FAR 8.405-3 Blanket purchase agreements (BPAs). |
Comptroller General - Key Excerpts |
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MSC argues that the agency unreasonably rejected its
quotation for failing to submit the [summary
subcontracting report] SSR. According to MSC, because the
document is preexisting and was already in GSA’s
possession (on-line in the eSRS reporting system and
submitted to a GSA MAS contracting officer) at the time
quotations were submitted, no prejudice to other vendors
would result if GSA accepted MSC’s quotation. MSC
therefore asserts that the agency should have waived MSC’s
failure to provide the report as a minor informality or
irregularity. In this regard, MSC asserts that even if the
agency needed the report to evaluate quotations, since it
possessed the information, it was not a material
requirement.
The agency states that the solicitation required all
vendors to submit a copy of the SSR as part of their
quotation and MSC failed to do so. Memorandum of Law (MOL)
at 6. The agency argues that the solicitation required
rejection of any quotation that failed to submit the SSR
and that therefore the burden was on the vendor to submit
the required information, and not on GSA to search for it
outside of the quotation. Id. at 9. The agency contends
that it acted in a reasonable manner when it rejected
MSC’s quotation. Id. 6-10.
Where, as here, an agency issues an RFQ to Federal Supply
Schedule contractors under FAR subpart 8.4 and conducts a
competition (see FAR § 8.405), we will review the record
to ensure that the agency’s evaluation is reasonable and
consistent with the terms of the solicitation. See GC
Servs. Ltd Partnership, B-298102, B-298102.3, June 14,
2006, 2006 CPD ¶ 96 at 6. In reviewing a protest
challenging an agency’s technical evaluation, our Office
will not reevaluate the quotation; rather, we will examine
the record to determine whether the agency’s evaluation
conclusions were reasonable and consistent with the terms
of the solicitation and applicable procurement laws and
regulations. OPTIMUS Corp., B-400777, Jan. 26, 2009, 2009
CPD ¶ 33 at 4-5.
Here, the solicitation stated that vendors must submit the
SSR with their small business participation plan. RFQ,
Amend. 01, §§ 11.7.6, 12.5.4. The solicitation further
advised vendors that the agency would reject a quotation
without evaluating it if the quotation did not include the
SSR. RFQ § 12.5.4. Since MSC did not submit the SSR with
its quotation, it was reasonable for the agency to reject
MSC’s quotation. See The Arbinger Co.--Advisory Opinion,
B-413156.21, Oct. 14, 2016, 2017 CPD ¶100 at 4 (under FAR
part 15 procurement, agency reasonably rejected proposal
without evaluating it for failing to provide correct
version of document where solicitation advised offerors
that agency would reject proposal that did not include
unaltered version of document). Accordingly, we deny this
protest allegation.
MSC also asserts that the agency should have allowed it to
provide the SSR during clarifications. However, there is
no requirement in FAR subpart 8.4 that an agency seek
clarifications or otherwise conduct discussions with
vendors. Aurotech, Inc., B‑413861.4, June 23, 2017, 2017
CPD ¶ 205 at 9.
The protest is denied. (MSC
Industrial Direct Company, Inc. B-416255: Jul 12,
2018)
TN maintains that the agency improperly is using the delivery
order at issue to acquire, on a sole-source basis, what is known
as e-mail-as-a-service (EaaS). Whereas, the agency’s prior
e-mail capabilities are based on software licensed to the agency
that is installed on the agency’s computing assets (principally
desktop computers, laptop computers and servers), EaaS is a
cloud-based subscription service or product that does not
involve installing software on the agency’s computing assets.
Instead, the service is hosted in a Microsoft-owned cloud
computing environment that provides both the functionality of
the agency’s requirements, along with remote storage of the
agency’s data. TN argues that, if the agency is interested in
acquiring an EaaS capability, it must compete its requirements
among vendors capable of providing the service. TN maintains
that its Google-offered products will meet the agency’s
requirements for EaaS.
The agency denies that it has acquired an EaaS capability, and
maintains instead that it simply has upgraded its licenses to
the latest version of Microsoft’s products. The contracting
officer specifically represents as follows:
Nowhere in the delivery order 0004 has the IRS purchased
Microsoft Office 365 or EaaS (See delivery order 0004, mod
0001 and 0002). The IRS has purchased Office Pro Plus licenses
on a term basis within delivery order 0004 which all reside on
locally installed desktops/laptops (delivery Order 0004). The
IRS had 117,500 Office Professional Plus licenses in its
inventory since at least March 2013. (See BPA pg 11). The IRS
is merely continuing to use comparable software licenses or
the “latest and greatest” version of Office Professional as it
has done for years which it is authorized to do under the BPA.
