
based on its failure to have sufficient capabilities in
health-related missions amounted to a nonresponsibility
determination that should have been referred to the SBA
under SBA’s COC procedures. See Protest at 7.
In response, the agency explains that the agency
reasonably found CRS’s proposal unacceptable under the
management approach, domain-specific capability in a
health-related mission subfactor. See AR, MOL at 7; see
also AR, Supplemental (Supp.) MOL at 1-2. The agency
further argues that this assessment was not a
determination that CRS lacked the requisite capabilities
to perform health-related missions, and therefore was not
a responsibility determination. See AR, MOL at 8-9. In
this regard, the agency contends offerors eliminated under
the management approach, domain-specific capability in a
health-related mission subfactor were eliminated because
their proposals were not responsive to the solicitation as
reflected in the agency’s evaluation. Id.
The Small Business Act provides that it is the SBA’s duty
to certify to government procurement officers with respect
to all the elements of contractor responsibility
(including capability, competency, capacity, credit,
integrity, perseverance, and tenacity) of any one or group
of small business concerns to receive and perform a
specific government contract. 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7)(A).
SBA’s implementing regulations specifically require a
contracting officer to refer a small business concern to
SBA for consideration for a COC when the contracting
officer “[r]efuses to consider a small business concern
for award of a contract or order after evaluating the
concern’s offer on a non-comparative basis (e.g., a
pass/fail, go/no-go, or acceptable/unacceptable) under one
or more responsibility type evaluation factors (such as
experience of the company or key personnel or past
performance).” 13 C.F.R. § 125.5(a)(2)(ii).
Here, the solicitation provided that in phase 1 of the
evaluation, proposals were to be evaluated on a go/no-go
basis, i.e., non-comparative basis. See RFP at M-3, M-4.
The solicitation further provided that if rated
unacceptable under any factor in phase 1, the entire
proposal would be rendered unacceptable and ineligible for
award. See id. at M-4. Further, the record provides no
support for the agency’s argument that CRS’s proposal was
eliminated because it was not responsive to the
solicitation. Contrary to the agency’s arguments, the
record shows that the agency found that the examples
provided by CRS in its proposal were “not sufficient to
demonstrate inherent capabilities in health-related
missions” and that CRS’s proposal did not demonstrate that
it possessed the requisite capability through “internal
resources with substantial relevant experience.” See AR,
Tab 7, Go/No-Go Assessment at 10. On this record, we find
that the agency’s conclusion relates to CRS’s capability
to perform the contract, not simply the adequacy or
completeness of its proposal submission. See 22nd Century
Team, LLC--Costs, B-412742.4, Dec. 15, 2016, 2016 CPD ¶
369 at 6. Accordingly, the Small Business Act requires
that the agency should have referred CRS to the SBA for a
COC review in accordance with 13 C.F.R. § 125.5(a)(2)(ii).
Cascadian Am. Enters., B-412208.3, B-412208.4, Feb. 5,
2016, 2016 CPD ¶ 29 at 7-8.
In sum, the agency evaluated the small business offerors
on an acceptable/unacceptable basis, as opposed to a
comparative basis, with respect to relevant experience, a
responsibility-type evaluation factor, and found CRS’s
proposal unacceptable under that factor. See 13 C.F.R. §
125.5(a)(2)(ii). As such, rejection of CRS’s proposal
based on its rating of unacceptable under the management
approach, domain-specific capability in a health-related
mission subfactor, without first referring the matter to
the SBA for a COC determination, was improper.
Accordingly, we sustain the protest. (Competitive
Range Solutions, LLC B-413104.10: Apr 18, 2017)
Both protesters essentially argue that the agency’s
exclusion of their proposals based on their failure to
submit documentation verifying an adequate cost accounting
system for all CTA members amounted to a
non-responsibility determination that should have been
referred to the SBA for a COC. We disagree.
We have long held that the evaluation of proposals is a
matter within the discretion of the procuring agency; we
will question the agency’s evaluation only where the
record shows that the evaluation does not have a
reasonable basis or is inconsistent with the RFP. Hardiman
Remediation Servs., Inc., B-402838, Aug. 16, 2010, 2010
CPD ¶ 195 at 3.
Under the SBA’s COC program, agencies must refer to SBA a
determination that a small business is not responsible if
that determination would preclude the small business from
receiving an award. 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7); 13 C.F.R. §
125.5; FAR subpart 19.6. SBA’s regulations specifically
require a contracting officer (CO) to refer a small
business concern to SBA for a COC determination when the
CO has refused to consider a small business concern for
award of a contract or order “after evaluating the
concern’s offer on a non-comparative basis (e.g.,
pass/fail, go/no go, or acceptable/unacceptable) under one
or more responsibility-type evaluation factors (such as
experience of the company or key personnel or past
performance).” 13 C.F.R. § 125.5(a)(2)(ii).
On this record, we do not agree that the agency’s
evaluation involved a nonresponsibility determination
requiring referral to SBA. While the protesters argue that
our Office has found that an agency’s rejection of a
proposal due to evaluated problems in the offeror’s
accounting system is a matter of responsibility, not
technical acceptability, see PMO Partnership Joint
Venture, B-401973.3, B-401973.5, Jan. 14, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶
29 at 5, we find this argument inapposite here. In this
instance, the agency’s elimination of these two proposals
from further consideration was not based on any evaluated
problems with the accounting systems of the respective CTA
members. See AttainX Protest at 10; AttainX Comments at 5;
FreeAlliance.com Protest at 8, FreeAlliance.com Comments
at 2. Rather, the record shows that NIH rated the
proposals unacceptable based on the fact that both
protesters failed to submit the specific documentation
required by the solicitation, given their reliance on a
third-party CPA firm to verify their adequacy of
accounting systems. In other words, both protesters’
proposals were found unacceptable because they did not
include the expressly required verification “on the
[letterhead] of the third-party CPA firm” attesting to the
fact that the CTA members’ accounting systems had been
“audited and determined adequate for determining costs
applicable to [the] contract in accordance with FAR §
16.301-3(a)(1).” See RFP at L-17. Clearly stated RFP
requirements are considered material to the needs of the
government, and a proposal that fails to conform to such
material terms is unacceptable and may not form the basis
for award. TYBRIN Corp., B-298364.6, B-298364.7, Mar. 13,
2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 51 at 5; National Shower Express, Inc.;
Rickaby Fire Support, B-293970, B-293970.2, July 15, 2004,
2004 CPD ¶ 140 at 4-5.
It is an offeror’s responsibility to submit a well-written
proposal, with adequately detailed information that
clearly demonstrates compliance with the solicitation
requirements and allows a meaningful review by the
procuring agency. See, e.g., International Med. Corps,
B-403688, Dec. 6, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 292 at 7. An offeror
runs the risk that a procuring agency will evaluate its
proposal unfavorably where it fails to do so. Recon
Optical, Inc., B-310436, B-310436.2, Dec. 27, 2007, 2008
CPD ¶ 10 at 6. Accordingly, we find no merit to the
protesters’ arguments. (AttainX,
Inc.; FreeAlliance.com, LLC B-413104.5, B-413104.6:
Nov 10, 2016)
Certificate of Competency Requirement
Finally, DA Defense argues that, even assuming the
confidence assessment assigned to its past performance was
reasonable, under the solicitation’s modified best value
evaluation scheme, which required a substantial confidence
rating to be eligible for award, the satisfactory
confidence assessment was tantamount to a
nonresponsibility determination. The protester contends
that because the Army made a de facto nonresponsibility
determination and the protester is a small business, the
agency was required to refer the matter to the SBA for
review under the SBA’s certificate of competency program
pursuant to 13 C.F.R. § 125.5 and FAR subpart 19.6. See
Protest (Sept. 8, 2015) at 8-10. The Army and Marton
respond that no referral to the SBA was necessary because
the agency did not make a responsibility determination
with respect to the protester, and the protester was not
otherwise the apparent successful offeror. See AR at 9
(citing Rice Servs., Inc., B-411540, B‑411540.2, Aug. 20,
2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 260 at 4 n.2); Intervenor’s Comments
(Oct. 19, 2015) at 1-2.
We find no merit to DA Defense’s argument that the Army
was required, based on the protester’s satisfactory
confidence past performance assessment, to refer the
matter to the SBA for a certificate of competency review.
An agency may use traditional responsibility factors, such
as past performance, as technical evaluation factors
where, as here, a comparative evaluation of those areas is
to be performed. Source Diversified, Inc., B-403437.2,
Dec. 16, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 297 at 8 n.11; Zolon Tech, Inc.,
B‑299904.2, Sept. 18, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 183 at 8; T. Head &
Co., Inc., B‑275783, Mar. 27, 1997, 97-1 CPD ¶ 169 at 3-4.
No SBA referral is required where a small business
offeror’s technically-acceptable proposal is not selected
for award because another offeror’s proposal is evaluated
as superior under a comparative analysis or because of a
cost/technical tradeoff analysis. Zolon Tech, Inc., supra;
CMC & Maint., Inc., B-292081, May 19, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 107
at 4.
There was no pass/fail evaluation of past performance
here. The record shows that, consistent with the RFP’s
anticipated qualitative assessment of past performance, DA
Defense’s past performance was evaluated as satisfactory
as part of a comparative, best-value evaluation, not a
responsibility determination. AR, Tab 14A, SSEB Report
(Aug. 17, 2015), at 21-25; Tab 14B, Source Selection
Decision (Aug. 19, 2015), at 4-5. Moreover, the RFP did
not preclude award to an offeror with a satisfactory
confidence rating. Instead, as discussed above, the
solicitation provided for award to the offeror that
submitted the lowest-priced proposal that was technically
acceptable, and had a substantial confidence rating for
past performance; in the event no offeror had a
substantial confidence rating, offerors who had
satisfactory confidence ratings would be considered. On
this record, we agree with the Army that it had no
obligation to refer its qualitative assessment of DA
Defense’s satisfactory past performance to the SBA for a
certificate of competency. (DA
Defense Logistics HQ B-411153.3: Dec 2, 2015) (pdf)
[N3 Government Solutions, LLC] N3GS does not dispute that,
as stated in its proposal, it possessed an interim top
secret security clearance, rather than a final one, and
that this remained the case through at least June 12.
