FAR
8.405-2: Ordering procedures for services requiring a
statement of work |
Comptroller
General - Key Excerpts |
Immersion challenges the SSA’s independent analysis under
the technical factor and the SSA’s resulting conclusion
that the two quotations were technically equal. See
Protester’s Comments at 9-18. Specifically, the protester
first challenges the SSA’s removal of a weakness from
NetImpact’s quotation under the staffing plan subfactor
after concluding that “[t]here is no underlying or
convincing detail on how this negatively impacts the [g]overnment.
The [vendor] met this requirement.” Id. at 12 (citing AR,
Tab 9, SSDD at 330). In the protester’s view, the SSA’s
changes failed to address the SSEB’s view that the
discrepancies between NetImpact’s staffing plan and its
project management approach may have “[t]he resulting risk
[] that the [vendor] will not provide sufficient staffing
to adequately fulfill the requirements associated with
these PWS tasks/responsibilities.” Id.; see also AR, Tab
14, TER at 507.
In response, the agency states that the SSA documented his
decision and rationale for removing the assessed weakness
by stating that the SSEB did not note any negative impact
to the government from the alleged weakness. Supplemental
(Supp.) AR at 3. The agency further explains that there
are no discrepancies between the “Roles and
Responsibilities” and the “Labor Category Mapping” tables
in NetImpact’s quotation because the tables represent
different aspects of NetImpact’s staffing--one shows what
PWS element each position led or supported, while the
other provides an overview of labor categories, PWS
support, hours, experience, skills, roles, and
responsibilities. Id.; see also AR, Tab 10, NetImpact
Quotation Vol. I, at 410-411, 422. In this regard, the
agency argues that “between the two [tables], NetImpact
proposed personnel that would be responsible for each
element of the PWS requirements. The [quotation],
therefore, covered all elements of the PWS.” Supp. AR at
3. The agency also argues, in support of its evaluation,
that “[t]he price evaluation completed by the SSEB and
relied on by the SSA demonstrate[d] that [the agency]
considered the labor proposed by each of the [vendors].”
Id.
In reviewing protests of an agency’s evaluation and source
selection decision in procurements conducted under FSS
procedures, we do not conduct a new evaluation or
substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Harmonia
Holdings Grp., LLC, B‑413464, B-413464.2, Nov. 4, 2016,
2017 CPD ¶ 62 at 7; Research Analysis & Maint., Inc.,
B-409024, Jan. 23, 2014, 2014 CPD ¶ 39 at 5. Rather, we
examine the record to ensure that the agency’s evaluation
is reasonable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation. Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC , supra; U.S.
Info. Techs. Corp., B-404357, B‑404357.2, Feb. 2, 2011,
2011 CPD ¶ 74 at 8-9. For procurements conducted pursuant
to FAR subpart 8.4 that require a statement of work, such
as this one, FAR § 8.405-2(f) designates minimum
documentation requirements. Additionally, in a FAR subpart
8.4 procurement, an agency’s evaluation judgments must be
documented in sufficient detail to show that they are
reasonable. Harmonia Holdings Grp., LLC , supra.
Although source selection officials may reasonably
disagree with the ratings and recommendations of
lower-level evaluators, they are nonetheless bound by the
fundamental requirement that their independent judgments
must be reasonable, consistent with the provisions of the
solicitation, and adequately documented. The Arcanum Grp.,
Inc., B-413682.2, B-413682.3, Mar. 29, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶
270 at 8; IBM U.S. Fed., a division of IBM Corp.; Presidio
Networked Solutions, Inc., B-409806 et al., Aug. 15, 2014,
2014 CPD ¶ 241 at 14.
On this record, we cannot conclude that it was reasonable
for the SSA to remove this weakness. Here, the SSEB
identified specific concerns that NetImpact may not
provide sufficient staffing to adequately fulfill the
solicitation’s requirements based on discrepancies in its
staffing plan. See AR, Tab 14, TER at 507. There is
nothing in the contemporaneous record or the agency’s
filings documenting what, if anything, the SSA reviewed to
support the SSA’s conclusion that there was no detail on
the impact to the government--such as NetImpact’s
quotation--or that the SSA discussed the SSEB’s concern
with the SSEB. As a result, we find no support for the
agency’s argument that the SSA documented his decision and
rationale to remove the weakness by relying on the SSA’s
statement that the SSEB did not note any negative impact
to the government from the alleged weakness.
We also find no support for the agency’s argument that
“the [p]rotester’s alleged discrepancy is non-existent”
because the protester “has not shown that [the] different
numbers in different charts equate to a
weakness-generating discrepancy.” Supp. AR at 3. In this
regard, the protester points out (and the record supports
the conclusion) that it was the SSEB, not the protester
that identified discrepancies in the two labor categories
as a weakness. Protester’s Supp. Comments at 11‑12.
Finally, the agency’s reliance on its price evaluation to
support its argument that the SSA considered the weakness
the SSEB assessed to NetImpact’s quotation under the
staffing plan subfactor is not supported by the record.
Here, the record shows that the agency’s price evaluation
included an analysis of the discounts offered from the
existing GSA contract pricing, a comparison of the
vendors’ prices and differences in full-time equivalents
and those of the independent government cost estimate, and
a conclusion that the labor categories were sufficient for
the proposed effort. See AR, Tab 29, NetImpact Price
Quotation Review; AR, Tab 30, Immersion Price Quotation
Review. While the agency concluded that the labor hours
proposed by Immersion were sufficient for the proposed
effort, the agency’s evaluation is silent as to whether
NetImpact’s proposed labor hours were sufficient for the
proposed effort. Compare AR, Tab 29, NetImpact Price
Quotation Review with AR, Tab 30, Immersion Price
Quotation Review. As a result, contrary to the agency’s
argument, the record does not document how the SSA
considered the SSEB’s assessment of a weakness against
NetImpact’s staffing plan or his rationale for removing
that weakness.
The protester also challenges the SSA’s removal of a
strength for its quotation under the staffing plan
subfactor. See Supp. Protest at 17-19. In this regard, the
SSEB assessed a strength explaining that Immersion’s
staffing approach would significantly decrease the risk of
lost productivity while new personnel are trained, while
also easing and simplifying the process of transition. See
AR, Tab 14, TER at 505; AR, Tab 9, SSDD at 326. In
disagreeing with the SSEB, the SSA concluded that the
SSEB’s comments on the approach were too general, and did
not specify how the quotation exceeded the PWS
requirement, the impact of the approach on the quotation,
or how the approach benefitted the government. See AR, Tab
9, SSDD at 326-327. The SSA noted that the PWS did not
specify the type of personnel, education, and level of
experience that was required to support the PWS
requirements. Id. at 327. The SSA also noted that having
institutional knowledge of the mission and organization
process of DTMO was not a requirement in the PWS. Id.
In its response, the agency states that the staffing plan
subfactor would be evaluated as to how it supported the
vendor’s technical approach. AR, Memorandum of Law (MOL)
at 10. In this regard, the agency states that the SSA
reasonably exercised his discretion and found that
Immersion’s proposed retention of predecessor staff merely
met the requirements of the solicitation. Id. at 9.
On this record, we cannot conclude that it was reasonable
for the SSA to remove this strength. Here, the SSEB’s
comments were specific and identified the impact of the
approach on the quotation, as well as how the approach
benefitted the government. Further, under PWS 4.1.1.3, the
contractor was required to provide subject matter
expertise. See Solicitation at 274.
As discussed above, the SSA selected NetImpact’s
lower-priced quotation on the basis that the two
quotations were technically equal after removing strengths
and weaknesses assessed by the SSEB from both quotations;
however, the SSA’s rationale is not meaningfully explained
in the record and otherwise appears inconsistent with the
contemporaneous evaluation record and the solicitation.
Prejudice is an element of every viable protest. See
Piquette & Howard Elec. Serv., Inc., B-408435.3, Dec. 16,
2013, 2014 CPD ¶ 8 at 10. Our Office will not sustain a
protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable
possibility that it was prejudiced by the agency’s
actions; that is, unless the protester demonstrates that,
but for the agency’s actions, it would have had a
substantial chance of receiving the award. XPO Logistics
Worldwide Gov’t Servs., LLC, B-412628.6, B-412628.7, Mar.