Further, the IRS has purchased Microsoft Exchange licenses
within modification 0002 to delivery order 0004. (See Do 4 mod
2). All of the Exchange licenses are deployed locally on
premise at the IRS and there has been no deployment to a cloud
for any user’s email within the IRS. The IRS has had Microsoft
Exchange licenses within its inventory since at least March
2013 (See BPA pg 10).
Contracting Officer’s Statement at 8.
The Competition in Contracting Act generally requires “full and
open competition” in government procurements as obtained through
the use of competitive procedures. 41 U.S.C. § 3301. FSS
delivery orders that are outside the scope of the underlying BPA
are similarly subject to the requirement for competition. See
Onix Networking Corp., B-411841, Nov. 9, 2015, 2015 CPD ¶ 330 at
6-7. In determining whether a delivery order is outside the
scope of an underlying contract (or in this case, a BPA), our
Office considers whether there is a material difference between
the delivery order and the underlying BPA. Id. Evidence of a
material difference is found by reviewing the BPA as awarded,
and the terms of the delivery order issued, and considering
whether the original solicitation adequately advised offerors of
the potential for the type of work contemplated by the delivery
order. Id. The overall inquiry is whether the delivery order is
of a nature that potential offerors reasonably would have
anticipated competing for the goods or services being acquired
through issuance of the delivery order. Id.
Here, the record belies the agency’s representations to our
Office during the protest concerning what it was acquiring and
how it intended to deploy what it had acquired.
As noted above, the contracting officer represents that the
agency acquired “Office Pro Plus” licenses on a term basis, but
that this was unobjectionable because the agency had a quantity
of “Office Professional Plus” licenses in its inventory, and the
“Office Pro Plus” licenses are simply the ‘latest and greatest’
version of its “Office Professional Plus” licenses. The record
shows, however, that the “Office Pro Plus” product is, in fact,
an Office 365 cloud-based product, which is distinct from the
“Office Professional Plus” licenses owned by the agency. See AR,
exh. E, Delivery Order, at Contract Line Item Nos. 0007, 1004,
2004; exh. L, Softchoice’s FSS Price List, at 440.[5] Thus, the
contracting officer’s representation that the agency is merely
acquiring the latest--or upgraded--version of its “Office
Professional Plus” licenses is factually inaccurate.
The record includes corroborating evidence demonstrating that
the agency understood that it was acquiring a cloud-based
solution using Microsoft’s Office 365 product line, and was not
merely upgrading its inventory of “Office Professional Plus”
licenses. In this connection, the record includes an e-mail sent
by one of the agency’s senior information technology (IT)
officials noting the fact that she (and others) had not been
advised that the agency had acquired Office 365 subscriptions.
The e-mail in question states:
I am not sure what factors were considered when it was
prematurely decided that the 30,000 Detroit mailboxes would
move to the cloud. I was also not privy to the procurement of
the 90k [90,000] Office 365 licenses. From a few meetings I
have been involved in, I believe inaccurate and/or incomplete
information has been provided to the IT Executives and the CTO
[Chief Technology Officer] regarding a cloud solution for
email.
AR, exh. H, Miscellaneous Agency Correspondence, at H-271.
The record therefore demonstrates that under the delivery order,
the agency acquired “Office Pro Plus” subscriptions--a
cloud-based Microsoft Office 365 product--even though the
portfolio of software assets identified in the BPA did not
include any cloud-based products.
The record also shows that when the agency issued Modification
No. 2 to the original delivery order (exercising the first
option year under the delivery order) it added several line
items to acquire “Exchange Plan 2” monthly subscriptions. AR,
exh. E.2, Modification No. 2, Line Item Nos. 1008, 2006. The
part number for this product corresponds to a product identified
in Softchoice’s FSS contract as “Exchange Online Plan 2.” AR,
exh. L, Softchoice’s FSS Price List, at 439. These subscriptions
allow the agency to migrate e-mail users to the cloud. In this
connection, the modification provides as follows:
Exchange Online: Exchange licenses can be used on premises or
in the O365 Government Community Cloud. . . . The contractor
will facilitate the migration of IRS user mailboxes based upon
a mutually agreed upon migration plan at no additional charge.