Nevertheless, the protester argues that [Defense Threat
Reduction Agency] DTRA failed to fulfill the corrective
action announced in response to N3GS’s earlier protest
because the contracting officer lacked a valid basis to
deny the SBA additional time to consider issuing a COC.
Protest at 6-7.
DTRA argues that the unacceptability of a small business
offeror’s facility security clearance should not be a
matter for which referral to the SBA is required. Agency
Report at 5. Even if referral is required, DTRA argues
that the contracting officer had broad discretion whether
to allow additional time for the SBA to consider N3GS’s
COC, and properly declined the extension request here. Id.
at 6.
Our Office invited the SBA to provide its views on the
protest issues. The SBA argues that questions over whether
a small business has met a pass/fail requirement for a
facility security clearance, as here, are properly matters
of responsibility that must be referred to the SBA for
consideration of a COC, as DTRA did when it took
corrective action in response to N3GS’s first protest. SBA
Brief at 4‑5. On the other hand, the SBA argues that the
contracting officer’s decision not to grant an extension
to the SBA to further consider the COC referral was a
matter within the contracting officer’s discretion, and
that N3GS could not have received a COC in any event
because the firm did not have the required final facility
security clearance. Id. at 6-7.
Under SBA regulations, when an agency refers a question
over the responsibility of a small business to the SBA to
consider issuing a COC, the contracting officer must
withhold the contract award “for a period of 15 working
days (or longer if agreed to by SBA and the contracting
officer).” 13 C.F.R. § 125.5(c)(2) (2014); see also
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 19.602-2 (“15
business days,” or longer by agreement). If no COC is
issued in the 15-day period (or longer period agreed
between SBA and the contracting officer), the contracting
officer is directed to make award to the next firm in
line. FAR § 19.602-4(c).
Although the SBA asked the contracting officer to agree to
more time to consider issuing a COC, there was no
agreement by the contracting officer to do so. Our Office
has held that “the granting of such extensions is entirely
discretionary with [the contracting agency].” Eagle Sec.,
Inc., B-242397, Apr. 29, 1991, 91‑1 CPD ¶ 415 at 4. We
will not review the contracting officer’s discretion in
denying an extension absent a showing that the decision to
deny the request may have been influenced by fraud or bad
faith. Worthy Indus. Corp., B-240489, Nov. 27, 1990, 90‑2
CPD ¶ 428 at 3. Here, N3GS has not shown, or even alleged,
that the failure of the SBA to complete the COC process
within 15 days, or the contracting officer’s decision not
to extend that time, was caused by fraud or bad faith. To
the contrary, N3GS describes the delay as being caused by
“an admitted clerical or process error and through no
fault of the Agency and no fault of [N3GS].” Protester’s
Opposition to Dismissal, at 2.
In short, the record here shows that DTRA referred the
question of N3GS’s responsibility to the SBA for
consideration under its COC process, as DTRA agreed to do
as corrective action in response to N3GS’s earlier
protest. The SBA sought, but was denied, an extension of
the 15-day period to consider the COC, as to which there
is no allegation that fraud or bad faith played any role.
As a result, we have no basis to question the contracting
officer’s decision to proceed with the contract award to
VSI, as provided in FAR § 19.602-4. (N3
Government Solutions, LLC B-411303.2: Sep 9, 2015)
(pdf)
JS&A contends that GSA had determined that JS&A was in
line to receive one of the awards, as evidenced by its
referral of the firm’s responsibility to the SBA for a COC
review. JS&A argues therefore that because the SBA
subsequently issued a COC to the protester, GSA “had an
obligation” to make the award to the protester.
Protester’s Comments (April 8, 2015), Attach. A, at 14.
For the reasons discussed below, we find no merit to this
argument. (sentence deleted).
A contracting officer may not make an award to an offeror
unless it is found to be responsible. FAR § 9.103(a). In
making a responsibility determination, the contracting
office must determine, among other things, that the
contractor has “adequate financial resources to perform
the contract, or the ability to obtain them.” FAR §
9.104-1(a). Where a small business concern’s offer would
otherwise be accepted for award, but the firm is found by
the contracting officer to be nonresponsible, the
contracting officer must refer the matter to the SBA for
consideration of a COC. FAR §§ 9.104-3(d); 19.601(c).
Where the SBA issues a COC, agencies are required to make
award to the concern, without requiring it to meet any
other responsibility or eligibility requirement. 15 U.S.C.
§ 637(b)(7)(C); FAR § 19.602-4.
Our Office has held, however, that while the SBA’s COC
provisions and the FAR preclude an agency from denying
award to an offeror that has received a COC based on
responsibility matters, an agency is not required to make
award to that offeror if there are other reasons for
denying the award that are not related to its
responsibility. See Tenderfoot Sock Co., Inc., B-293088.2,
July 30, 2004, 2004 CPD ¶ 147 at 3 (although protester was
issued a COC, the agency reasonably awarded a contract to
a different offeror because the COC request was premature,
as the agency had not yet determined whether the protester
was in line for award); The Gerard Co., B-274051, Nov. 8,
1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 177 at 3 (agency properly obtained best
and final offers--due to issuance of amendment--after COC
was issued to protester); Mechanical Equip. Co. Inc.,
B-239208, Apr. 25, 1990, 90-1 CPD ¶ 428 (in a solicitation
restricted to qualified sources, the agency reasonably
considered another offeror as a source of supply after the
SBA had issued a COC for the protester).
Here, as stated above, the RFP provided for award of
contracts on a best-value basis. Based on the issuance of
a COC to the protester, GSA could not deny the protester
the award based on matters relating to its responsibility.
Consistent with our Office’s decisions, however, the
agency could select offerors other than JS&A, provided the
basis for doing so was unrelated to the protester’s
responsibility. The record here shows that the agency
conducted a best-value tradeoff between JS&A and the three
offerors who proposed higher prices than the protester:
Hill, Heery, and URS. AR, Tab 14, Source Selection
Decision (Jan. 26, 2015), at 4, 7, 9; Tab 16, GSA
Debriefing for JS&A (Feb. 20, 2015), at 2. In each
instance, the agency concluded that the three awardee’s
proposals provided strengths under the non-price factors
which merited award despite JS&A’s lower price. Id. On
this record, we conclude that the agency was not required
to award the contract to JS&A based solely on the issuance
of the COC. (Jay Shapiro &
Associates, Inc. B-411174: Jun 5, 2015) (pdf)
Latvian Connection argues that its exclusion from the
competition constituted a negative responsibility
determination with respect to a small business, which
therefore should have been referred to the SBA under its
Certificate of Competency (COC) procedures. Protest at 14.
The SBA, which submitted comments to our Office in
response to the protest, likewise asserts that the actions
of DOS and FedBid constituted a de facto nonresponsibility
determination, which should have been referred to the SBA
under its COC procedures. SBA Comments, Feb. 26, 2015, at
2-5. DOS, however, responds that there was no
responsibility determination by the agency here since
Latvian Connection never submitted a response to the
solicitation and, in any case, FedBid acted to suspend
Latvian Connection without direction or encouragement from
DOS. AR at 9; Agency Response to SBA’s Comments at 2.
Under the Small Business Act, agencies may not find a
small business nonresponsible without referring the matter
to the SBA, which has the ultimate authority to determine
the responsibility of small businesses under its COC
procedures. 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7); FAR subpart 19.6;
FitNet Purchasing Alliance, B‑410263, Nov. 26, 2014, 2014
CPD ¶ 344 at 6-7. In this regard, the Small Business Act
provides that it is the SBA’s duty:
To certify to Government procurement officers . . . with
respect to all elements of responsibility, including, but
not limited to, capability, competency, capacity, credit,
integrity, perseverance, and tenacity, of any small
business concern or group of such concerns to receive and
perform a specific Government contract.
15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7)(A) (emphasis added). Importantly,
this section of the Act also provides that a “Government
procurement officer . . . may not, for any reason
specified in the preceding sentence preclude any small
business concern or group of such concerns from being
awarded such contract without referring the matter for a
final disposition to the Administration.” Id.
Here, Latvian Connection was suspended from use of FedBid.
Under FedBid’s rules, therefore, Latvian Connection was
ineligible to respond to DOS’s solicitation, and thereby
precluded from competing or being awarded a contract. The
basis of Latvian’s suspension was the firm’s lack of
“System and Business Integrity.” FedBid Suspension E-mail,
July 8, 2014, at 1. Although FedBid, a private company,
was the entity that precluded Latvian’s ability to compete
for the contract, we have previously held that when FedBid
hosts a reverse auction on its website, it acts as an
agent for the agency conducting the procurement. AeroSage
LLC, B-409627, July 2, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 192 at 4. As a
result, we conclude that the DOS, through its agent,
FedBid, precluded Latvian Connection, a small business,
from competing for, and potentially being awarded, a
contract on the basis of the firm’s integrity, without
referring the matter to the SBA. This amounted to a
determination of nonresponsibility, which the agency
should have referred to the SBA for a COC determination.
Therefore, we sustain the protest on this basis. (Latvian
Connection, LLC B-410947: Mar 31, 2015) (pdf)
Also see Latvian Connection, LLC
B-410981: Apr 6, 2015) (pdf)
Failure to Refer to SBA
MTA asserts that the requirement that intermittent interpreters
possess TS/SCI clearances was a classic responsibility factor,
and since it was evaluated on a “pass/fail” basis, the agency
was required to refer the rejection of its proposal for failure
to meet that requirement to the SBA under its Certificate of
Competency (COC) procedures.
Our Office has held that the ability to obtain a security
clearance is generally a matter of responsibility, absent an
express requirement in the solicitation to demonstrate the
clearance prior to award, which would indicate that the
requirement was a definitive responsibility criterion. See TMG
Constr. Corp., B-407190, Nov. 19, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 343 at 5;
Rohmann Servs., Inc., B-405171, B-405171.2, Sept. 8, 2011, 2011
CPD ¶ 177 at 8; Waterfront Techs., Inc.--Protest and Costs,
B-401948.16, B-401948.18, June 24, 2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 123 at 6.
Under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7) (2006), the
SBA has conclusive authority to determine the responsibility of
small business concerns. Thus, when a procuring agency finds
that a small business is not eligible for award based on a
nonresponsibility determination or a failure to satisfy
definitive responsibility criteria, the agency is required to
refer the matter to the SBA for a final determination under its
COC procedures. TMG Constr. Corp., supra, at 5 n.4; Waterfront
Techs., Inc.--Protest and Costs, supra.