14, 2017, 2017 CPD ¶ 88 at 15; McDonald-Bradley, B-270126,
Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD ¶ 54 at 3. There is no basis for
our Office to know what the ultimate source selection
might have been, had these flaws not occurred. In such
circumstances, we resolve doubts regarding prejudice in
favor of a protester since a reasonable possibility of
prejudice is a sufficient basis for sustaining a protest.
See Supreme Foodservice GmbH, B-405400.3 et al., Oct. 11,
2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 292 at 14. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs.,
Inc.--Recon., B-309752.8, Dec. 20, 2007, 2008 CPD ¶ 84 at
5. Accordingly, we conclude that Immersion has established
the requisite competitive prejudice to prevail in a bid
protest. (Immersion
Consulting, LLC B-415155,B-415155.2: Dec 4, 2017)
Evaluation Report and Source Selection Decision
The record shows that the technical evaluation report did
not reflect a consensus of the evaluators, but simply
provided a mathematical average of the individual
evaluators’ scores assigned to the vendors. The
accompanying spreadsheets listed the individual
evaluators’ scores, the resulting average, and narrative
strengths for each firm (and, for C&C, the invalid past
performance weakness discussed above). By simply averaging
the individual evaluators’ scores, by not considering that
the only weakness identified in the evaluation report
spreadsheets for C&C was apparently invalid, and by making
no effort to reconcile or explain the significantly
negative views of one evaluator with the strongly positive
views of the other three, the evaluation report provided
an unsound foundation on which to base a source selection
decision.
Even apart from those issues, the source selection
decision was unreasonable. This procurement was a
competition among FSS vendors for services defined by a
statement of work. See FAR § 8.405-2. An agency evaluation
may assign adjectival ratings and point scores, but those
are guides to--not substitutes for--intelligent
decisionmaking. Opti-Lite Optical, B-281693, Mar. 22,
1999, 99-1 CPD ¶ 61 at 4. Scores and ratings do not
mandate automatic selection of a particular proposal.
Midland Supply, Inc., B-298720.3, May 14, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶
104 at 5. Source selection officials have broad discretion
in determining the manner and extent to which they will
make use of, not just the adjectival ratings and point
scores, but also the written narrative justification
underlying those technical results, subject only to the
tests of rationality and consistency with the evaluation
criteria. Id. The propriety of the price/technical
tradeoff decision turns on whether the selection
official’s judgment concerning the significance of the
difference in the technical ratings was reasonable and
adequately justified. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc.,
B-289942, B-289942.2, May 24, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 88 at 6.
The sole rationale of the FTA’s source selection decision
here was AOC’s high score, without discussing what, if
anything, the difference between the technical scores of
AOC and C&C actually signified. The record contains no
evidence that the agency compared the qualitative
strengths and weaknesses of AOC’s quotation to those of
C&C’s quotation, or justified why any advantages of AOC’s
quotation were worth a $298,000 premium. Such a mechanical
evaluation and tradeoff does not provide a reasonable
basis on which to base a source selection decision.
Shumaker Trucking & Excavating Contractors, Inc.,
B‑290732, Sept. 25, 2002, 2002 CPD ¶ 169 at 6. Indeed, in
contrast to the impression conveyed by AOC’s higher score
and adjectival rating, the technical report narrative
described C&C’s quotation as providing “extraordinary
wealth of knowledge, applicable skills, and their method .
. . which will lead to a comprehensive [vi]ew of the
organization,” while the narrative for AOC’s quotation
simply states that the firm’s technical approach and
personnel “met” the requirements. AR, Tab 6b, Evaluation
Spreadsheet, at 1. Despite this, there is no sign in the
source selection decision that the contracting officer
compared the evaluated merits of any quotations or their
prices.
The source selection decision is thus improper, both
because it is based on the misevaluation of C&C’s
quotation, and because it fails to document a reasoned
source selection rationale. The source selection decision
shows only that the contracting officer considered the
evaluated point scores and found that the incumbent, AOC,
had the highest score. There is no indication that the
contracting officer considered the merits of the
evaluations; the decision lists only scores. There is no
indication that the contracting officer considered C&C’s
or other vendors’ lower prices; the decision lists only
AOC’s price, and compares it only to a government
estimate. Although the RFQ provided for a tradeoff among
non-price and price factors, the source selection decision
shows that AOC’s quotation was selected simply because it
had the highest score and an acceptable price. There was
no meaningful consideration of the other vendors’
evaluations (beyond their total point scores) or their
prices. The source selection decision is thus unreasonable
and inconsistent with the RFQ. (Castro
& Company, LLC B-412398: Jan 29, 2016) (pdf)
TPS asserts that, as it was the incumbent for this requirement,
the agency acted improperly in not furnishing it a copy of the
solicitation. As noted by the protester, section 863 of the
Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, 122 Stat. 4356, 4547-48 (2008),
mandated the issuance of regulations in the FAR “to require
enhanced competition in the purchase of property and services by
all executive agencies pursuant to multiple award contracts.”
Id. In addition, while the statute permits notice to fewer than
all contract holders under multiple award contracts, it requires
that such notice be “provided to as many contractors as
practicable.” Id. at § 863(b)(3)(A).
As relevant here, the FAR was amended pursuant to the Act to
provide that, in the case as here of a proposed FSS order for
services exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold:
(iii) The ordering activity contracting officer shall--
(A) Post the RFQ on e-Buy to afford all schedule contractors
offering the required services under the appropriate
multiple-award schedule(s) an opportunity to submit a quote;
or
(B) Provide the RFQ to as many schedule contractors as
practicable, consistent with market research appropriate to
the circumstances, to reasonably ensure that quotes will be
received from at least three contractors that can fulfill the
requirements. When fewer than three quotes are received from
schedule contractors that can fulfill the requirements, the
contracting officer shall prepare a written determination to
explain that no additional contractors capable of fulfilling
the requirements could be identified despite reasonable
efforts to do so. The determination must clearly explain
efforts made to obtain quotes from at least three schedule
contractors.
FAR § 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii); see 76 Fed. Reg. 14548, 14550, 14553
(Mar. 16, 2011). TPS argues that, given the Act’s emphasis on
enhancing competition for the award of orders placed under
multiple-award contracts, the VA “had an affirmative duty under
procurement law and regulation to solicit an offer from TPS
unless the agency could establish that doing so was somehow not
practicable.” Comments at 10 (emphasis in original).
Our Office, however, has previously rejected the position that
agencies are required to solicit the incumbent FSS contractor.
See Allmond & Co., B-298946, Jan. 9, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 8 at 2
(the applicable statute and regulations simply do not require an
agency to solicit the incumbent FSS contractor); Lockmasters
Security Institute, Inc., B-299456, May 21, 2007, 2007 CPD ¶ 105
at 3 (under the FSS, a vendor has no legal expectation or
entitlement to be one of those vendors solicited merely because
it was the incumbent). Although, as noted by the protester,
these cases predate the change made in the FAR pursuant to the
Act, resulting in the current FAR § 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii) quoted
above, TPS points to nothing in the statute, the legislative
history, or in the implementing regulations, nor are we aware of
anything, which specifically mandates soliciting the incumbent
FSS contractor. Thus, we are aware of no violation of
procurement law or regulation to be found solely from an
agency’s decision not to solicit its incumbent FSS contractor.
In addition, TPS’s contention, in essence, is that for those
situations where an agency is not electing to post an RFQ on
e-Buy (FAR § 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(A)), providing the RFQ to as
many schedule contractors as “practicable” should translate to a
requirement that the incumbent schedule contractor must be
solicited. We disagree. The word “practicable” in the regulation
is followed by an explanatory clause. Specifically, an agency
that elects not to post on e-Buy its FSS solicitation (valued
above the simplified acquisition threshold) is required to
solicit “as many schedule contractors as practicable, consistent
with market research appropriate to the circumstances, to
reasonably ensure that quotes will be received from at least
three contractors that can fulfill the requirements.” FAR §
8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(B) (emphasis added). Here, the record shows
that the agency solicited 14 vendors and received 6 quotations.