AR, exh. E.2, Modification No. 2, at 9; see also id., Softchoice
Letter Accompanying the Modification, at 2 (“Exchange Plan 2
licenses can be used on premises or in the Office 365 Government
Community Cloud.”).
Although the contracting officer states that the IRS has
Microsoft Exchange licenses in its inventory, those licenses are
identified as “Exchange Standard Client Access Licenses” in the
BPA. AR, exh. D, BPA at 10. Those licenses are different from
the online subscription service being acquired by the agency
under the modification. Microsoft’s product literature describes
“Exchange Client Access Licenses” as software licenses that
enable users to access an organization’s network server, in this
case, the IRS’s own servers. See
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/Licensing/product-licensing/client-access-license.aspx
(last visited June 13, 2016). In contrast, Microsoft’s Exchange
Online service is described in Microsoft’s product literature as
a product designed to host e-mail on Microsoft’s servers, that
is, in the cloud. See https://products.office.com/en-us/exchange/exchange-online
(last visited June 13, 2016).
Microsoft’s Exchange Online service also may be deployed in a
“hybrid” environment. In this latter connection, the record
shows that the agency is interested in a “hybrid” e-mail
solution, which would allow the agency to have certain e-mail
users’ accounts hosted on the agency’s own servers--based on the
identified users’ requirements for enhanced security--while
allowing the majority of the agency’s e-mail accounts to be
hosted in the cloud. See AR, exh. H, Miscellaneous Agency
Correspondence, at 201, 203 (“IRS may require a hybrid EaaS
cloud environment up to 10,000 Exchange users remaining on
premises.”). Microsoft’s product literature explains that the
Microsoft Exchange Online environment allows for customization
of the e-mail environment:
Exchange lets you tailor your solution based on your unique
needs and ensures that your communications are always
available, while you remain in control. Move to the cloud
overnight, deploy on-premises, or manage a hybrid deployment
with mailboxes that are both online and on-premises.
See https://products.office.com/en-us/exchange/microsoft-exchange-features-email-for-business
(last visited June 13, 2016).
The record therefore shows that under the modification, the
agency acquired “Exchange Online” subscriptions--a cloud-based
Microsoft Office 365 product--even though the portfolio of
software assets identified in the BPA did not include any
cloud-based products.
As a final matter, we have no basis to question the contracting
officer’s representation that, at this time, all of the software
the agency has acquired is being used only in the IRS-owned
computing environment. However, the record shows that the
decision to deploy the software only within the IRS computing
environment was made in reaction to TN’s protest. In this
connection, the record includes an e-mail from an IRS employee
discussing the agency’s course of action in response to the
protest. The e-mail provides as follows:
[J]ust had a meeting . . . dealing with an external protest
for our award 9 months ago to utilize a hybrid Microsoft cloud
solution to deliver the NARA [National Archives and Record
Administration] requirements by the end of this year. There
were no good options in dealing with the protest, but we have
a path in which we will go forward with the software but stay
on irs-owned equipment and premises. The team needs to look at
the costs and schedule which may be significant, but would be
minimal compared to the long term delay (year +) options of
competing the requirements to handle the protest.
Will loop you into the conversation when we see the revisions
from the strategic decision to reverse course to utilize the
hybrid approach.
AR, exh. H, Miscellaneous Agency Correspondence, at H-13.
In sum, the record shows that the agency used the delivery order
to acquire a “hybrid” cloud-based solution for its e-mail
requirements. However, the acquisition of products or services
to implement a cloud-based solution is outside the scope of the
underlying BPA which, by its terms, is limited to acquiring
updated or replacement versions of the agency’s preexisting
software portfolio that is installed in the agency’s own
computing environment. We note as well that the fact that the
agency has at the present time decided not to deploy to the
cloud--a decision made in direct response to the TN
protest--does not mean that it has not acquired a cloud-based
suite of products. It follows that the delivery order at issue
in the protest amounts to an improper, out-of-scope, sole-source
award. In light of the foregoing considerations, we sustain TN’s
protest. (Tempus Nova, Inc.
B-412821: Jun 14, 2016) (pdf)
As to our review
of the procedures for establishing BPAs under FSS contracts, FAR
§ 8.405-3 provides express guidance on these procedures.