Here, we find that the agency was not required to refer the
matter to the SBA for COC consideration. Where a proposal, on
its face, should lead an agency to the conclusion that an
offeror has not agreed to comply with a material term or
condition of the solicitation, the matter is one of the
proposal’s acceptability, and not a matter of the offeror’s
responsibility. TYBRIN Corp., B-298364.6, B-298364.7, Mar. 13,
2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 51 at 6 (proposal that on its face does not
satisfy a solicitation's limitation on subcontracting clause
concerns the acceptability of the proposal, and not the
offeror's responsibility). Further, a proposal that fails to
conform to a material term or condition of the solicitation is
unacceptable and may not form the basis for an award. Id. In
this regard, MTA’s final proposal, as timely revised prior to
the final closing time, identified only four intermittent
interpreters, none of whom had an TS/SCI clearance as required
by the solicitation. In these circumstances, the agency could
reasonably conclude that, notwithstanding MTA’s assurances that
it was working on obtaining certain unidentified intermittent
interpreters with the requisite clearance, the fact that its
timely submitted proposal identified interpreters without the
requisite clearance called into question MTA’s commitment to
comply with this requirement, thus furnishing a basis for
rejecting the proposal as unacceptable. (MT
& Associates, LLC, B-410066: Oct 17, 2014) (pdf)
Construct has
alleged that the SBA's initial decision denying the firm's
[certificate of competency] COC request was improper. In this
regard, the protester argues that the denial stemmed from SBA's
application of an incorrect limitation on subcontracting
standard. Although SBA subsequently reversed the initial
decision, and granted Construct a COC for this procurement,
Construct has not received the award due to the initial COC
denial. Because we conclude that the initial COC denial stemmed
from SBA's misapplication of its regulations, we sustain
Construct's protest on that basis.
Under the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. sect. 637(b)(7),
agencies may not find a small business non-responsible without
referring the matter to the SBA, which has final authority to
determine the responsibility of small business concerns. Joanell
Labs., Inc.; Nu-Way Mfg. Co., Inc., B-242415.8, et al., Apr. 15,
1922, 92-1 CPD para. 369. With regard to consideration of SBA
COC determinations, the Small Business Act gives the SBA the
conclusive authority to review a contracting officer's
determination that a small business is not responsible. 15 U.S.C.
sect. 637(b)(7). Therefore, our Office does not review
challenges to the SBA's decision not to issue a COC unless there
is a showing that the COC denial resulted from possible bad
faith, or the SBA's failure to follow its own regulations or to
consider vital information because of how information was
presented to, or withheld from, the SBA by the procuring agency.
Bid Protest Regulations, 4 C.F.R. sect. 21.5(b)(2). In this
context, the subject for our review is limited to examining
whether SBA applied the correct regulations when it denied
Construct a COC. See McNeil Technologies, Inc., B-254909, Jan.
25, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 40.
In order for SBA to issue a COC, a referred company must,
preliminarily, demonstrate that it is eligible to apply for a
COC. See SBA letter, June 22, at 1. In this case, the SBA
concluded that Construct was not eligible. Specifically, the SBA
stated that:
SBA regulations require that for any procurement that is set
aside for small business, the small business must perform
minimum percentage of work with its own employees. This
provision, which is included in both SBA's regulations and in
the Federal Acquisition Regulation, is known as the
"limitations on subcontracting clause." 13 C.F.R sect. 125.6;
FAR sect. 19.508(e) and FAR sect. 52.219-14. The clause
requires that you perform a minimum of 15% of the cost of the
contract with your own employees, not including the cost of
materials. Based on the figures provided by Construct
Solutions, it proposed to perform about half that, or less
than 8%. For that reasons [sic], SBA cannot issue a
Certificate of Competency.
Id. (Emphasis added).
The SBA regulation cited in the SBA's June 22 letter, 13 C.F.R
sect. 125.6, consists of several distinct provisions. As
relevant, 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(a), applies to small businesses
and requires in part that, "[i]n the case of a contract for
general construction, the concern will perform at least 15
percent of the cost of the contract with its own employees (not
including the costs of materials)." Id. at sect. 125.6(a)(3)
(emphasis added). This provision, the requirements of which were
cited in SBA's refusal to issue the COC, does not, however,
apply to SDVOSBs. Rather, the subcontracting limitations forth
in 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(b) apply to SDVOSBs and establish a
less stringent subcontracting threshold. Specifically, the
regulation states that an SDVOSB prime contractor can
subcontract a portion of the work, provided that "[i]n the case
of a contract for general construction, the [SDVOSB] spends at
least 15% of the cost of contract performance incurred for
personnel on the concern's employees or the employees of other [SDVOSBs]."
Id. at sect. 125.6(b)(2) (emphasis added). Construct asserts
that when analyzed under the appropriate standard, its COC
application demonstrates that 26.21 percent of the work will be
performed by its employees or the employees of another SDVOSBC.
In sum, the record reflects that SBA incorrectly applied the
limitation on subcontracting found at 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(a),
to Construct, a SDVOSB subject to the limitation on
subcontracting at 13 C.F.R. sect. 125.6(b). We therefore sustain
the protest where SBA refused to issue a COC to Construct due to
failure to properly follow its own regulations.
RECOMMENDATION
Where our Office has sustained a protest of the SBA's refusal to
issue a COC, we have recommended that the procuring agency
resubmit the matter of the small business firm's responsibility
to SBA for further consideration. See COSTAR, B‑240980, Dec. 20,
1990, 90-2 CPD para. 509. In that context, we have also further
recommended that, if the SBA should issue a COC on behalf of the
firm, that the agency should then take corrective action up to
and including changing the award decision. For example, in
COSTAR, supra, our Office recommended that, if the SBA issued a
COC to the protester, the agency should terminate a previously
awarded contract under the solicitation for convenience of the
government and make a new award to the protester.
In the current protest, as noted above, the SBA has acknowledged
that its initial refusal to issue a COC to the protester was in
error, and has issued Construct a COC related to this
procurement. SBA Letter, July 25, at 1. Therefore, we conclude
that the appropriate remedy in this protest, as in COSTAR, is to
recommend that the agency terminate the award to Ironclad and
make a new award to Construct. We also find that Construct is
entitled to recover its costs of filing and pursuing the
protest, including reasonable attorney's fees. 4 C.F.R. sect.
21.8(d)(1). Construct should submit its claim for such costs
directly to the VA within 60 days. (Construct
Solutions, Inc.--Protest and Reconsideration, B-405288;
B-405288.2, October 11, 2011) (pdf)
Zolon asserts that the agency’s determination that its revised
price was unrealistic and risky constituted a finding that the
firm was not responsible. In this regard, Zolon notes that, in
making the best value determination, the agency found that the
firm’s pricing structure would make it very difficult or
impossible to transition a large percentage of the incumbent
personnel to a new contract, and was highly unlikely to allow
the firm to meet the government’s performance standards. Zolon
also notes that the agency considered its past performance and
experience to be deficiencies that it could not overcome. Zolon
concludes that since it is a small business, the agency was
required to refer the matter of its responsibility to the Small
Business Administration (SBA) for review under its certificate
of competency procedures. See Federal Acquisition Regulation
sect. 19.602-1(a). Zolon’s assertions are without merit. An
agency may use traditional responsibility factors, such as
personnel competencies and capabilities, as technical evaluation
factors where, as here, a comparative evaluation of those areas
is to be performed. Advanced Resources Int’l, Inc.-Recon.,
B-249679.2, Apr. 29, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 348 at 2. A
comparative evaluation means that competing proposals will be
rated on a scale relative to each other rather than on a
pass/fail basis. Dynamic Aviation Helicopters, B-274122, Nov. 1,
1996, 96-2 CPD para. 166 at 3. No SBA referral is required where
a small business offeror’s proposal, while evaluated as
acceptable, is not selected for award because another offeror’s
proposal is evaluated as superior under a comparative analysis
or because of a cost/technical tradeoff analysis. Capitol CREAG
LLC, B-294958.4, Jan. 31, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 31 at 6-8. There
was no pass/fail evaluation here; the record shows that
evaluation of Zolon’s past performance and experience, as well
as the price realism and risk assessment based on the firm’s low
proposed labor rates, were all part of a comparative, best value
evaluation, not a responsibility determination. Best Value
Determination at 00385, 00389-390. (Zolon
Tech, Inc., B-299904.2, September 18, 2007) (pdf)
As indicated, JAF’s proposal was not considered for award
because its proposed price was considered unreasonably low.
However, there was no technical or price evaluation factor under
the RFP providing for the evaluation of price realism or the
offerors’ understanding of the requirements. The price
evaluation provided only for the evaluation of the
“reasonableness” of the proposed price, that is, whether the
price was unreasonably high. Thus, the agency’s concern that
JAF’s price was too low was a matter of the firm’s
responsibility. Since JAF is a small business, if the Air Force
believed that JAF could not satisfactorily perform the contract
at its proposed price, it was required to refer this finding of
nonresponsibility to the SBA for that agency’s review under its
certificate of competency procedures. Accordingly, we sustain
JAF’s protest on this basis. (J.A.
Farrington Janitorial Services, B-296875, October 18, 2005)
(pdf)
As set forth in the regulations and explained by SBA, until
1998, SBA's regulations specifically provided that the COC
procedures did not apply to contracts awarded under SBA's
section 8(a) program. 13 C.F.R. 124.313 (1998). SBA's
regulations were amended on June 30, 1998, to provide (as they
do now) that if, in the conduct of "competitive 8(a)
procurements," the "procuring activity contracting officer
believes that the apparent successful offeror is not responsible
to perform the contract, he or she must refer the concern to the
SBA for a possible Certificate of Competency." 63Fed. Reg.
35726, 35758 (1998); 13C.F.R. 124.507(b)(5) (2004). In making
this regulatory change, SBA explained that it wanted "to make
competitive 8(a)procurements as similar as possible to non8(a)
Government contracting procedures." 62 Fed. Reg. 43583, 43592
(1997); SBA Supplemental Report at 1. SBA emphasizes, however,
that as provided in the regulatory history of 13 C.F.R.