Accordingly, the agency met the competition requirements of the
regulation. (Technical
Professional Services, Inc. B-410640: Jan 20, 2015) (pdf)
CPS contends that
its quotation documented more relevant past performance than Arc
Aspicio’s quotation, which ICE [Immigration and Customs
Enforcement] failed to credit in its evaluation and selection
decision. In this regard, CPS notes that the RFQ informed
vendors that past performance was of equal weight to the other
evaluation factors and that more relevant past performance
(and/or past performance with higher quality ratings) would be
considered more favorably. AR, Tab 3, RFQ, amend. 1, at 5. CPS
also argues that the RFQ required vendors to identify at least
three examples of relevant past performance, but that only two
of Arc Aspicio’s three examples of past performance were
relevant. Specifically, CPS objects that one of the awardee’s
past performance examples involves a significantly smaller
effort than the work here (approximately [DELETED] of the
value).
The agency responds that the evaluators and contracting officer
reasonably considered the vendors’ past performance, assigning
each a low risk rating based upon the determination that there
was little doubt that they could perform the task order. Supp.
AR at 11-23. ICE argues that it was reasonable to assign Arc
Aspicio’s past performance a low risk rating, given the
awardee’s submission of three relevant examples of past
performance with high quality ratings. Id. at 15. In this
regard, the agency contends that CPS was not prejudiced, because
its past performance received the highest possible past
peformance rating (that is, low risk). Id. at 23.
Where an agency issues an RFQ to GSA FSS contractors under FAR
subpart 8.4 and conducts a competition, we will review the
record to ensure that the agency’s evaluation and selection
decision are reasonable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation and applicable procurement laws and regulations.
See Digital Solutions, Inc., B‑402067, Jan. 12, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶
26 at 3-4; DEI Consulting, B‑401258, July 13, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶
151 at 2. For procurements conducted pursuant to FAR subpart 8.4
that require a statement of work, such as this one, the agency’s
evaluation and trade-off judgments must be documented in
sufficient detail to show that they are reasonable. FAR §
8.405-2(f); Neopost USA Inc., B-404195, B-404195.2, Jan. 19,
2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 35 at 7.
Here, the RFQ provided that award would be made on a best-value
basis, considering past performance as one of three
equally-weighted evaluation factors. The RFQ further stated that
the agency would “assess the relevance and quality of the
offeror’s performance record in assessing past performance.” AR,
Tab 3, RFQ amend. 1, at 5. Thus, the solicitation provided for
the evaluation of past performance on a qualitative basis that
considered the relative merits of the firms’ past performance in
terms of relevance and quality. Where, as here, the solicitation
anticipates the use of a best value evaluation plan--as opposed
to selection based on low price and technical acceptability--the
evaluation of quotations is not limited to determining whether a
quotation is merely technically acceptable; rather, quotations
should be further differentiated to distinguish their relative
quality under each stated evaluation factor by considering the
degree to which technically acceptable quotations exceed the
stated minimum requirements or will better satisfy the agency’s
needs. See US Info. Techs. Corp., B-404357, B-404357.2, Feb. 2,
2011, 2011 CPD ¶ 74 at 9; see also Systems Research and
Applications Corp.; Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., B-299818 et al.,
Sept. 6, 2007, 2008 CPD ¶ 28 at 24.
The record shows that CPS submitted five relevant examples of
its past performance (two of which were for the exact work here)
and that ICE received good to excellent references for four of
these examples. In contrast, Arc Aspicio submitted three
examples of its past performance (one of which was of
significantly less magnitude than the work being procured here),
and two of which the agency found that Arc Aspicio had excellent
ratings (although, as noted above, for one of these two examples
the TET had not received a rating for the work it found most
directly relevant). The record thus indicates that the firms’
past performance may present qualitative differences in terms of
either relevance or quality. For example, CPS’s subcontract work
on the incumbent contract indicates that CPS may have more
specific, relevant past performance than does Arc Aspicio,
particularly given that one of Arc Aspicio’s past performance
examples is significantly smaller than the work presented here.
Despite the indication in the record that there may be
differences in the quality of CPS’s and Arc Aspicio’s past
performance, at least in terms of relevance, there is no
evidence in the contemporaneous evaluation record showing that
either the TET or the contracting officer considered the
relative merits of the two firms’ past performance. Rather, the
record shows that the TET simply catalogued the firms’
respective past performance and quality ratings before
concluding that both proposals should be rated low risk under
the past performance evaluation factor. AR, Tab 6, Evaluation
Report, at 5-6, 13-14. At no point in this record is there any
consideration by the TET or the contracting officer of whether
the past performance of these vendors is equally relevant or why
the two firms’ past performance was equivalent. Id.; AR, Tab 7,
Contracting Officer Decision Document, at 6-7. In this regard,
there is no discussion of the respective merits of the firms’
past performance in the contracting officer’s trade-off
analysis, which only focuses upon the respective merits of the
vendors’ quotations under the technical approach and solution
factor and price.
The agency’s failure to consider the relative qualitative merits
of the firms’ past performance may have been driven by the
adjectival rating scheme that was employed by the TET and
contracting officer. As noted above, the highest rating that a
vendor could receive for past performance was low risk,
indicating that there was no doubt that the vendor could perform
the task order work. This scheme provided no adjectival ratings
to account for better or more relevant past performance.
Regardless, we have long stated that evaluation ratings, whether
adjectival or numerical, should be merely guides to intelligent
decision-making, and that therefore evaluators and selection
officials should reasonably consider the underlying bases for
ratings, including the advantages and disadvantages associated
with the specific content of competing quotations, in a manner
that is fair and equitable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation. See Systems Research and Applications Corp.; Booz
Allen Hamilton, Inc., supra. This was, however, not done here.
In short, because the record does not show that the TET or the
contracting officer reasonably considered the relative merits of
the vendors’ past performance consistent with the RFQ’s
evaluation scheme, we sustain the protest. (CPS
Professional Services, LLC, B-409811, B-409811.2: Aug 13,
2014) (pdf)
The protester
raises a number of objections to the agency’s reevaluation of
proposals and selection decision. Among other things, the
protester objects to the agency’s decision to upwardly adjust
its proposed labor hours to perform the first call, which
resulted in NikSoft’s evaluated price being higher than LS3’s.
In this regard, NikSoft complains that DOJ ignored NikSoft’s
individual technical approach and improperly assumed that
NikSoft would perform the first call in the same manner as LS3,
which had a different technical approach to providing these
services. See Comments at 15-16.
Where, as here, an agency issues an RFQ to FSS contractors under
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 8.4 and conducts a
competition, we will review the record to ensure that the
agency's evaluation is reasonable and consistent with the terms
of the solicitation. See Digital Solutions, Inc., B-402067, Jan.
12, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 26 at 3-4; GC Servs. Ltd. P'ship, B-298102,
B-298102.3, June 14, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 96 at 6. With regard to
the establishment of BPAs under FSS procedures, the FAR requires
that the agency establish the BPA with the contractor that
provides the best value, considering price and other identified
factors. FAR § 8.405-3(a)(1), (2). In this regard, FAR §
8.405-2(d) requires the agency to evaluate all responses
received using the evaluation criteria provided in the
solicitation, and to consider the level of effort and the mix of
labor in evaluating the offered prices. See Advanced Tech. Sys.,
Inc., B-296493.6, Oct. 6, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 151 at 9-10.
While we are mindful that, when an agency places an order under
a BPA, limited documentation of the source selection is
permissible, the agency must at least provide a sufficient
record to show that the source selection was reasonable. FAR §
13.303-5(e); see also FAR § 8.405-2(e) (minimum documentation
requirements include documenting the rationale for any tradeoffs
when establishing a BPA or placing an order); e-LYNXX Corp.,
B-292761, Dec. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 219 at 8 (even for
procurements conducted under simplified acquisition procedures,
an agency must have a sufficient record to allow for a
meaningful review).
The record here provides no basis to support the agency’s
determination that NikSoft’s level of effort or labor mix was
insufficient to perform the first call, or to support its
determination that NikSoft’s level of effort should be increased
to the same level of effort proposed by LS3. Specifically, apart
from the agency’s conclusion that NikSoft’s level of effort is
insufficient and that LS3’s level of effort is sufficient, there
is no analysis or explanation in the agency’s price evaluation
and source selection decision to support these determinations.