Paragraph (a) under FAR § 8.405-3, entitled “Establishment,”
begins with an enumeration of the requirements applicable to
each and every BPA established under the FSS. The subsection
then describes the required competitive procedures applicable to
BPAs for supplies and for services that do not require a
statement of work (§ 8.405-3(b)(1)), and the required
competitive procedures applicable to BPAs for services requiring
a statement of work, because the services are “priced at hourly
rates” (§ 8.405-3(b)(2)).
Within the over-arching principles set forth at the beginning of
the FAR’s guidance applicable to establishing BPAs under the FSS,
agencies are required to “establish the BPA with the schedule
contractor(s) that can provide the supply or service that
represents the best value.” FAR § 8.405-3(a)(1). Moreover, price
is the one common element that must always be part of any best
value determination in establishing a BPA. FAR § 8.405-3(a)(2)
(“[i]n addition to price (see 8.404(d) and 8.405-4), when
determining best value, the ordering activity may consider”
various other enumerated factors); See also Cyberdata Techs.,
Inc., B-406692, Aug. 8, 2012, 2012 CPD ¶ ___ at 4 (protest
sustained where agency eliminated protester’s quotation from
consideration--and subsequently issued FSS BPAs--without
meaningfully considering prices). Finally, the FAR requires that
agencies “shall, to the maximum extent practicable, give
preference to establishing multiple-award BPAs, rather than
establishing a single-award BPA.” FAR § 8.405-3(a)(3)(i). As a
result, we find that USAID’s arguments are at odds with the
clear requirements for these instruments set forth in the FAR.
To be meaningful, a best value determination requires a weighing
of the value and benefits associated with a firm’s approach
against their associated cost to the government. See TtEC-Tesoro,
JV, B-405313, B-405313.3, Oct 7, 2011, 2012 CPD ¶ 2 at 9. In a
best value procurement, it is the function of the source
selection authority to perform a tradeoff between price and
non-price factors, that is, to determine whether the superiority
of one proposal (or as here, quotation) under the non-price
factor(s) is worth a higher price. Even where, as here, price is
stated to be of less importance than the non-price factors, an
agency must meaningfully consider cost or price to the
government in making its selection decision. See e-LYNXX Corp.,
B-292761, Dec. 3, 2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 219 at 7. Thus, before an
agency can select a higher-priced proposal that has been rated
technically superior to a lower-priced but acceptable one, the
decision must be supported by a rational explanation of why the
higher-rated proposal is, in fact, superior, and explaining why
its technical superiority warrants paying a price premium. See
Coastal Env’ts, Inc., B-401889, Dec. 18, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 261 at
4.
In contrast to these requirements and the terms of the RFQ, the
contracting officer acknowledged here that “there were no direct
comparisons on evaluated prices between vendors.” Contracting
Officer’s Statement at 3. That is, notwithstanding the purported
“consideration” of vendors’ pricing submissions, the agency did
not (and indeed, takes the position it could not) draw any
conclusion about vendors’ prices--not even whether the costs to
the government associated with any given vendor’s quotation were
likely to be higher than, lower than, or equal to the costs of
any other vendor.
In explaining why it could not comply with the general
requirements applicable to the establishment of all BPAs--i.e.,
the requirements to consider price and consider best value in
selecting BPA recipients--USAID argues that these considerations
would have been inappropriate in a competition where the agency
was not required to have a statement of work. In this regard,
USAID contends that this was a procurement conducted under the
authority of § 8.405-3(b)(1).
As set forth above, after the “Establishment” paragraph (§
8.405-3(a)), the FAR guidance on establishing BPAs under the FSS
turns to the competition requirements that apply to different
BPA types. As also set forth above, there are separate
competition requirements applicable to BPAs for supplies and for
services that do not require a statement of work (§
8.405-3(b)(1)), and to BPAs for services requiring a statement
of work, because the services are “priced at hourly rates” (§
8.405-3(b)(2)).
Of relevance here, paragraph 8.405-3(b)(1) explains:
The procedures of this paragraph apply when establishing a BPA
for supplies and services that are listed in the schedule
contract at a fixed price for the performance of a specific
task, where a statement of work is not required (e.g.,
installation, maintenance, and repair).
USAID argues that this provision is applicable to its
competition despite the fact that the record shows that this
competition does not involve services that are listed in the FSS
at a fixed price for the performance of a specific task; rather,
the prices listed in the vendors’ schedules are plainly priced
at hourly rates.