124.507(b)(5), and as indicated by SBA's current regulations,
the availability of the COC process to an 8(a) participant is
limited to nonresponsibility determinations made during
competitive 8(a) acquisitions. With regard to noncompetitive
acquisitions, such as the one here, SBA, in amending its
regulations to provide for the applicability of the COC process
to nonresponsibility determinations made in the context of
competitive 8(a) acquisitions, stated as follows:
COC procedures would not, however, be available for sole
source 8(a) procurements. In most cases, the procuring agency
would have selected the Participant for the sole source
contract by assessing the firm's capabilities prior to
offering the procurement to SBA. It is unlikely that the
procuring agency would select a Participant, go through
negotiations with the firm, and then find the firm not to be
responsible. If that does happen, or if the procuring agency
determines that a firm nominated by SBA for an open
requirement cannot perform the contract, SBA would review the
situation to determine whether it agrees with the procuring
agency. If SBA agrees, it can nominate another Participant to
perform the contract, if one exists that is found to be
eligible and responsible for the requirement, or it can permit
the agency to withdraw the requirement from the 8(a) program
if an eligible and responsible Participant is not found. If
SBA does not agree, it can appeal the procuring agency's
decision to the head of the procuring agency pursuant to
124.505. 62 Fed. Reg. 43583, 43592 (1997).
The procedures referenced above are implemented through 13 C.F.R.
124.505(a)(2), which provides that the "Administrator of SBA may
appeal . . . to the head of the procuring agency" the procuring
agency's "decision to reject a specific [8(a)] Participant for
award of an 8(a) contract." As such, here, once CNCS determined
that UEA was nonresponsible, and informed SBA of that
determination, SBA, if it agreed with CNCS, should have allowed
for the replacement of UEA with another 8(a) vendor, such as the
vendor identified by CNCS, or should have permitted CNCS to
withdraw the requirement from the 8(a) program if no qualified
8(a) vendor was available. See DLS Servs., Inc. , supra , at 3.
If SBA disagreed with CNCS regarding its determination that UEA
was nonresponsible, the Administrator of SBA could have appealed
the CNCS contracting officer's responsibility determination to
the head of the procuring agency. 13 C.F.R. 124.505(a)(2). In
short, we agree with SBA that it erred in considering UEA for a
COC because the COC process is not applicable to noncompetitive
8(a) acquisitions. SBA Report at 2; SBA Supplemental Report at
1-2. (United Enterprise & Associates,
B-295742, April 4, 2005) (pdf)
GSA and Pepco assert that Liberty's proposal evidenced a
defective commitment to complying with the subcontracting
limitation, and that this therefore was a matter of
acceptability, and not responsibility. See Ecompex, Inc. ,
B-292865.4 et al., June 18, 2004, 2004 CPD 149 at 5; Mechanical
Equip. Co., Inc.; Highland Eng., Inc.; Etnyre Int'l, Ltd.; Kara
Aerospace, Inc. , supra ; KIRA Inc. , B287573.4, B-287573.5,
Aug.29, 2001, 2001 CPD 153 at 3. We disagree. As an initial
matter, the contracting officer in fact determined that
Liberty's proposal was acceptable; the only question was whether
Liberty was entitled to the SDB preference. Further, while GSA
asserts that the generating asset in [DELETED] for which Liberty
submitted an expired letter of intent could not generate
sufficient power to meet the 50percent rule, the agency fails to
take into account the fact that Liberty stated that it had "been
in negotiations with several plant owners in the PJM territory
to acquire the necessary manufacturing capability," Letter from
Liberty to GSA, Nov.16, 2004, and not merely with the owner of
the generating asset in [DELETED]. Consequently, this is not an
instance where the offeror's proposal, on its face, reasonably
indicated that the offeror would not comply with a
subcontracting limitation, see , e.g. , Orincon Corp. , B276704,
July 18, 1997, 97-2 CPD 26 at 4; rather, it involves a question
of the offeror's capability to comply with a subcontracting
limitation and, thus, its responsibility. As such, this was a
matter for the SBA. GSA now asserts that Liberty also failed to
meet the requirement set forth in FAR 52.21923(d)(2) that
states: "A small disadvantaged business concern submitting an
offer in its own name shall furnish in performing this contract
only end items manufactured or produced by small disadvantaged
business concerns in the United States or its outlying areas."
The agency notes in this regard that in its November 11 response
to the agency's inquiries, Liberty stated that it would obtain
supplemental electricity from one or more firms on a list of its
existing suppliers, which includes large businesses. However, as
noted by the SBA in its comments on this matter, SBA Comments,
Feb. 2, 2005, at 3, while the provisions of FAR 52.21923(d)(1)
apply to manufacturers, those of FAR 52.21923(d)(2) clearly
apply to SDBs that are nonmanufacturers, that is, SDBs that
intend to furnish the products of other SDB concerns. See
distinction between manufacturer and nonmanufacturer in 15 U.S.C.
637(a)(17)(A); 13 C.F.R. 121.406; FAR 19.001, 19.102(f),
19.601(d). Here, Liberty essentially claimed that it would
qualify as a manufacturer under FAR 52.21923(d)(1); thus, FAR
52.21923(d)(2) was irrelevant to determining Liberty's SDB
status and entitlement to the preference, and the final
determination as to whether that in fact is the case is for the
SBA, as discussed above. Accordingly, we sustain the protest. (Liberty
Power Corporation, B-295502, March 14, 2005) (pdf)
It is true that the reasons for GSA's concern about CREAG arose
in connection with the evaluation under the solicitation (not
post-evaluation, when a responsibility review is normally
conducted). This, however, is not determinative. We have long
recognized that agencies may use responsibility-type factors as
evaluation criteria. See , e.g. , Nomura Enters., Inc. ,
B-277768, Nov. 19, 1997, 97-2 CPD 148 at 3. Here, the evaluation
criteria related to management and staffing are at issue, and
both can be viewed as "traditional" responsibility factors. See
Clegg Indus., Inc. , B242204.3, Aug. 14, 1991, 91-2 CPD 145 at
2. Where a solicitation uses traditional responsibility factors
as technical evaluation criteria and where the proposal of a
small business concern which otherwise would be in line for
award is found ineligible for award based on an agency's
evaluation under those criteria, the agency has effectively made
a determination that the small business offeror is not a
responsible contractor capable of performing the solicitation
requirements. In those circumstances, because of the offeror's
small business size status, the agency must refer the matter of
the firm's responsibility to the SBA for the possible issuance
of a COC. Here, however, we conclude that the basis for GSA's
ultimate decision not to make award to CREAG was not a
responsibility determination. As noted above, management and
staffing are sometimes responsibility criteria. In this
procurement, though, GSA's concern was not that CREAG lacked
adequate management and staffing (which might well have been a
responsibility concern), but rather that CREAG's proposed
management and staffing plan--CREAG's approach to performing the
contract work--created a high risk of unacceptable performance.
This was not due to doubt about CREAG's ability or capability to
perform (again, potentially a responsibility concern), but
rather to the decentralized approach that CREAG proposed to use
to perform GSA's requirements. As the SSEB wrote, "The offeror
did not present an adequate resolution to adequately managing
the scope of the contract." Final SSEB Report to the SSA at 59.
Because GSA's negative assessment was based on the way that
CREAG proposed to perform, rather than on CREAG's capabilities,
we conclude that what occurred was not tantamount to a
nonresponsibility determination, and we therefore find that no
referral to the SBA was required. (Capitol
CREAG LLC, B-294958.4, January 31, 2005) (pdf)
The award to Southern was unobjectionable. The FAR requirement
that agencies make award to a concern where SBA issues a COC
presumes that the COC referral will occur after the concern has
been determined to be otherwise in line for the award. FAR
9.104-3(d). The record in this case shows that, at the time of
the referral, the contracting specialist had not yet determined
that Tenderfoot was in line for the award; she had determined
only that Tenderfoot was one of several firms that could receive
the award. Contracting Officers Statement at1. Nevertheless,
apparently not fully understanding the COC process, and having
questions about Tenderfoots financial capability, the
contracting specialist (prematurely) submitted the matter to SBA
for a COC review. AR at 3. Although SBA acted on the referral
and issued a COC to Tenderfoot, VA was not required to make
award to Tenderfoot at that juncture, since it had not yet
determined that Tenderfoot was otherwise in line for the award.
The agency could not deny Tenderfoot the award based on matters
of responsibility, but nothing prohibited it from selecting
another offeror for award based on a price/technical tradeoff in
accordance with the RFPs evaluation scheme. See The Gerard Co. ,
B274051, Nov. 8, 1996, 962 CPD 177 at 3 (agency properly
obtained best and final offers--due to issuance of
amendment--after COC was issued to protester). (Tenderfoot
Sock Company, Inc., B-293088.2, July 30, 2004)
Under the Small Business Act, agencies may not find a small
business nonresponsible without referring the matter to the SBA,
which has the ultimate authority to determine the responsibility
of small businesses under its COC procedures. 15 U.S.C. §
637(b)(7) (2000); FAR Subpart 19.6; Federal Support Corp.,
B-245573, Jan. 16, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 81 at 4. Past performance
traditionally is considered a responsibility factor, that is, a
matter relating to the offeror's ability to perform the
contract. See FAR § 9.104-1(c); Sanford and Sons Co., B-231607,
Sept. 20, 1988, 88-2 CPD ¶ 266 at 2. Traditional responsibility
factors may be used as technical evaluation factors in a
negotiated procurement, but only when a comparative evaluation
of those areas is to be made. See, e.g., Medical Info. Servs.,
B‑287824, July 10, 2002, 2001 CPD ¶ 122 at 5; Nomura Enter.,
Inc., B-277768, Nov. 19, 1997, 97‑2 CPD ¶ 148 at 3. Comparative
evaluation in this context means that competing proposals will
be rated on a scale, relative to each other, as opposed to a
pass/fail basis. Ducosort, Inc., B‑254852, Jan. 25, 1994, 94-1
CPD ¶ 38 at 6. We have cautioned that an agency may not find a
small business nonresponsible under the guise of a relative
assessment of responsibility-based technical factors in an
attempt to avoid referral to the SBA. Federal Support Corp.,
supra, at 4; Sanford and Sons Co., supra, at 3. That appears to
be what occurred here. Here, the agency did not, and could
not, perform a “comparative evaluation.” The only technical
evaluation factor, past performance, a traditional
responsibility factor, was evaluated for the sole “purpose” of
making an “assessment of the Offeror's ability to perform.”[8]
RFP § 00120 ¶ 2.2.2.1.1. As essentially conceded by the agency,
PHC's proposal was rejected because PHC allegedly failed to meet
the RFP requirements that the offeror have past performance
experience in medical construction on projects of 50 to 100 bed
hospitals or large clinics valued at between $5 and $10 million.