Nor has the agency provided any explanation or support for these
conclusions in response to NikSoft’s protest. This is
particularly problematic given DOJ’s recognition that the two
vendors had differing approaches to performing the call.
FAR § 8.405-2(d) does not elaborate on the precise method of
analysis, or the extent of consideration an agency must give to
a vendor’s proposed level of effort and labor mix. In our view,
agencies are not required to conduct a formal evaluation of the
kind typically performed in a negotiated procurement under FAR
Part 15. However, in light of the significant differences
between NikSoft’s and LS3’s levels of effort and labor mixes,
the conclusory statements in the record simply are not adequate
to demonstrate that DOJ reasonably considered whether NikSoft’s
level of effort and labor mix were sufficient to perform the
call, or to explain the agency’s decision to upwardly adjust
NikSoft’s level of effort to that of LS3’s. We, therefore,
sustain the protest on this basis. (NikSoft
Systems Corporation, B-406179.2, Aug 14, 2012) (pdf)
NikSoft’s protest
challenges numerous aspects of the agency’s technical evaluation
and the resulting source selection decision. NikSoft
specifically argues that the agency’s source selection decision
failed to meaningfully consider whether LS3’s higher-priced
quotation merited the associated cost premium.
Where, as here, a procurement conducted pursuant to FAR subpart
8.4 provides for award on a “best value” basis, it is the
function of the SSA to perform a price/technical tradeoff, that
is, to determine whether one quotation's technical superiority
is worth its higher price. InnovaTech, Inc., B-402415, Apr. 8,
2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 94 at 2, 6 n.8; The MIL Corp., B-297508,
B-297508.2, Jan. 26, 2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 34 at 13. Specifically,
FAR § 8.405-2(d) requires the agency to evaluate all responses
received using the evaluation criteria provided in the
solcitation and to consider the level of effort and the mix of
labor proposed to perform the task in evaluating the offered
prices. See Advanced Tech. Sys., Inc., B-296493.6, Oct. 6, 2006,
2006 CPD ¶ 151 at 9-10. While we are mindful that, when an
agency places an order under a BPA, limited documentation of the
source selection is permissible, the agency must at least
provide a sufficient record to show that the source selection
was reasonable. FAR § 13.303-5(e); see also FAR § 8.405-2(e)
(minimum documentation requirements include documenting the
rationale for any tradeoffs when establishing a BPA or placing
an order); e-LYNXX Corp., B-292761, Dec. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 219
at 8 (even for procurements conducted under simplified
acquisition procedures, an agency must have a sufficient record
to allow for a meaningful review).
Here, as indicated by the contemporaneous documentation set out
above, there is no evidence that the agency gave any meaningful
consideration to NetSoft’s lower price in making the source
selection decision. Rather, the record shows that the agency’s
selection decision was solely based on LS3’s higher technical
rating. Indeed, the contracting officer explains that the basis
for the agency’s selection decision was as follows: “Given
[LS3’s] rating of ‘exceptional,’ with no other bidders having
received an equivalent or higher rating, thereby rendering
further analysis under the trade-off approach unnecessary, LS3
was selected for award.” CO’s Statement at 413. Because the
agency did not consider price as required by the solicitation
and applicable regulations, we sustain NikSoft’s protest on this
basis. (NikSoft Systems Corp.,
B-406179, Feb 29, 2012) (pdf)
With respect to
USIT's challenge to the agency's evaluation of 5D's price, USIT
complains that DLA relied upon a flawed independent government
estimate in evaluating prices, because the government estimate
($7,359,688) was overstated by approximately $900,000 due to the
inclusion of costs and labor hours associated with the technical
support tasks that had been removed from the procurement by
amendment 3. Protester's Comments at 9. USIT argues that 5D's
quoted price should have been found to be approximately 22.5
percent higher than the government estimate (and not 8 percent
higher) once the estimate was corrected to remove the hours and
costs associated with the deleted technical support tasks. See
Protester's Comments at 11; see also AR, Tab 20, Selection
Decision, at 12. USIT also argues that the price evaluation was
unreasonable because DLA did not evaluate 5D's reallocation of
labor hours from the deleted technical support tasks to the
customer support tasks in its revised quotation. Protester's
Comments at 11; Protester's Supp. Comments at 5.
When an agency issues an RFQ to vendors holding FSS contracts
for the delivery of services at hourly rates, and, as here, a
statement of work is included, the ordering agency must evaluate
the quotations received consistent with the stated evaluation
criteria. FAR sect. 8.405‑2(d). The FAR also requires the agency
to consider the level of effort and the mix of labor proposed to
perform the task being ordered, determine that the total price
is reasonable, and document the agency's price reasonableness
determination. FAR sect. 8.405‑2(d), (e) ; see also Advanced
Tech. Sys., Inc., B‑296493.6, Oct. 6, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 151
at 9-10.
In our view, the record here does not show that DLA's price
evaluation was reasonable. As noted above, vendors were required
to provide detailed pricing information, labor hours, and labor
mix for each PWS task and to demonstrate the relationship
between their pricing structure and their technical approach.
See RFQ sect. 4.2.4.1. USIT and 5D both provided labor
categories, corresponding labor rates, and hours by labor
category for each task, as required by the RFQ. USIT and 5D
apparently have very different approaches to performing the PWS
tasks, given the dramatic differences in the vendors' quoted
labor hours and labor mix for the PWS tasks. For example, with
respect to the customer support task (to which 5D reallocated
its labor hours from the deleted technical support task), USIT
quoted a total of [DELETED] hours at a price of $2.4 million,
and 5D quoted a total of [DELETED] hours at a price of $4.5
million.
At best, the record here indicates that the vendors' quoted
labor hours were reviewed by the [technical evaluation panel]
TEP, and found "sufficient to complete the tasks." See, e.g.,
AR, Tab 17, Final Consensus Evaluation Summary for 5D, at 1. As
noted above, the CO also compared 5D's quoted price to the
government estimate (noting that 5D's total price was within 8
percent of the government estimate) and concluded that 5D's
quoted price was fair and reasonable "based on the existence of
full and open competition, the fact that the [TEP] accepted the
total labor hours, and the use of [FSS] pricing." AR, Tab 20,
Selection Decision, at 12-13.
There is no documentation in the record demonstrating that the
TEP or the CO evaluated 5D's, or USIT's, labor mix to perform
the PWS tasks, or performed the analysis required by FAR sect.
8.405-2(d) to determine whether the labor mix proposed--albeit
at fixed hourly rates--would result in a reasonable price for
performance. Rather, the TEP's evaluation report and CO's
selection decision merely state that the TEP found that the
vendors' total labor hours were considered sufficient to perform
the PWS tasks. The record also lacks any analysis of 5D's
reallocation of over 6,000 labor hours (at a price over
$878,000) from a task that had been deleted from the PWS to
another task. There is also no explanation for why reallocating
these hours to another PWS task was reasonable. Moreover, no
such analysis or explanation has been provided in response to
this protest. On this record, we cannot find a basis to uphold
DLA's determination that the vendors' overall price (which is
based upon the application of the vendors' FSS rates to their
quoted labor hours for each labor category) was reasonable.
(U S Information Technologies
Corporation, B-404357; B-404357.2, February 2, 2011) (pdf)
The protester
asserts that it was improper for GSA to rescore the quotations
after receiving the evaluation materials prepared by IHS’s
technical evaluators. According to the protester, this rescoring
resulted in the technical superiority of CSN’s quotation being
exaggerated, and also ultimately led to the SSA’s not
considering OPTIMUS’s quotation in the price/technical tradeoff
decision, notwithstanding OPTIMUS’s substantial price advantage
over CNI.
We will not reevaluate quotations in reviewing a protest
challenging an agency’s technical evaluation; rather, we will
examine the record to determine whether the agency’s evaluation
conclusions were reasonable and consistent with the terms of the
solicitation and applicable procurement laws and regulations.
Engineered Elec. Co. d/b/a/ DRS Fermont, B-295126.5, B-295126.6,
Dec. 7, 2008, 2007 CPD para. 4 at 3-4.