During the course of this protest, our Office sought the views
of the GSA as to whether USAID had followed the rules applicable
to establishing BPAs under the FSS. GSA expressed its view that
USAID’s requirement was for services requiring a statement of
work, and that FAR 8.405-3(b)(2)(vi) thus applied. [7] Once GSA
noted that this competition required the use of a statement of
work, it noted that this “implies more is required . . . than
relying on the base pricing in a GSA Schedule as being fair and
reasonable.”[8] Letter from GSA to GAO, July 18, 2012, at 2. GSA
further stated that it would defer to our Office’s views as to
whether USAID had met the applicable legal standard. Id.
For our purposes--as a forum limited to resolving the disputes
raised by protesters--we need not address whether USAID was
required to develop a statement of work before holding this BPA
competition. Instead, we are able to conclude, on this record,
that the agency gave no meaningful consideration to cost/price
in selecting the BPA recipients, in violation of the requirement
at FAR § 8.405-3(a)(2) that price be meaningfully considered in
establishing BPAs. We reach this conclusion because the
requirements of FAR § 8.405-3(a) apply to all BPAs established
under the FSS, regardless of the BPA type--and regardless of the
competition requirements that apply to each BPA type. In
addition, USAID failed to make a proper best value decision
before it excluded Glotech from consideration for a BPA. (Glotech,
Inc., B-406761, B-406761.2, Aug 21, 2012) (pdf)
Significant Issue Exception to Timeliness Requirements
As an initial matter, our Bid Protest Regulations provide that
protests based upon alleged improprieties in a solicitation
which are apparent prior to closing shall be filed prior to
closing. 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(a)(1) (2012). However, our Regulations
also provide that GAO may consider a protest that raises issues
significant to the procurement system. 4 C.F.R. § 21.2(c). In
this regard, what constitutes a significant issue is to be
decided on a case-by-case basis. Pyxis Corp., B-282469,
B-282469.2, July 15, 1999, 99-2 CPD ¶ 18 at 4. We generally
regard a significant issue as one of widespread interest to the
procurement community and that has not been previously decided.
Satilla Rural Electric Membership Corp., B-238187, May 7, 1990,
90-1 CPD ¶ 456 at 3.
Here, while we have previously addressed the requirement that
price or cost be considered before a technically acceptable
proposal (or quotation) can be excluded from consideration for
award, see Kathpal Tech., Inc.; Computer & Hi-Tech Mgmt., Inc.,
B-283137.3 et al., Dec. 30, 1999, 2000 CPD ¶ 6 at 9, we have not
previously considered this issue in the context establishing a
BPA under the FSS. In addition, as set forth more fully below,
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) imposes specific
requirements applicable to best value decisions related to the
creation of BPAs under the FSS. See FAR § 8.405(a). Given these
requirements, and given the extensive reliance on BPAs in
federal procurement, we think an agency’s decision to ignore the
role of price or cost in excluding technically acceptable
vendors from further consideration for receipt of a BPA under
the FSS is too fundamental to ignore. Accordingly, even though
this solicitation sufficiently placed vendors on notice that the
agency would not consider price in “downsizing” the competition,
we find that this situation is appropriate for the use of the
significant issue exception to our bid protest timeliness rules.
GSA’s “Downsizing” Decision Improperly Ignored Prices
As discussed above, there is little dispute in this record that
Cyberdata was excluded from the competition without
consideration of its price. Vendors were specifically advised
that the agency “will downsize the quotations to the most
favorably evaluated quotations based on the technical quotation
only.” RFQ amend. No. 1, Questions and Answers, at 2. In
addition, the best value determination, submitted as part of the
agency report, indicated that in fact “[p]ricing was not used in
determining the top twelve (12) most technically favorable
quotations.” Best Value Determination at 1. Likewise, the
contracting officer reports that “[t]he Government used the
overall technical ranking to determine which twelve [v]endors
would be invited to deliver oral presentations.” CO’s Statement
at 3.
The FAR, however, requires with regard to creating BPAs under
the FSS that: “[o]rdering activities shall establish the BPA
with the schedule contractor(s) that can provide the supply or
service that represents the best value.” FAR § 8.405-3(a)(1).