Because of this, past performance was clearly evaluated on a
“pass/fail” basis. Under the circumstances, the agency's
rejection of PHC's proposal amounted to a determination of
nonresponsibility, which required referral to the SBA for a
possible COC. See Federal Support Corp., supra, at 4 (protest
sustained where “regardless of how the evaluation criteria was
characterized in either the RFP or in the evaluation,”
determination of technical unacceptability was nonresponsibility
determination); Modern Sanitation Sys. Corp., B-245469, Jan. 2,
1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 9 at 3 (technical unacceptability based on
“go-no go” evaluation of responsibility criteria, without regard
to how the rest of the proposal was judged, constitutes
nonresponsibility determination that must be referred to the
SBA); Clegg Indus., Inc., B‑242204.3, Aug. 14, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶
145 at 3 (same). (Phil
Howry Company, B-291402.3; B-291402.4, February 6, 2003)
(txt
version)
Global argues that, since it is a small business, the agency was
required to refer the rejection of its proposal to the Small
Business Administration (SBA) for Certificate of Competency (COC)
review. Protester's Comments at 6. However, traditional
responsibility factors, such as experience, may be used for the
comparative evaluation of proposals in relevant areas; where a
proposal is determined to be deficient pursuant to such an
evaluation, the matter is one of relative technical merit, not
responsibility, and does not require a referral to the SBA. See
Advanced Resources Int'l, Inc.--Recon., B-249679.2, Apr. 29,
1993, 93-1 CPD ¶ 348 at 2. The agency here found that Global
lacked adequate required expertise, and downgraded its proposal
in the technical evaluation. Since this was not a
nonresponsibility determination, no referral to SBA was
required. See Micronesia Media Distributors, Inc., B-222443,
July 16, 1986, 86-2 CPD ¶ 72 at 2. (Global
Business and Legal Services, B-290381.2, December 26, 2002)
(pdf)
Here, since the SBA has declined
to issue a COC and since none of the limited exceptions exist
for our Office to review the SBA's decision, the essential issue
for our consideration raised by this protest is whether new
information requiring reversal of the nonresponsibility
determination was presented to the contracting officer after the
denial of the COC. The information presented by the protester
following the SBA's denial of a COC was not new information.
(Quality
Trust, Inc., B-289445, February 14, 2002)
In considering the applicable
standard here, we note first that despite DLC's status as a
small business concern, this nonresponsibility determination was
not required to be referred to the Small Business Administration
(SBA) for review under that agency's certificate of competency
procedures, as GPO is not subject to the referral requirements
of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. sect. 637(b)(7) (1994).
(Downtown
Legal Copies, B-289432, January 7, 2002)
A proposal found deficient
following a comparative evaluation of proposals (rather than on
a pass/fail basis) under traditional responsibility factors such
as experience, past performance, and personnel qualifications is
not a matter of responsibility subject to the Small Business
Administration's certificate of competency procedures. (Medical
Information Services, B-287824, July 10, 2001)
Our Office will review the SBA's
determinations regarding the issuance of, or failure to issue, a
COC, only where there is a showing of possible bad faith on the
part of government officials or a failure to consider vital
information bearing on the firm's responsibility. 4 C.F.R. sect.
21.5(b)(2). Where, as here, one offeror protests the issuance of
a COC to a competitor on the ground that the SBA failed to
consider "vital information," we will consider the
protest only where the solicitation contains definitive
responsibility criteria and the issue raised concerns the
competitor's compliance with those criteria. [3] Eastern Marine,
Inc., B-212444.2, Aug. 28, 1984, 84-2 CPD para. 232 at 4;
Surgical Instrument Co. of Am., B-212653, Nov. 30, 1983, 83-2
CPD para. 628 at 2; Uniflite, Inc., B-197365, Jan. 23, 1980,
80-1 CPD para. 67 at 2. Here, since neither bad faith nor a
failure to comply with a definitive responsibility criterion has
been alleged, we will not consider the matter. (Integrity
Management Services, Inc., B-283094.2, May 3, 2000)
|
|
Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
New
MPC Containment Systems, LLC
B-416188.2: Jul 23, 2018 |
Competitive Range Solutions,
LLC B-413104.10: Apr 18, 2017 |
Sea Box, Inc. B-414742: Sep
6, 2017 |
Latvian Connection, LLC B-410947:
Mar 31, 2015 (pdf) Also see
Latvian Connection, LLC
B-410981: Apr 6, 2015) (pdf) |
AttainX, Inc.; FreeAlliance.com,
LLC B-413104.5, B-413104.6: Nov 10, 2016 |
Construct Solutions, Inc.--Protest and
Reconsideration, B-405288; B-405288.2, October 11, 2011
(pdf) |
DA Defense Logistics HQ
B-411153.3: Dec 2, 2015 (pdf) |
J.A. Farrington Janitorial Services,
B-296875, October 18, 2005 (pdf) |
N3 Government Solutions, LLC
B-411303.2: Sep 9, 2015 (pdf) |
United Enterprise & Associates,
B-295742, April 4, 2005 (pdf) |
Jay Shapiro & Associates, Inc.
B-411174: Jun 5, 2015 (pdf) |
Liberty Power Corporation,
B-295502, March 14, 2005 (pdf) |
MT & Associates, LLC, B-410066:
Oct 17, 2014 (pdf) |
Phil
Howry Company, B-291402.3; B-291402.4, February 6, 2003
(txt
version) |
Zolon Tech, Inc., B-299904.2,
September 18, 2007 (pdf) |
|
Capitol CREAG LLC, B-294958.4,
January 31, 2005 (pdf) |
|
Tenderfoot Sock Company, Inc.,
B-293088.2, July 30, 2004 (pdf) |
|
Global Business and Legal Services, B-290381.2, December 26,
2002 (pdf) |
|
Brickwood
Contractors, Inc., B-290444, July 3, 2002 (pdf)
|
|
Quality
Trust, Inc., B-289445, February 14, 2002 (Pdf
version)
|
|
E.
F. Felt Company, Inc., B-289295, February 6, 2002
|
|
Downtown
Legal Copies, B-289432, January 7, 2002
|
|
Medical
Information Services, B-287824, July 10, 2001 |
|
Integrity
Management Services, Inc., B-283094.2, May 3, 2000 |
|
Court of Federal Claims - Key Excerpts |
B. The SBA's Decision to Deny the COC was not Arbitrary or Capricious.
After the BOP determined that JRS lacked capacity to perform and was thus
nonresponsible, the BOP was required to refer the matter to the SBA. FAR§ 19.602-1.
When issued, a COC represents the SBA' s detennination that the applicant "is
responsible (with respect to all elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to,
capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, tenacity, and limitations
on subcontracting) for the purpose of receiving and performing a specific Government
contract." FAR§ 19.601. The SBA's determination of responsibility is governed by the
same factors listed in FAR § 9 .104-1 that guide the procuring agency's decision. See
CSE Const. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 230, 250 (2003). Further, the "SBA may
deny a COC for reasons of nonresponsibility not originally cited by the contracting
officer." FAR§ 125.5(£)(1).
JRS argues that the SBA's decision not to issue a COC must be set aside because
it was cursory, conclusory, and based on non-relevant or erroneous factual allegations.
First, JRS argues that the SBA impermissibly imposed a requirement that JRS have a
qualified instructor on staff when there was no such requirement in the solicitation.
Second, JRS argues that it was improper for the SBA to consider other contracts it and
JRS Management were awarded but did not perform. Third, JRS argues that the SBA
improperly contacted references as part of its investigation when the SBA knew that JRS
did not have contracts of a related nature, size, and scope and therefore none of the
references were relevant. Finally, JRS argues that the SBA erred by not giving sufficient
consideration to the horticulture instruction contracts that JRS Management successfully
managed.
For the reasons that follow, the court finds that JRS's arguments are insufficient to
meet the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to this court's review of agency action.
1. The SBA Reasonably Considered that JRS did not have a
Horticulture Instructor Committed to Perform.
JRS argues that the SBA erred in denying the COC on the grounds that JRS did
not have an instructor ready to perform the contract. According to JRS, the solicitation
did not require it to have an instructor on staff. Rather, JRS argues the solicitation only requires bidder to list candidates potentially available. JRS further argues that FAR §
52.222-17, which requires new contractors to offer continued employment to an
incumbent's "service employees" under certain circumstances, required JRS to first offer
the instructor position to the incumbent and thus it could not commit another instructor.
The government counters that FAR § 52.222-17 is not applicable because it exempts
professionals including instructors of this type, and further asserts that the SBA correctly
considered JRS 's failure to identify a specific instructor when it denied the COC.
The court agrees with the government that the SBA' s denial of a COC based in
part on JRS 's failure to identify a committed instructor was rational. As an initial matter,
it appears that JRS's reliance on FAR§ 52.222-17 to suggest that it could rely on the
incumbent serve as the instructor is misplaced. The FAR states that only "service
employees" of the predecessor contractor shall be offered the right of first refusal by the
successor contractor, and exempts individuals employed in a "professional capacity" as
defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541. FAR§ 52.222-17(a). A teacher is a "professional" for the
purpose of the regulations when the teacher's "primary duty" is "teaching, tutoring,
instructing or lecturing in the activity of imparting knowledge and who is employed and
engaged in this activity as a teacher in an educational establishment .... " 29 C.F.R. §
54 l .303(a). Teachers "of skilled and semi-skilled trades and occupations" are classified
as professionals. Id. An "educational establishment" is defined to include "an institution
of higher education or other educational institution" and may include "post-secondary
career programs." 29 C.F.R. § 541.204(b).
In this case, the solicitation specified that the instructor was to teach an
"established horticulture program" that was "approved through the New River
Community College." BOP AR 49. The instructor was required to have a degree in
horticulture or agriculture. BOP AR 50. In Wilks v. District of Columbia the court
found that a prison's Office of Educational Services was an educational establishment for
the purposes of the regulations because instructors were certified by D.C. Public Schools
and conducted formal classes. 721 F. Supp. 1383, 1386 (D.D.C. 1989); see Astor v.