GSA’s scoring changes here are unobjectionable. The record shows
that both the GSA program manager and SSA did not change the
scores in a vacuum; rather, the changes were made with reference
to the contents of the quotations and the evaluation materials
prepared by the IHS evaluators (and, in the case of the SSA, the
evaluation materials prepared by the program manager). In this
regard, the program manager states as follows:
I can testify that I created a consensus evaluation document
utilizing the comments from the first set of IHS’ evaluations.
As is common practice of the Project Manager, I reviewed all
[quotations] to verify the comments from the first set of
evaluations. I evaluated each [quotation’s] Past
Experience/Past Performance, Technical/Management Approach and
Staffing Plan. Each of these factors included multiple
criteria that received scores in the evaluation. The IHS
evaluators, however, did not correlate their scores to the
Evaluation Plan Criteria accurately thus resulting in
inaccurate scores. In the consensus document, I applied the
comments from the first set of evaluations, correlated such
comments to the Evaluation Plan Criteria, and applied the
correct score. (All [of the IHS evaluators’] evaluation
comments were preserved on the consensus evaluation document.)
I added comments on the consensus document when the score I
applied differed from the technical panel average score for
that factor.
Agency Submission, Dec. 8, 2008, Program Manager Affidavit, at
2. Similarly, the SSA states his rationale for changing the
scores a second time:
I can testify that the resulting scores from the initial
evaluations and consensus document resulted in fractional
scores. . . . The scoring criteria in the solicitation was
based on . . . whole number scores. . . . To determine whether
a score of 2.5 equaled a ‘2’ or a ‘3’, I re-read all 7
[quotations]. As the Source Selection Authority, based on my
reading of (1) the [quotations], (2) the solicitation
criteria, and (3) the comments of the evaluation panel and the
GSA [program manager], I determined the most appropriate whole
number score.
Agency Submission, Dec. 8, 2008, SSA Affidavit, at 2.
In the final analysis, ratings, be they numerical, color, or
adjectival, are merely guides for intelligent decision making in
the procurement process. Citywide Managing Servs. of Port
Washington, Inc., B-281287.12, B-281287.13, Nov. 15, 2000, 2001
CPD para. 6 at 11. The germane consideration is whether the
record shows that the agency fully considered the actual
qualitative differences in the technical quotations or
quotations. See, e.g., Bernard Cap Co., Inc., B-297168, Nov. 8,
2005, 2005 CPD para. 204 at 6.
Both GSA officials, after a detailed review of the evaluation
materials and the quotations themselves, assigned point scores
that they determined more accurately portrayed the relative
merits of the quotations, and were consistent with the terms of
the solicitation’s evaluation scheme. These actions were in no
way inconsistent with the RFQ, and the protester has not shown
that the revised scores inaccurately reflected the relative
merits of the quotations. We thus have no basis to object to the
rescoring. (OPTIMUS Corporation,
B-400777, January 26, 2009) (pdf)
The protester maintains that the agency failed to provide it
with meaningful discussions. According to the protester, the
agency’s request for price reductions after the submission of
initial quotations constituted the opening of discussions, which
obligated the agency to bring to OPTIMUS’s attention the
weaknesses the agency identified in the technical portion of its
quotation.
This assertion is without merit. As noted, this requirement is
being met through the FSS, and was conducted pursuant to FAR
part 8.4. There is no requirement in FAR part 8.4 that an agency
soliciting vendor responses prior to issuing a task order under
an FSS contract conduct discussions with vendors regarding the
contents of those responses, even where the solicitation does
not specifically advise firms of the agency’s intent to issue a
task order without discussions. Avalon Integrated Servs., Corp.,
B-290185, July 1, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 118 at 4. [5] Under FAR
sect. 8.405-2(c)(3)(ii), where, as here, an agency is placing an
order under the FSS that exceeds the maximum order threshold, it
is required to seek price reductions below the prices included
in the vendors’ FSS price lists. The agency’s request for price
reductions was pursuant to this requirement, and therefore did
not constitute the opening of discussions, such that the agency
was obligated to engage in meaningful discussions. (OPTIMUS
Corporation, B-400777, January 26, 2009) (pdf)
Because GSA administers the FSS program, we solicited GSA’s
views on the responsibility determination issue. In its filing,
GSA notes that the purpose of the FSS program, as set forth in
FAR Part 38, is to provide federal agencies with a simplified
process of acquiring commercial supplies and services. In
furtherance of this goal, GSA states, it is responsible for
awarding indefinite-delivery contracts in accordance with all
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, including
compliance with the requirements relating to contractor
responsibility (see FAR sect. 38.101(d), (e)). GSA concludes
that, because it is tasked with making determinations of
responsibility pertaining to the award of FSS contracts,
ordering agencies, while not precluded from doing so, are not
required to make a responsibility determination prior to placing
an FSS order. Letter from GSA to GAO, July 26, 2006, at 1-3. We
agree. Responsibility is a contract formation term that
refers to the ability of a prospective contractor to perform the
contract for which it has submitted an offer; by law, a
contracting officer must determine that an offeror is
responsible before awarding it a contract. See 41 U.S.C. sect.
253b(c), (d); FAR sect. 9.103(a), (b). The concept of
responsibility expressly applies to “prospective
contractors”--not “current” or “existing” contractors--a
limitation that is repeated throughout the applicable statutes
and regulations, and that indicates that the requirement for a
responsibility determination applies before award of a contract.
See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. sect. 403 (“As used in this Act . . . the
term ‘responsible source’ means a prospective contractor . . .
.”); FAR sect. 9.100 (“This subpart prescribes polices,
standards, and procedures for determining whether prospective
contractors . . . are responsible”); FAR sect. 9.102(a) (“This
subpart applies to all proposed contracts with any prospective
contractor . . . .”); and FAR sect. 9.103(c) (“A prospective
contractor must affirmatively demonstrate its responsibility . .
. .”). Consistent with this statutory and regulatory framework,
once an offeror is determined to be responsible and is awarded a
contract, there is no requirement that an agency make additional
responsibility determinations during contract performance. E.
Huttenbauer & Son, Inc., B-258018.3, Mar. 20, 1995, 95-1 CPD
para. 148 at 2 (holding that a contracting officer was not
required to make a new responsibility determination before
deciding whether to exercise an option because the concept of
responsibility has no applicability with respect to a contract
once that contract has been awarded). Contrary to the
protester’s position, the extent of the requirement for a
determination of responsibility is not tied to the type of
contracting vehicle that the government elects to use for an
acquisition; thus, there is no basis to conclude that the
requirement for a responsibility determination is broader for
orders placed under FSS contracts. In this regard, we note that
FAR sect. 8.405 and sect. 8.406 set forth the ordering
procedures and ordering activity’s responsibilities,
respectively, with regard to FSS contracts; there is no
requirement in these provisions to make a responsibility
determination. In sum, we conclude that the initial
responsibility determination made by GSA in connection with the
award of the underlying FSS contract satisfies the requirement
for a responsibility determination regarding that vendor and
that there is no requirement that an ordering agency perform
separate responsibility determinations when placing orders under
that contract. In view of our conclusion, ATS’s challenge to
HUD’s consideration of PSI’s responsibility here does not give
rise to a valid basis of protest since HUD was not required to
perform a responsibility determination. (Advanced
Technology Systems, Inc., B-296493.6, October 6, 2006) (pdf)
Given the clear language of FAR sect. 8.405-2(d)--“the [o]rdering
activity is responsible for considering the level of effort and
the mix of labor proposed to perform a specific task being
ordered”--we conclude that HUD was required to consider each
vendor’s proposed level of effort and labor mix as part of its
evaluation of quotations here. As explained below, however,
while the record indicates that the agency did consider PSI’s
proposed level of effort and labor mix as part of its best value
determination, the record also indicates a complete lack of
support for the agency’s conclusion that PSI’s proposed level of
effort and labor mix were sufficient to perform the specific
tasks being ordered under this bridge contract. In order for us
to review an agency’s evaluation of vendors’ quotations, an
agency must have adequate documentation to support its judgment.