Further, the FAR indicates with regard to establishing a BPA
that “[i]n addition to price (see 8.404(d) and 8.405-4), when
determining best value, the ordering activity may consider
[various other enumerated factors.]” FAR § 8.405-3(a)(2). Thus,
under the FAR, price is the one factor that, at a minimum, must
always be considered when determining best value for purposes of
establishing a BPA under the FSS.
Moreover, we have previously held that a best value analysis
necessarily encompasses consideration of an offeror’s price or
cost since, to be meaningful, a best value determination
requires a weighing of the value and benefits associated with a
firm’s approach against their associated cost to the government.
See TtEC-Tesoro, JV, B-405313, B-405313.3, Oct 7, 2011, 2012 CPD
¶ 2 at 9. In a best value procurement, it is the function of the
source selection authority to perform a tradeoff between price
and non-price factors, that is, to determine whether one
proposal’s superiority under the non-price factor is worth a
higher price. Even where, as here, price is stated to be of less
importance than the non-price factors, an agency must
meaningfully consider cost or price to the government in making
its selection decision. See e-LYNXX Corp., B-292761, Dec. 3,
2003, 2003 CPD ¶ 219 at 7. Thus, before an agency can select a
higher-priced proposal that has been rated technically superior
to a lower-priced but acceptable one, the decision must be
supported by a rational explanation of why the higher-rated
proposal is, in fact, superior, and explaining why its technical
superiority warrants paying a price premium. See Coastal
Environments, Inc., B-401889, Dec. 18, 2009, 2009 CPD ¶ 261 at
4.
Here, the agency’s elimination of technically acceptable
quotations, such as Cyberdata’s, without consideration of their
price, was inconsistent with the requirement that price be
considered in a best value analysis. See System Eng’g Int’l,
Inc., B-402754, July 20, 2010, 2010 CPD ¶ 167 at 5 (protest
sustained where record shows that agency in best value
procurement performed tradeoff between two higher-rated,
higher-priced quotations, but did not consider the lower prices
submitted by other lower-rated but technically acceptable
vendors); Coastal Environments, Inc., supra (protest sustained
where agency conducted a tradeoff between the two highest-rated,
highest-priced proposals, but did not consider the lower prices
offered by other lower-rated, but technically acceptable
offerors); Kathpal Tech., Inc.; Computer & Hi-Tech Mgmt., Inc.,
supra, at 9 (agency cannot eliminate a technically acceptable
proposal from consideration for award without taking into
account the relative cost of that proposal to the government).
We therefore sustain the protest on the basis that GSA failed to
evaluate quotations consistent with the FAR requirement that
BPAs established with FSS contractors must provide the supply or
service that represents the best value. FAR § 8.405-3(a).
(Cyberdata Technologies, Inc.,
B-406692, Aug 8, 2012) (pdf)
Turning to the issue of whether AF&S’s products met the
solicitation’s “salient characteristics,” the term “salient
characteristics” generally refers to the essential
characteristics of a product that must be met for another
product to be considered equal to a specified name brand
product. See Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 52.211-6. In
general, the particular features of the brand name item
identified in the solicitation as salient characteristics are
presumed to be material and essential to the government’s needs,
and quotations offering other than the brand name product that
fail to demonstrate compliance with the stated salient
characteristics are properly rejected as unacceptable.
Sourcelinq, LLC--Protest and Costs, B-405907.2 et al., Jan. 27,
2012, 2012 CPD ¶ 58 at 4.
Here, there was no indication that the agency intended to permit
variation from requirements defined as salient characteristics,
such as the requirement that the item 11 towel dispensers be
capable of dispensing towels of adjustable lengths.[7] In the
foregoing connection, the protester asserts that the dispenser
product sample submitted by AF&S was generic and provided no
indication of compliance with the salient characteristics
associated with item 11. More significantly, there is no
indication in the record that the evaluators considered AF&S’s
compliance with this salient characteristic in their review of
AF&S’s sample. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we
are unable to conclude that the agency had a reasonable basis
for determining that the towel dispenser offered by AF&S under
item 11 complied with the stated salient characteristics
pertaining to that item.
Also, it is apparent from the record here that the agency failed
to account for variation in product size. In this regard, the
agency’s response to vendor question 38 placed vendors on notice
that to the extent they offered products differing from the
stated size, the differences were to be reflected in the
vendor’s pricing. Thus, it was incumbent upon the agency to take
such variations into account in comparing vendors’ prices to
ensure that vendors were competing on an equal basis. The
record, however, does not reflect that the agency actually
accounted for such variation, notwithstanding the material
impact on vendors’ pricing. For example, with respect to item 2,
which called for 2000-sheet rolls of toilet tissue, AF&S offered
a product with 1210 sheets per roll. There is no evidence in the
record that AF&S, or the agency, adjusted for the fact that the
rolls proposed by AF&S are only 3/5 the specified length.