United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 303, 316 (2007) (citing Wilks with approval).
Therefore, it appears that this position also meets the standard for teacher under
the regulations. However, even if JRS was required to give Mr. Arbaugh a right of first
refusal under FAR § 52.222-17, nothing in the regulation prohibited JRS from making a
tentative or conditional offer to other instructors in the event that Mr. Arbaugh declined
its offer. Given JRS's extensive history of being unable to perform contracts when it
did not have a committed instructor, the SBA reasonably suggested that JRS obtain letters
of intent from either or both of the two potential other instructors. SBA AR 759. When
JRS elected not to pursue that request and provide the necessary assurance, JRS ran the
risk that the SBA would find that JRS might not be able to provide an instructor on the
effective date of the contract..
In this regard, the court agrees with the government that the SBA did not deny the COC on the grounds that JRS did not have an instructor on the payroll. Rather, given
JRS' s history of failing to secure instructors under similar circumstances, the SBA sought
assurance that JRS would be able to provide an instructor on the effective date of the
contract. Because JRS did not address this issue even after the SBA expressed concerns
and gave JRS instructions that would have alleviated the problem, it was not irrational for
the SBA to conclude that without a commitment from another instructor, JRS might lack
the capacity to perform.
2. The SBA Reasonably Considered JRS's History of not
Performing after being Awarded a Contract
JRS argues that SBA should not have considered the approximately twenty-five
percent rate of unaccepted awards in making its decision because JRS had well-founded
reasons for declining those awards. According to JRS, "JRS heeded the SBA's advice
with regard to being cautious before entering into contracts with the federal government"
and points to the SBA's website to show that the SBA ignored its own advice in using the
unaccepted offers of award as a basis for denying the COC. Pl.'s Reply 27. The
government responds by pointing out that "[r]egardless of JRS's reasons for refusing
awards, the fact remains that the SBA's decision to consider this information was both
rational and reasonable[.]" Def. 's Reply 15.
The court finds, given the extensive number of contracts that JRS has
acknowledged being awarded but not performing, that the SBA's consideration of this
history was not arbitrary or capricious. This is not a case where the SBA ignored JRS's reasons for declining those contracts. To the contrary, JRS's reasons are clearly reflected
in the record. However, the SBA could reasonably conclude that JRS engaged in a
pattern of bidding and receiving contract awards even where JRS was aware that it might
not have the capacity to begin or complete them. In addition, the record shows that in a
number of instances, the contracts were not declined but were accepted by JRS but then
closed without any work being performed, or the agency was forced to rescind the offer
after JRS's delays in meeting the contract's requirements.
JRS's reliance on the SBA website is also misguided. The website states that "a
prospective contractor's response to an RFQ is not an offer that can be accepted to form a
binding contract" and the SBA "cautions small businesses to carefully and completely
read solicitations, to use a pricing strategy that considers all costs allowing for sufficient
overhead/profit, and to read a proposed contract carefully before signing." Pl.' s Reply
27. However, the fact that the SBA recommends that contractors carefully review the
terms of a contract before signing it does not imply that the SBA encourages prospective
offerors to submit bids for contracts that they do not think they will be able to perform.
As discussed above, JRS' s failure to accept approximately a quarter of the bids accepted
by the government is a significant number. In addition, its failure to take on the work it
was offered has caused delays in programing. Therefore, it was rational for the SBA to
consider JRS 's history.
3. The SBA Reasonably Considered JRS's References.
JRS argues that the SBA's decision should also be set aside because the SBA
improperly relied on comments from three of JRS 's references when the references
worked with JRS on contracts other than horticulture instruction, and are therefore not
relevant. The government responds that it was rational for the SBA to consider
information received from JRS 's references when determining whether to issue a COC.
The SBA was required to conduct a comprehensive investigation as to whether JRS was responsible, and the investigation properly included contacting third parties with
knowledge of JRS's performance on other contracts. See FAR§ 125.5(d)(3) ("SBA
personnel may obtain clarification or confirmation of information provided by the
applicant by directly contacting suppliers ... and other third parties upon whom the
applicant's responsibility depends."). Regardless of whether the references offered
insights into JRS' s performance on a horticulture contract, the references offered insights
into how JRS approaches its commitments under its other instructional contracts.
Accordingly, the court finds that the SBA decision denying the COC need not be set
aside on this basis.
JRS also argues that the SBA improperly denied the COC because of JRS's
history of filing bid protests. However, the SBA decision document does not rely on this
history. To the contrary, the decision document focused on JRS's history of not performing on awarded contracts, JRS's failure to identify a committed instructor, and
JRS's difficulty with resolving issues with contracting officers. SBA AR 760.
4. The SBA's Decision not to Credit JRS Management's
Experience does not make its Decision Unreasonable.
Although JRS acknowledges that it did not have prior horticulture instruction
contracts, it argues that the SBA "erred when it concluded that JRS' s expertise was
limited to finding and filling teaching positions related to religious education." Pl.' s Rep.
20. According to JRS, the record shows that one of JRS's active contracts is for an
HV AC instructor at FCI La Tuna, Texas, and therefore "the record shows that JRS' s
experience is not limited to religious education." Id. JRS further argues that the SBA
failed to take into account that Ms. Sims has over 11 years of experience in managing
five horticulture instruction contracts through JRS Management, and that she had
experience within the last three years in managing a horticulture contract.
The government responds that "the SBA procurement analyst did refer to the FCI
La Tuna contract as being a non-religious contract, but noted that the work has not started
yet on that contract." Def.' s Reply 12. The government also argues that, regardless of
whether JRS Management had horticulture instruction experience, it is undisputed that
JRS did not have experience with horticultural instruction and thus the SBA analyst was
not incorrect.
JRS' s COC application indicates that JRS Management did have experience
fulfilling horticulture contracts within the three years prior to JRS' s bid in this case. SBA
AR 413-64. However, assuming that the SBA was required to consider these contracts, the court finds that the error was harmless. The record shows that JRS Management's
horticulture instruction contracts were in a different geographic area and involved
different instructors who were not available to perform the contract in this case.
Ultimately, it is the court's duty to consider whether the evidence in the record
supported the SBA's decision to deny the COC, not to hold the agency to a standard of
perfection. Am. Auto Logistics, LP v. United States, 117 Fed. Cl. 137, 205 (2014),
aff d, 599 F. App'x 958 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("It is not the court's role to determine whether
the evaluations were perfect or even as good as they could be . ... "). Here, the evidence
supports the SBA's conclusion. It is undisputed that JRS had a repeated history of failing
to provide a qualified instructor for contracts it was awarded when JRS did not have that
personnel available. The record shows that JRS did not have a committed instructor for
the subject contract, and the record also showed that JRS had a history of strained
relations with contracting officers. In light of JRS's track record, the court finds that the
SBA's conclusion regarding JRS's lack of capacity with regard to the subject contract
was reasonable. (Jacqueline R. Sims d/b/a
JRS Staffing Services v. U. S. No. 15-367C, February 3,
2016) (pdf)
B. Analysis of the Merits
This is a relatively simple case made more complicated by some
curious agency actions following receipt of a GAO bid protest
decision. Broadly speaking, the question presented is whether
the VA’s corrective action was reasonable. More specifically,
the question is whether the VA’s referral of Marathon’s
incomplete proposal to the SBA for a Certificate of Competency
determination was proper, given the agency’s original decision
to exclude that proposal for failing to provide information
explicitly required by the solicitation. The answer, as
explained below, is that there was nothing improper about the
VA’s original decision, and without any impropriety to remedy,
the VA’s corrective action cannot be defined as reasonable, nor
can it be upheld.
1. The Original Procurement
Decision
The starting point of this
analysis is the VA’s original decision, which it previously
defended in the GAO protest as follows:
MMC acknowledged in its response
to the EN sent to it that it had overlooked [the past
performance evaluation] requirement. It is an offeror’s
responsibility to submit a well-written proposal, which clearly
demonstrates compliance with the solicitation and allows a
meaningful review by the agency. International Med. Corps.,
B-403688, Dec. 6, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 292 at 8. Further, with
respect to VA’s refusal to consider MMC’s late submittal of past
performance references . . . the solicitation clearly stated
that failure to submit complete information . . . may exclude
the proposal from further consideration.
. . . .
MMC contends the FAR 15.305(a)(2)(iv) instructs that in cases
where past performance information is not available, “the
offeror may not be evaluated favorably or unfavorably on past
performance.” This FAR subsection is not applicable here because
MMC was not evaluated favorably or unfavorably, it was
appropriately found nonresponsive. Furthermore, the past
performance information would have been available had it been
submitted in a timely manner pursuant to the solicitation. Then,
and only then, could MMC receive an evaluation of its past
performance. Proposals with significant informational
deficiencies may be excluded, whether the deficiencies are
attributable to either being omitted or merely inadequate
information addressing fundamental factors. American Med. Depot,
B-285060 et al., July 12, 2000, 2002 CPD ¶ 7 at 6-7.
AR 1621-22. The unfortunate
reality here is that the VA’s first decision in this procurement
was correct, and the subsequent “corrective” actions have served
only to introduce error and confusion into an otherwise
straightforward circumstance. Understanding why this is so
requires a review of the solicitation, Marathon’s proposal, and
the range of proper agency discretion upon receiving that
proposal.
a. The Solicitation and Marathon’s
Proposal
In general, when using the LPTA
source selection process, award is “made on the basis of the
lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or exceeding the
acceptability standards for non-cost factors.” FAR 15.101-2(b).
Whether to include past performance among these non-cost
evaluation factors is left to the discretion of the contracting
officer. Id. In this specific case, the VA elected to include
past performance. AR 82-83, 86, 89. In addition, the
solicitation clearly stated that the “Government intend[ed] to
evaluate offers and award a contract without discussions with
offerors” (AR 84), and warned that failure to submit complete
information “may exclude the proposal from further
consideration” (AR 87). That is precisely what occurred. When
Marathon failed to include the required proposal information, it
was eliminated from the competition. AR 1444.
b. Agency Discretion
Discretion, by definition,
involves the freedom to choose between certain options. Here,
the issue is which options were available when the VA received
Marathon’s incomplete proposal. On the one hand, “where, in a
negotiated procurement, an offeror’s proposal does not comply
with the solicitation’s requirements, ‘an agency is not required
to eliminate the awardee from the competition, but may permit it
to correct its proposal.’” ManTech Telecomms. & Info. Sys. Corp.
v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 57, 71 (2001) (quoting D & M Gen.