See Northeast MEP Servs., Inc., B-285963.5 et al., Jan. 5, 2001,
2001 CPD para. 28 at 7. Where an agency fails to sufficiently
document its evaluation findings, it bears the risk that there
may not be adequate supporting rationale in the record for us to
conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis for the source
selection decision. Southwest Marine, Inc.; American Sys. Eng’g
Corp., B-265865.3, B-265865.4, Jan. 23, 1996, 96-1 CPD para. 56
at 10. The record here does not provide any basis to support the
agency’s determination that PSI’s proposed level of effort and
labor mix were sufficient to perform the PWS requirements. The
agency’s source selection decision provides no support for the
contracting officer’s determination--it is simply a conclusion
without explanation. Similarly, in the statement submitted after
the filing of ATS’s protest here, the contracting officer merely
reiterates his conclusion that PSI’s proposed level of effort
and mix of labor were determined acceptable, again without
providing an explanation of how this determination was made. The
only additional information provided in the contracting
officer’s statement is that he spoke with other HUD personnel
who also concluded, again without explanation, that PSI had
proposed an acceptable level of effort and labor mix. FAR sect.
8.405-2(d) does not elaborate on the method or extent of
consideration an agency is responsible for giving to a vendor’s
proposed level of effort and labor mix in the circumstances
here. In our view, agencies are not required to conduct a formal
evaluation of the kind typically performed in a negotiated
procurement under FAR Part 15. However, here, in light of the
significant differences both between PSI’s and ATS’s proposed
levels of effort, and between PSI’s own prior and current
proposed levels of effort and labor mixes for the identical
TRACS requirements, the conclusory statements in the record
simply are not adequate to demonstrate that HUD reasonably
considered whether PSI’s level of effort and labor mix were
sufficient to perform the specific tasks, as required by FAR
sect. 8.405-2(d). We, therefore, sustain the protest on this
basis. (Advanced Technology
Systems, Inc., B-296493.6, October 6, 2006) (pdf) |
|
Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
Technical Professional Services, Inc.
B-410640: Jan 20, 2015 (pdf) |
Immersion Consulting, LLC
B-415155,B-415155.2: Dec 4, 2017 |
OPTIMUS Corporation, B-400777,
January 26, 2009 (pdf) |
Castro & Company, LLC B-412398:
Jan 29, 2016 (pdf) |
Advanced Technology Systems, Inc.,
B-296493.6, October 6, 2006 (pdf) (responsibility determination) |
CPS Professional Services, LLC,
B-409811, B-409811.2: Aug 13, 2014 (pdf) |
|
NikSoft Systems Corporation,
B-406179.2, Aug 14, 2012 (pdf) |
|
NikSoft Systems Corp., B-406179,
Feb 29, 2012 (pdf) |
|
U S Information Technologies
Corporation, B-404357; B-404357.2, February 2, 2011 (pdf) |
|
Advanced Technology Systems, Inc.,
B-296493.6, October 6, 2006 (pdf) (level of effort, labor mix) |
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims- Key Excerpts |
A. Whether a Clear and Prejudicial Violation of the FAR Occurred
The crux of MVS’s protest is that the government violated Part 8 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”), found at Title 48 of the Code of Federal Regulations, in
considering the materials MVS submitted in response to the RFQ for satellite communications
services. Specifically, MVS contends that the government violated FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(C),
which requires the order activity contracting officer to “[e]nsure all quotes received are fairly
considered and award is made in accordance with the evaluation criteria in the RFQ.”
1. The enforceability of FAR 8.405-2.
At the outset, the court notes that “a procurement under [S]ubpart 8.4 is different in kind
from one conducted under Part 15, even if some procedures also present in Part 15 are u[s]ed.”
Holloway & Co., PLLC v. United States, 87 Fed. Cl. 381, 393 (2009) (quoting Systems Plus, Inc.
v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 206, 211 (2005)) (alteration in original). In short, the rigorous
competitive procedures in Part 15 do not necessarily apply. See id. The government argues that
this distinction means that MVS cannot base its challenge on a clear and prejudicial violation of
the FAR, relying on Ellsworth Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 388 (1999). See Def.’s
Mot. at 37. The decision in Ellsworth states:
[In a FAR Part 8 procurement,] a frustrated bidder may still challenge the
agency award under the arbitrary and capricious standard articulated in 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). However, the protester will not be able to prevail on
the theory that the procurement procedure involved a clear and prejudicial
violation of applicable statutes and regulations, because no applicable
procedural regulations are contained in Part 8. A protester instead must
rely on establishing that the government officials involved in the procurement
process were without a rational and reasonable basis for their decision.
45 Fed. Cl. at 395-96. In making this argument, however, the government fails to acknowledge
that FAR Part 8 has been amended to include procedural requirements in the 14 years since
Ellsworth was decided. Saliently, FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(C), on which MVS relies, was
established by Interim Rule, effective May 16, 2011, and as a Final Rule, effective April 2, 2012.
See 76 Fed. Reg. 14541, 14548 (Mar. 16, 2011) (establishing the interim rule); 77 Fed. Reg.
12912, 12927 (Mar. 2, 2012) (establishing the final rule). Those rules implemented Section 863
of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. 110-
417, 122 Stat. 4356 (Oct. 14, 2008). “Section 863 mandated the development and publication of
regulations in the FAR to enhance competition for the award of orders placed under multipleaward
contracts.” 76 Fed. Reg. 14548. As such, FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(C) is a procedural
regulation that this court may enforce and which could provide a basis for a claim that the
government engaged in a clear and prejudicial violation of the FAR.
2. The applicability of FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(C) to the DISA procurement.
FAR 8.405-2 sets forth procedures to be followed when an ordering activity seeks to
obtain services requiring a statement of work through a Federal Supply Schedule contract. FAR
8.405-2(c)(3)(iii)(C) places an obligation on “[t]he ordering activity contracting officer . . . [to
e]nsure all quotes received are fairly considered and award is made in accordance with the
evaluation criteria in the RFQ.” FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii). The government first contends that
MVS’s claim cannot fall within the ambit of this regulation because the provision “addresses the
ordering activity contracting officer . . . [which] is DISA, not GSA, so that provision applies to
DISA.” Hr’g Tr. 30:25 to 31:4. According to the FAR, an ordering activity is “an activity that is
authorized to place orders, or establish blanket purchase agreements (BPA), against the [GSA’s]
[m]ultiple [a]ward [s]chedule contracts.” FAR 8.401.
At the time the RFQ was issued, DISA was the activity authorized to acquire commercial
satellite communications services against Federal Supply Schedule contracts. See MOA at 1; AR
10-291 (RFQ). However, this role was established in a unique manner — through an MOA
between DISA and GSA which the agencies entered in 2009. Prior to the MOA, both agencies
had been “manag[ing] separate contractual vehicles to provide these [commercial satellite
communications] services, resulting in an overlap of offerings, providers, and markets.” MOA at
2. To “avoid[] duplication of efforts,” MOA at 1, DISA and GSA agreed to a formal partnership
in which each agency would assume significant responsibilities in the acquisition process, see,
e.g., MOA, App. A. The MOA does not specify which agency would assume responsibility for
processing facility clearance applications if such clearances were required for a commercial
satellite communications services procurement. Nonetheless, as the government has
acknowledged, DISA and GSA agreed that GSA would receive and sponsor facility clearance
applications for commercial satellite communications services procurements. See Hr’g Tr.
81:16-24; Def.’s Mot. at 22; see also Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s and Intervening Def.’s Responses to
Pl.’s Mot. for Judgment on the Admin. Record (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 12, ECF No. 76. GSA
sponsored the facility clearance applications via Schedule 70 contracts that it managed, even
though the Schedule 70 contracts did not require security clearances as a condition of award. See
AR 9-261 to -62 (E-mail from Donald Carlson to Karen Stewart); Hr’g Tr. 84:13 to 85:6; see
also Def.’s Mot. at 22. Security clearances were only required for the award of certain task
orders within the commercial satellite communications services procurement program, of whichthe RFQ at issue was one. See AR 1-27 (2009 Industry Day PowerPoint Slides); AR 2-75 (2010
Industry Day PowerPoint Slides); AR 12-546 (Amendment 2). As such, the ordering activity for
the RFQ, DISA, did not maintain sole responsibility for all aspects of the order placed against the
Schedule 70 contract. Rather, the MOA allocated responsibility for security clearance
sponsorship and processing, a key facet of the RFQ, to GSA, as DISA’s partner in the
procurement of satellite communications services. Because of that allocation, and because GSA
was in sole control of the processing of vendors’ security clearance applications for the RFQ, the
court concludes that GSA served as the ordering activity with respect to the security clearance
aspects of the procurement.
The court must next inquire whether MVS’s quote was “fairly considered” within the
meaning of FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii). MVS only questions the government’s obligations with
respect to the receipt and processing of its request for a secret facility clearance needed to obtain
the task order at issue. Whether the government’s conduct with respect to that part of the
procurement amounted to fair consideration turns on the circumstances surrounding that process.
In this instance, GSA held two industry day events in 2009 and 2010 at which it noted that
facility clearances might be required for the award of some commercial satellite communications
task orders. AR 1-27; AR 2-75. The GSA website also provided a similar notice. AR 53-3235
(Screenshot of GSA website). The statements did not specify that completed copies of DD Form
254 were to be transmitted to GSA, which would enter facility security clearances as
modifications to Schedule 70 contracts. MVS, which did not become eligible for these task
orders until January 2011 when it received its Schedule 70 contract, apparently did not
understand that GSA was responsible for processing the DD Form 254. Instead, it twice
submitted a DD Form 254 to DISA “as part of bid packages in which the DD254 was required.”
AR 8-258 (E-mail from Karen Stewart to Anne Miller (Nov. 13, 2012)). In November 2012,
only a few days before the RFQ at issue was released, GSA contacted MVS directly to ask
whether MVS intended to submit a DD Form 254 to obtain a facility clearance that would appear
as a modification to the company’s Schedule 70 contract. AR 8-251 (E-mail from Anne Miller
to Karen Stewart and Tim Bracken (Nov. 13, 2012)). When MVS expressed confusion in its
reply, Mr. Carlson of GSA replied, explaining that the DD Form 254 “that [GSA] award[s] to the
Schedule 70 contract is the one you really want to have in the system” and that GSA would act
as MVS’s sponsor for such a clearance. AR 9-262 (E-mail from Donald Carlson to Karen
Stewart). MVS did not immediately apply for a facility clearance. On December 6, 2012, it
submitted a completed DD Form 254 to GSA several days after DISA issued Amendment 2 to
the RFQ and clarified that vendors would be required to possess a secret facility clearance priorto award of the task order. See AR 12-546 (Amendment 2); AR 16-774 (E-mail from Tim
Bracken to Anne Miller (Dec. 5, 2012)). MVS’s submission to GSA did not make any mention
of its need to obtain a facility clearance by a certain deadline, and there is no evidence in the
record that Mr. Carlson, the GSA official responsible for processing DD Form 254s for the
commercial satellite communications services program, was aware of any exigent circumstances.
The record reflects that Mr. Carlson, who received MVS’s DD Form 254 on December 6,
2012, AR 17-777 (E-mail from Anne Miller to Donald Carlson), did not act to process therequest until February 1, 2013 — 57 days after he received it, see AR 18-782 (E-mail from
Donald Carlson to Anne Miller). Action was taken only after MVS called Mr. Carlson on
February 1 to inquire about the status of its request. See AR 19-818 (E-mail from Brian Aziz to
Cathy Nelson). That same day, Mr. Carlson sent an e-mail to Ms. Miller, GSA’s contract
specialist responsible for MVS’s Schedule 70 contract, in which he acknowledged the long
period of time which had passed, saying, “[s]orry about the delay in getting back to [you] on the
DD-254 for MVS.” AR 18-782. He also asked Ms. Miller to return to him the completed
contents of a DD-254 package he had allegedly sent to her, including a signed DD Form 254,
sponsor letter, and a contract modification award document. Id. When Ms. Miller explained that
he had never sent such a package, Mr. Carlson replied that he would send a “DD-254 package to
DISA for [its] approval,” and would send that package to Ms. Miller once approval was given.
Id. Approval was given on February 7, 2013, see AR 54-3341 (E-mail from Donald Carlson to
Anne Miller), and the DD Form 254 forms were sent to MVS to review, AR 54-3353 (E-mail
from Anne Miller to Brian Aziz). MVS sent the completed forms to GSA that same day, see AR
54-3386 (E-mail from Anne Miller to Donald Carlson), and Mr. Carlson sent the forms to DSS
for processing on February 8, 2013, AR 54-3431 (E-mail from Donald Carlson to DSS). DSS
granted an interim secret facility clearance to MVS on April 8, 2013, Am. Compl., Ex. 10, and a
final secret facility clearance to MVS on April 29, 2013, Am. Compl., Ex. 11, too late for MVS
to receive the task order award.
The record reflects a long period of inaction between December 6, 2012, and February 1,
2013, on the part of GSA. During that time, MVS did not contact GSA to inquire about its
application for a facility security clearance until it received a letter from DISA requesting a final
quotation revision and proof of facility clearance. See AR 32-1788 to -89 (Request for Final
Quotation Revision). MVS represents that its inactivity was reasonable, because it contends that
the evaluation notices sent by DISA in late December made no mention that MVS’s submission
with respect to a facility clearance was deficient. See Hr’g Tr. 72:2-18. It claims that it acted
promptly to resolve the matter after receiving notice from DISA that proof of a security
clearance would be needed in February. See Hr’g Tr. 72:18-22. The court concurs that MVS’s
actions are understandable in light of the circumstances. MVS did not hinder the facility
clearance application process in any manner.
Regarding GSA’s actions, Mr. Carlson provides an explanation for his delay in
processing MVS’s facility clearance request. He notes that between December 6, 2012, and
February 1, 2013, he worked “on the development of [six] DD-254 packages, including MVS’s,
as well as . . . numerous others that were in various stages of development or modification award
processing.” Decl. of Donald V. Carlson (“Carlson Decl.”) ¶ 14 (May 10, 2013), ECF No. 44.
He states that he also worked on a security audit report and was on personal leave for sixteen
days during that time period. Id. Mr. Carlson additionally says he halted the processing of DD
Form 254 requests for a two-week period in January while DSS “was questioning whether a
bona fide need existed for any facility clearances under SINs 132-54 and 132-55 under Schedule
70.” Id. ¶ 15. He resumed processing requests after that issue was resolved and “worked on all
the vendors[’] requests for facility clearances and did not expedite the request of any particular
vendor.” Id. ¶ 16. Mr. Carlson, however, notes that he did expedite the processing of MVS’s
request as soon as he was informed that the matter required prompt consideration. Id. ¶ 17.
Under these circumstances, the court cannot say that MVS’s quote and attendant request
for a facility security clearance did not receive fair consideration as required by FAR 8.405-
2(c)(3)(iii). While Mr. Carlson certainly did not act with alacrity, vigor, or timeliness, he
provided a propinquent level of bureaucratic service and consideration. He did not actively
ignore any indications that MVS’s request was urgent, and he provided MVS with appropriate
action once he became aware of the exigency. In sum, MVS has not demonstrated that the
government, acting through GSA or DISA, has committed a violation of FAR 8.405-2(c)(3)(iii).
(emphais added by Wifcon.com) (MVS
USA, Inc. v. U. S. and Northrop Grumman Systems, Corp., No.
13-246C, July 2, 2013) (pdf)
D. FAR Part 15 and FAR 8.405-2(e)
Matt Martin contends that the AR does not
establish that the SSO conducted an
independent best-value analysis “or that she made any tradeoffs
or business judgments
that would justify accepting a technically inferior proposal.”
Pl.’s Mem. 18 (citing FAR
15.308) see also Pl.’s Mem. 11-12. This procurement was
conducted pursuant to FAR
Subpart 8.4. See AR Tab 13, at 360. FAR Subpart 8.4 and FAR Part
15 are different
provisions with different purposes. The amount of documentation
necessary in FAR
Subpart 8.4 procurements does not rise to the level required by
FAR Part 15.11 “The very
purpose of FAR Part 8 is to provide a more simplified and
flexible approach away from
the more formal and rigorous procedures for negotiated
procurements.” Allied Tech. Grp.
Inc. v. United States, 94 Fed Cl. 16, 50 (2010) (internal
quotation omitted). “Orders
placed against [Federal Supply Schedule] contracts are viewed as
involving ‘full and open
competition’ without requiring the use of procedures contained
in FAR Part 15.”