Contracting, Inc., B–252282 et al., 93-2 CPD ¶ 104, at 2 (Comp.
Gen. Aug. 19, 1993)), aff’d, 30 F. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
On the other hand, an agency is also not obligated to open
discussions to obtain missing information when it discovers an
offeror’s omission. Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 102 Fed.
Cl. 218, 232 (2011), aff’d, 704 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, Marathon “could not have had any expectation when
it submitted its proposal that it would have the opportunity to
rectify proposal deficiencies through discussions.” Id.
Nonetheless, the Government’s and
Marathon’s arguments rest on the notion that factors “H” and “I”
are responsibility factors and, therefore, Marathon’s failure to
submit the required information mandates referral to the SBA.
However, referral to the SBA is necessary only “[u]pon
determining and documenting that an apparent successful small
business offeror lacks certain elements of responsibility.” FAR
19.602-1 (emphasis added). Such was not the case here, as
Marathon’s lack of success was determined by its deficient
proposal, and the merits of its past performance were never
evaluated because it neglected to provide the information for
evaluation. Thus, the critical distinction is between failing a
past performance evaluation and failing to submit the
information necessary for the agency to conduct such an
evaluation.
Instructive in understanding this
distinction is another GAO decision, Menendez–Donnell & Assocs.,
B-286599, 2001 CPD ¶ 15 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 16, 2001). The
protestor, MDA, submitted a proposal that omitted some required
information about its experience and past performance, resulting
in the rejection of its proposal as unacceptable. One of MDA’s
arguments was that the agency “should have referred its
technical unacceptability to the Small Business Administration
(SBA) for review under that agency’s certificate of competency
program, citing Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) §
15.101-2(b)(1).” Id. at 3. In denying MDA’s protest, the GAO
“conclude[d] that the agency reasonably found that MDA’s
proposal failed to provide the information required by the RFP
to enable it to evaluate MDA’s key subcontractors”:
The information . . . was
available, but MDA chose not to present the information in its
proposal, in direct contravention of the terms of the RFP. In
our view, an offeror cannot simply choose to withhold past
performance information . . . where the solicitation expressly
requires that the information be furnished, and where the
information is readily available to the offeror.
. . . .
[T]he reasons the agency found
MDA’s proposal unacceptable concerned only MDA’s failure to
submit information establishing its and its subcontractors’
experience and past performance, and did not constitute a
finding that MDA is not a responsible prospective contractor.
Id. at 3 & n.1. This Court agrees
with the GAO’s reasoning in the Menendez decision and finds that
two principles guiding that decision are worthy of
amplification. First, offerors have an affirmative duty to
submit a proposal that conforms to the explicit requirements
outlined in the solicitation. Second, submitting a proposal and
evaluating a proposal are two distinct steps, and failure at one
step does not equal failure at the other. In other words,
finding that an offeror failed to submit required information
for a past performance evaluation is different from finding that
an offeror is not a responsible contractor. Applying those
principles to this case, it is clear that the VA was well within
its discretion to reject Marathon’s incomplete proposal.
Moreover, even though Menendez
involved a comparative evaluation of past performance as part of
a “best value” procurement, not an LPTA procurement, the
reasoning behind that decision is equally applicable here. When
using the LPTA source selection process, the contracting officer
may “elect[] to consider past performance as an evaluation
factor.” FAR 15.101-2(b). Such an election, however, does not
eliminate the general contracting requirement to make an
affirmative determination of responsibility prior to every
award. FAR 9.103(a)-(b). In addition to past performance, this
determination requires consideration of, among other things, a
prospective contractor’s financial resources, business ethics,
organization, experience, accounting and operational controls,
and technical skills. FAR 9.104–1. Thus, an LPTA award can be
understood as proceeding in two broad steps: (1) evaluation and
identification of the lowest priced, technically acceptable
proposal, which may include past performance as an evaluation
factor; and (2) determination of the apparent awardee’s
responsibility, which must include past performance along with
other responsibility factors. That the evaluation is made on a
Pass/Fail basis does not alter the fact that it is a discrete
step, or that information is necessary to take that step.
Accordingly, an offeror cannot reach the second hurdle until it
passes the first, and it cannot even reach the first unless it
submits a proposal that conforms to the solicitation’s
requirements. Indeed, when an agency cannot evaluate information
because the offeror fails to provide it, the agency does not
reach the question of responsibility, and thus is not required
to refer the matter to the SBA. Pacific Sky Supply, Inc.,
B-215189 et al., 85-1 CPD ¶ 53, at 4 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 18, 1985).
In sum, Marathon failed to submit
a complete proposal, and the VA retained discretion to either
reject the proposal or allow Marathon to correct its
deficiencies. The VA chose the former option, and, because this
choice was a proper exercise of its discretion, this proposal
evaluation should have ended there. Unfortunately, resolution
would not come so easily.
2. The Corrective Actions
The logic of the VA’s actions
began to unravel when the GAO sustained Marathon’s protest of
the initial award to Manus, and the VA took corrective action by
“allowing Marathon to provide the references it initially
omitted.” AR 1972. Manus filed a protest in the Court of Federal
Claims, but that protest was rendered moot when the VA
implemented its second corrective action. See Manus Medical, LLC
v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-428 (Fed. Cl. Sep. 13, 2013)
(“Manus I”). During oral argument, counsel for the Government
conceded that the first corrective action was erroneous, and the
Court concurs with that assessment.
Unfortunately, the second action
turned out to be no more rational than the first. As noted
above, corrective action must be “‘reasonable under the
circumstances’ and ‘appropriate to remedy the impropriety.’”
ManTech Telecomms., 49 Fed. Cl. at 65 (citations omitted). In
this case, there was no impropriety with the original award.
Marathon submitted incomplete information, and the VA properly
exercised its discretion in rejecting Marathon’s proposal
because of its omissions. The agency error did not occur until
later, for referring an incomplete proposal to the SBA for a
Certificate of Competency determination does not constitute a
proper exercise of discretion. Thus, the irony of this
procurement is that the VA’s only correct decision was its first
one, and the “corrective” actions it has taken since then have
served only to lead matters further astray.
(sections deleted)
The VA is hereby enjoined from
awarding Marathon a contract, or permitting any performance of a
contract by Marathon, under Solicitation VA259-12-R-0078 based
on the VA’s prior corrective actions. (Manus
Medical, LLC v. U. S. and Marathon Medical, LLC, No. 14-26C,
March 19, 2014) (pdf)
E. Referral to
SBA for Nonresponsibility Determination Not Required
OCI objects that its technical evaluation ratings by the NGB
amounted to a determination of nonresponsibility, which, by
statute, requires referral to the Small Business Administration
(“SBA”) for a conclusive finding. “The Agency’s determination
that OCI lacks the requisite management and resources to perform
the contract is tantamount to a non-responsibility
determination.” Pl.’s Mem. at 31. Because no SBA finding was
made in this respect, Plaintiff argues, it was improperly
excluded from the competitive range.
As decisions of the United States Government Accountability
Organization (“GAO”) have noted, “Under the Small Business Act,
agencies may not find a small business nonresponsible without
referring the matter to the SBA, which has the ultimate
authority to determine the responsibility of small businesses .
. .” Capitol CREAG LLC, B-294958.4, 2005 CPD P 31 at 6 (citing
15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7). The statute specifies that the SBS is
empowered:
To certify to Government procurement officers, and officers
engaged in the sale and disposal of Federal property, with
respect to all elements of responsibility, including, but not
limited to, capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity,
perseverance, and tenacity, of any small business concern or
group of such concerns to receive and perform a specific
Government contract.
15 U.S.C § 637(b)(7)(A). “Responsibility concerns, among other
factors, whether a prospective contractor will be able to comply
with the required or proposed delivery or performance schedule,
and whether it has the necessary organization, experience, and
technical skills (or the ability to obtain them).” Capitol CREAG
at 6-7 (citing FAR § 9.104-1(b), (e).
OCI cites three examples of what it characterizes as
nonresponsibility determinations by the SSA relating to OCI’s
ability to perform: 1) that OCI had “issues with MIS, data
capture, lack of SOP and counselor placement which the board
feels is indicative of a lack of relevant experience necessary
to proactively address potential performance challenges” (AR
5625); 2) that its “description of corporate management appears
weak, as the offeror proposes email and weekly activity reports
where the board feels a simple conference call would be timelier
for issues resolution as well as in keeping communication
channels open” (AR 5625); and 3) that OCI’s past project
management and personnel handling experiences and the “no
significant similar past performance” other than the ANG PHP
program gave the board “limited confidence that 09C4 can
successfully perform in a significantly expanded contract” (AR
5633). Pl.’s Mem. at 31.
Defendant responds that referrals to the SBA under section 637
are triggered only when there must be a determination of “all”
of the elements of responsibility and that, per the implementing
provisions of 48 C.F.R. (FAR) 19.602.1, “a contracting officer
only makes a responsibility determination after a small business
firm is determined to be an apparently successful offeror.”
Def.’s Mot. at 30 (emphasis added); see also Capitol CREAG at 7
(responsibility review normally conducted post-evaluation).
The court does not find the Government’s position here initially
dispositive. It agrees with the GAO that, where traditional
“responsibility” factors are employed as technical evaluation
criteria and the evaluation renders an offeror’s proposal flatly
ineligible for award, “the agency has effectively made a
determination that the small business offeror is not a
responsible contractor capable of performing the solicitation
requirements.” Id. On the other hand, where the
“responsibility-type criterion” is applied in a “comparative or
tradeoff analysis,” it is not “tantamount to a nonresponsibility
determination.” Id.