HomeSource, 94 Fed. Cl. at 486 (citing FAR 8.404(a)). The
Evaluation Plan uses some
language that also appears in FAR Part 15. See AR Tab 10, at
319. However, the use of
some of the same words in two procurements does not transform a
FAR Subpart 8.4
procurement into a FAR Part 15 procurement. See Ellsworth
Assocs., Inc. v. United
States, 45 Fed. Cl. 388, 394 (1999) (“The decisional law does
not support plaintiff's
contention that an FSS selection process that is handled more
like a negotiated
procurement must comply with the requirements of Part 15.”).
Matt Martin’s argument in criticism of the documentation of the
agency’s decision
in this case relies substantially on CRAssociates, Inc. v.
United States, No. 10-339 C, 2010 WL 4162118 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 4,
2010, reissued Oct. 20, 2010), and Femme Comp,
Inc. v. United States, 83 Fed. Cl. 704 (2008), Pl.’s Reply
11-15, 24-27, two cases
interpreting FAR Part 15, not FAR Subpart 8.4. In Femme Comp,
the court found that
the SSA had failed to document adequately her comparative
analysis of each proposal.
Femme Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. at 767-68. The court determined that the
SSA’s conclusions in
her Source Selection Document appeared to have relied on
assigned factor ratings instead
of underlying evaluations, in violation of FAR 15.308. Id. Matt
Martin’s reliance on
Femme Comp, as with its reliance on CRAssociates, see supra note
10, is similarly
unpersuasive because those cases involve alleged defects in a
procurement based on the
failure of the evaluations in those cases to comply with the
requirement of FAR Part 15. (Matt
Martin Real Estate Management LLC v. U. S. and HomeTelos, LP,
BLB Resources, Inc., Ofori & Associates, P.C., and PEMCO Ltd,
No. 10-675C, December 2, 2010) (pdf)
1. Analysis of cost.
The Technical Evaluation Panel used cost-realism analysis in
assessing the offerors' proposals while the contracting officer opted instead to perform
a reasonableness assessment under FAR Subpart 8.4 to determine which offerors' proposal
represented the "best value" to the government.
(sentences deleted)
Holloway seeks to apply
procedures from FAR Part 15 — procedures similar to the cost realism analysis mentioned by the Technical Evaluation Panel
— to this procurement.
(sections deleted)
However, the government is
not always obligated to perform a cost-realism analysis when analyzing competing proposals. Competitive procedures have
been classified into specific subtypes, of which competitive proposals are one and FSS
contracts are another. See Systems Plus, Inc. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 206, 209 (2005).
Applying that distinction, the court in Systems Plus
f[ou]nd it persuasive that [FAR] subpart 8.404(a) explicitly
exempts supply schedule
procurements from [FAR] Parts 13 (with minor exceptions), 14,
and 15. . . . Thus, while
the agency can elect to use procedures from these other parts,
they are not presumptively
applicable.
Id. at 210. The distinction
between when “the more formal and rigorous procedures for
negotiated procurements set forth in FAR Part 15” are required,
and when they are not, has to do
with the nature of the procurement. See Labat-Anderson, Inc. v.
United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 99,
103 (2001). A procurement taking place under the FSS program
involves the selection of
“products and services from a list of eligible contractors whose
pricing schemes have been preapproved
by GSA.” Id. In this circumstance, because the GSA has already
determined that the
prices of supplies and services under FSS contracts are “fair
and reasonable,” the ordering
agency is “not required to make a separate determination of fair
and reasonable pricing, except
for a price evaluation as required by [FAR §] 8.405-2(d).” FAR §
8.404(d). In this context,
FAR § 8.405-2(d) instructs that the contracting agency “is
responsible for considering the level
of effort and the mix of labor proposed to perform a specific
task being ordered, and for
determining that the total price is reasonable.” FAR §
8.405-2(d) (emphasis added).
In short, “a procurement
under subpart 8.4 is different in kind from one conducted under
Part 15, even if some procedures also present in Part 15 are
u[s]ed.” Systems Plus, 68 Fed. Cl. at
211; see also Ellsworth Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed.
Cl. 388, 395-96 (1999) (holding
that “consistent with the simplified and flexible approach Part
8 takes toward [FSS]
procurements, . . . the protester will not be able to prevail on
the theory that the procurement
procedure involved a clear and prejudicial violation of
applicable statutes and regulations,
because no applicable procedural regulations are contained in
[FAR] Part 8. A protester instead
must rely on establishing that the government officials involved
in the procurement process were
without a rational and reasonable basis for their decision.”).
Accordingly, a cost-realism
analysis that accords with FAR § 15.404-1(d)(1), quoted supra,
is not necessarily required when
reviewing offers made pursuant to a negotiated procurement under
the GSA’s FSS program.
This contrasts with the source selection decisions reviewed by
this court in Lumetra and>
Alabama Aircraft, neither of which involved an FSS procurement
but both of which explicitly
mandated that the agency “perform a cost-realism analysis.”
Lumetra, 84 Fed. Cl. at 560 (citing
Sections L and M of the Request for Proposals); see also Alabama
Aircraft, 83 Fed. Cl. at 671
(“Although the . . . contract was to be a fixed-price contract,
the RFP explicitly required the Air
Force to evaluate the ‘reasonableness and realism of the prices
and labor rates proposed’ by the
offerors.” (quoting the Solicitation-Request for Proposal)).
Here, no such mandate was included
in the RFQ.
Holloway argues that “[FAR]
8.4 does not prohibit cost realism assessment, which we
believe was required under this RFQ, and which was in fact
conducted by the [P]anel [and]
which the Source Selection Authority confirmed in the source
selection document.” See Hr’g Tr.
34:10-14 (Apr. 14, 2009). Holloway additionally points to CMS’s
second amendment to the
RFQ, in which CMS asked offerors to submit “a cost or price
proposal supported by cost and
pricing data adequate to establish the reasonableness and
realism of the proposed cost or price,”
AR 4-155 (Amendment #2 to RFQ) (emphasis added), as calling for
a cost-realism analysis by
the contracting officer. See Hr’g Tr. 36:2-7.
The second amendment to the RFQ introduced an ambiguity which
was not fully
resolved by CMS during this procurement. However, because the
RFQ expressly provided that the resulting award was to be a
“[t]ask [o]rder” under a “current GSA Schedule contract,” AR
1-1 (RFQ), all offerors were on notice that the framework
provided by FAR Subpart 8.4 applied.
In the circumstances at hand, a cost-realism analysis would be
required only if CMS had
specifically set out such a requirement. Moreover, the conduct
of CMS does not lend support to
the existence of a price-realism mandate. Although the Technical
Evaluation Panel at times used
cost-realism language, it frequently also referred to the
“reasonableness” of the price proposed
by various offerors. See, e.g., AR 14-1141 to 14-1144 (Business
Proposal Evaluation). In this
respect, the contracting officer opined that “[t]he main concern
of the TEP was whether or not
Grant Thornton’s proposed price was reasonable based on the
[Independent Government Cost
Estimate].” AR 26-1237 (Addendum to Source Selection Document)
(emphasis added). The
contracting officer restricted himself to a cost-reasonableness
analysis, omitting any mention of
cost-realism.Overall, CMS’s
contracting officer was not obligated by the RFQ to employ the
detailed
cost-realism procedures set out in FAR Part 15. It was
sufficient, under FAR Subpart 8.4, for the
contracting officer to have conducted, in conjunction with a
performance risk assessment, a “best
value” inquiry into the reasonableness of the competing
proposals. (Holloway & Company,
PLLC, v U. S. and Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 09-53C, May 14,
2009) (pdf) |
|
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
MVS USA, Inc. v. U. S. and Northrop
Grumman Systems, Corp., No. 13-246C, July 2, 2013 (pdf) |
|
Matt Martin Real Estate Management LLC
v. U. S. and HomeTelos, LP, BLB Resources, Inc., Ofori &
Associates, P.C., and PEMCO Ltd, No. 10-675C, December 2,
2010. (pdf) |
|
Holloway & Company, PLLC, v U. S. and
Grant Thornton, LLP, No. 09-53C, May 14, 2009 (pdf) |
|
|
|