Thus, for example, in Capitol CREAG, the offeror’s approach to
management and staffing factors, which may sometimes be
considered responsibility criteria, was found to create “a high
risk of unacceptable performance” even though it was not
technically “inadequate.” The offeror’s proposal was rated
“marginal,” rather than “unacceptable.” The GAO re-emphasized
that “no SBA referral is needed where the small business offeror
is not selected for award merely because, while its proposal is
evaluated as acceptable, another offeror’s proposal is evaluated
as superior under a comparative analysis or because of a
cost/technical tradeoff analysis.” Id. n.6. Similarly, in Nomura
Enterprise, Inc., B-277768, 97-2 CPD ¶ 148 at 3 (Nov. 19, 1997),
GAO noted the general rule that “[a]n agency may use traditional
responsibility factors [where] a comparative evaluation of those
areas is to be made.” A “comparative evaluation” is one with
“competing proposals [that] will be rated on a scale relative to
each other, as opposed to a pass/fail basis.” Id. Similarly, in
Medical Info. Servs., B-287824, 2001 CPD ¶ 122 at 5 (July 10,
2010), GAO observed that “[w]here a proposal is determined to be
deficient pursuant to a [comparative] evaluation, the matter is
one of relative technical merit, not unacceptability, which
would require a referral to the SBA.”
Accordingly, the question is whether OCI’s ratings – and
exclusion from the competitive range – were the result of a
comparative evaluation or the result of a “pass/fail” test. On
the Solicitation’s adjective rating scale, “Marginal” signified
that a “proposal does not clearly meet requirements and has not
demonstrated an adequate approach and understanding of the
requirements. The proposal has one or more weaknesses which are
not offset by strengths. Risk of unsuccessful performance is
high.” AR 5575. By contrast, “Unacceptable” meant that the
“proposal does not meet the requirements and contains one or
more deficiencies. Proposal is unawardable.” Id. Likewise, the
definitions for “Limited Confidence” and “No Confidence” under
the Past Performance factor demonstrate that, in the first
instance, the agency retains some, albeit limited, confidence in
the offeror’s ability to perform, while it has none for a
recipient of the lowest technical rating. AR 5576-77. OCI,
clearly therefore, was not ruled out of consideration on a
pass/fail basis as it would have been had it received an
“Unacceptable” or “No Confidence” rating (and as other offerors
had been, AR 5580). Rather, its deficiencies related to how it
proposed to perform. See, e.g., Capitol CREAG at 8.
Three of the 10 offerors did receive “Unacceptable” ratings on
one or more factors or subfactors, AR 5762, and were deemed
“unawardable as submitted.” AR 5881. Of the remaining seven
offerors, four were determined to qualify for the competitive
range. Goldbelt Glacier, for example, received ratings of
“Outstanding” for the most important factor, Mission Capability,
and both of its subfactors. The other three in the competitive
range all were rated “Good” for Mission Capability and both its
subfactors. OCI, however, was rated “Marginal” for this factor
and subfactors, while the other two offers who did not make it
into the competitive range were rated “Acceptable,” slightly
higher even than OCI. The “Competitive Range Determination,”
signed by the Contracting Officer and the Source Selection
Authority, is extensive in its comparative evaluation of the
four offerors selected as within the competitive range with the
three offerors, among them OCI, that were not deemed
“unawardable” but which, nonetheless, were eliminated from the
competitive range. See, e.g., AR 5890 (“Comparison of 36D6 [Goldbelt
Glacier] to 09C4 [OCI]”).
There is thus no basis for finding that OCI was entitled at that
stage of the Solicitation process to a referral to the SBA for a
responsibility determination. (Optimization
Consulting Inc., v. U. S. and Goldbelt Glacier Health Services,
LLC, No 13-103C, Feb. 28, 2014) (pdf)
|
|
Court
of Federal Claim - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
Jacqueline R. Sims d/b/a JRS Staffing
Services v. U. S. No. 15-367C, February 3, 2016 (pdf) |
Manus Medical, LLC v. U. S. and
Marathon Medical, LLC, No. 14-26C, March 19, 2014 (pdf) |
Optimization Consulting Inc., v. U. S.
and Goldbelt Glacier Health Services, LLC, No 13-103C, Feb.
28, 2014 (pdf) |
|
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Key Excerpts |
The GPO Was Not Required to Refer the Responsibility
Determination to the SBA
We begin with the language of that part of the Small
Business Act that relates to this question:
It shall also be the duty of the [Small Business]
Administration and it is empowered, whenever it
determines such action is necessary— . . . (7)(A)
To certify to Government procurement officers, and
officers engaged in the sale and disposal of Federal
property, with respect to all elements of responsibility,
including, but not limited to, capability,
competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance,
and tenacity, of any small business concern
or group of such concerns to receive and perform a
specific Government contract. A Government procurement
officer or an officer engaged in the sale
and disposal of Federal property may not, for any
reason specified in the preceding sentence preclude
any small business concern or group of such
concerns from being awarded such contract without referring the matter for a final disposition to
the [SBA].
15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7) (italics added).
The question of whether the GPO was required to
refer the responsibility determination to the SBA turns
upon the definitions of “Government procurement officer”
and “Government contract.”
If these terms are defined broadly, then § 637(b) could
require any government procurement officer, including
officers in the Legislative and Judicial branches, to refer responsibility determinations to the SBA. If these terms
are defined narrowly, then § 637(b) could be limited to
certain categories of government procurement officers,
specifically those in the Executive Branch, and, as a
result, only certain officers would be required to refer
responsibility determinations to the SBA.
We do not construe statutes in a vacuum, and “the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with
a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.”
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989);
accord FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000).
Similarly, we do not read the Small Business Act as “a
series of unrelated and isolated provisions,” Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). We “must consider
not only the bare meaning of each word but also the
placement and purpose of the language within the statutory
scheme.” Barela v. Shinseki, 584 F.3d 1379, 1383
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S.
137, 145 (1995)). “Statutory interpretation is ‘not guided
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look[s]
to the provisions of the whole law.’” Hawkins v. United
States, 469 F.3d 993, 1000-01 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting
Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35,
(1990)).
We observe that neither of the specific terms “Government
procurement officer” nor “Government contract” is defined in § 637(b) or in any section of the Small Business
Act. However, an examination of the statutory
scheme reveals that Congress defined related terms that
cast light on how these particular terms should be understood.
In 15 U.S.C. § 637c(3), a “Government procurement
contract” is defined as “any contract for the procurement
of any goods or services by any Federal agency.” A “Federal
agency” has “the meaning given the term ‘agency’ by
section 551(1) of Title 5, but does not include the United
States Postal Service or the Government Accountability
Office.” Id. § 637c(2). The terms “Federal agency” and
“agency” are also separately defined in § 632(b):
For purposes of this chapter [(Ch. 14A of U.S.
Code, Title 15, which includes § 637(b)(7))], any
reference to an agency or department of the United
States, and the term “Federal agency”, shall
have the meaning given the term “agency” by section
551(1) of Title 5, but does not include the
United States Postal Service or the Government
Accountability Office.
In turn, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) provides that:
For the purpose of this subchapter [(Subch. II of
Ch. 5 of U.S. Code, Title 5)]— (1) “agency” means
each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review
by another agency, but does not include— (A)
the Congress . . . .
The GPO is a legislative agency under the direction
and control of Congressional administration. See United
States v. IBM Corp., 892 F.2d 1006, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
Although we have not previously examined the issue, we
agree with our sister circuit that “Congress” in § 551(1)
refers to legislative agencies and departments generally.
See Mayo v. United States Gov. Printing Office, 9 F.3d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining the GPO is a unit
of Congress and therefore contained within the term
“Congress” in § 551(1)).
Therefore, we agree with both parties that the GPO,
as a legislative agency, is excluded from the definition of
‘agency’ in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1).
Colonial Press takes exception to the above analysis
and contends that the definitions of “Government procurement
contract,” “Federal agency,” and “agency” are
irrelevant because those terms do not appear in
§ 637(b)(7). Colonial Press also argues that § 637c does
not apply to the Small Business Act as a whole. Instead,
Colonial Press believes that § 637c only applies to the act
which contained it—An Act to Amend the Small Business
Act and the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub.
L. 95-507, 92 Stat. 1757 (1978) (“1978 Amendments”).
Colonial Press argues that § 637c’s language “[f]or purposes
of this Act” limits its applicability to the 1978
Amendments only—and not § 637(b)(7).
However, if we were to adopt Colonial Press’s reasoning,
we would interpret “Government procurement contracts”
to exclude contracts solicited by legislative
agencies in some portions of the Act, while interpreting
“Government procurement officers” to include contracting
officers of those same legislative agencies in another
portion of the Act—namely, § 637(b)(7). We agree with
the Government and the trial court that this is an unreasonable
and untenable construction.
Colonial Press’s analysis clashes with our “fundamental
canon of statutory construction that the words of a
statute must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Mich. Dep’t
of Treasury, 489 U.S. at 809; accord Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 132-33.
In this light, we construe “Government contract” and
“Government procurement officer” to limit those terms to
exclude contracts and contracting on behalf of legislative
agencies such as the GPO, regardless of whether such
agencies are contracting for executive agencies. (See note
3, supra.)
Moreover, though not dispositive, we note that the
GAO, GPO, and SBA have interpreted the Small Business
Act consistently since 1983 with our interpretation, i.e.,
that the GPO is not subject to the SBA’s COC Program
referral requirements. See J.A. 38–40, 388; Fry
Commc’ns, Inc., 62 Comp. Gen. 164, 167 (1983) (finding
the GPO was not subject to the Small Business Act).
Similarly, in Gray Graphics Corp. v. United States
Government Printing Office, No. 82-2890, 1982 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 18378, at *8 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1982), the district
court, relying in no small part on an affidavit from SBA
Associate General Counsel, held that the GPO is not
subject to the Small Business Act because the SBA “itself
does not now and has never regarded the GPO to be
subject to its jurisdiction.” See also Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 18 (1965) (“‘[T]he practical constructions given to
an act of Congress, fairly susceptible of different constructions,
by those charged with the duty of executing it is
entitled to great respect and, if acted upon for a number of
years will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.’”)
(quoting McLaren v. Fleischer, 256 U.S. 477, 480–81
(1921)).
The SBA’s memorandum, cited above and written in
the context of the GAO bid protest, that the COC referral
process “could, arguably” apply to the GPO does not affect
our analysis. J.A. 324. The statement as thus qualified
by the SBA is true; it does not aid, however, in the ultimate
determination of the question of whether it should
be so interpreted. (Colonial Press
International, Inc. v. U. S., No. 2014-5036, June 10, 2015)
(pdf) |
|
Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
Colonial Press International, Inc.
v. U. S., No. 2014-5036, June 10, 2015 (pdf) |
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