Accordingly, we find the record of the agency’s evaluation
deficient in this respect as well. (The
Clay Group, LLC, B-406647, B-406647.2, Jul 30, 2012)
(pdf)
Turning then to the protester's complaints
regarding the evaluation of Privasoft's quotation, AINS's chief
argument is that it was improper for the agency to enter into a
BPA with Privasoft Corp. because it was Privasoft, Inc. that
submitted the original quotation. AINS contends that permitting
Privasoft Corp. to step into the shoes of Privasoft, Inc.
constitutes an improper substitution of offerors. DOJ argues in
response that it is clear from the documentation submitted by
Privasoft that Privasoft Corp. submitted the original quotation,
that Privasoft Corp. will function as the contractor, and that
Privasoft Corp. merely used Privasoft, Inc. as its instrument
for submission of the quotation.
The record clearly establishes that Privasoft, Inc. submitted
the original quotation and that it was the entity seeking to
enter into a BPA with the agency. The original BPA (i.e., the
BPA that was the subject of AINS's first protest) was between
DOJ and Privasoft, Inc. AR, Tab 17. In addition, Privasoft
responded to the agency's first request for clarification by
explaining that since Privasoft Corp.'s FSS contract indicated
that orders were to be placed with Privasoft, Inc., it was
reasonable for the quotation to have been submitted by, and the
BPA to be established with, Privasoft, Inc. Also, Privasoft
posed the following question in response to the agency's request
for revised quotations: "Does DOJ have any concern regarding the
administrative structure of our bid and of the contract, with
Privasoft Corp. as the holder of the GSA Schedule 70 contract,
and Privasoft, Inc. as the holder of the BPA?" AR, Tab 10,
Privasoft Email, Dec. 11, 2008.
Although Privasoft, Inc. submitted the original quotation, under
the facts here we see no basis to object to the establishment of
a BPA with Privasoft Corp., the vendor holding the FSS contract.
A BPA is not a contract, and orders placed against an FSS BPA
are placed against the underlying FSS contract. Canon USA, Inc.,
B-311254.2, June 10, 2008, 2008 CPD para. 113 at 3. That is the
situation here: the quotation submitted by Privasoft, Inc. was
for the establishment of a BPA under Privasoft Corp.'s FSS
contract. As noted above, Privasoft Corp.'s FSS contract
identified Privasoft, Inc. as the entity through which ordering
and payment transactions would be effected. Under these
circumstances, we do not think that the roles of the two
different corporate entitities are a basis for us to sustain the
protest. (AINS,
Inc., B-400760.2; B-400760.3, June 12, 2009) (pdf)
In February 2004, pursuant to Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) sect. 8.405-3, the Army established blanket
purchase agreements (BPA) with eight contractors holding Group
36 General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule
(FSS) contracts for photocopiers. Canon was one of the eight
contractors, and was issued a BPA on February 23. The BPA had a
5-year term. In September 2007, Canon and GSA began to negotiate
the renewal of Canon’s FSS contract, which was set to expire on
October 31. These negotiations ultimately failed. On September
27, concerned about the effect that the expiration of the FSS
contract would have on its BPA, Canon contacted the Army to
determine whether any action was required to maintain its BPA as
a viable ordering vehicle. In response, the Army’s contract
specialist advised Canon by email that “[a]ccording to our
contract . . . the Term of the BPA is 5 years from date of
award. This would make your BPA W911SE-04-A-0005 valid until 22
FEB 09 and any extension is unnecessary.” Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss, Mar. 17, 2008, Tab 1, Email, at 1. Canon therefore
took no further action with respect to the BPA or the expiration
of the FSS contract, and on December 1, Canon’s FSS contract was
modified to prohibit the placement of new orders.
On December 13, the Army issued the RFQ to the eight BPA
holders. Canon submitted a timely offer under the RFQ, as did at
least one other BPA holder, Sharp Electronics Corporation. On
January 31, 2008, the Army announced that the order would be
issued to Canon, the lowest-priced offeror. On February 15,
Sharp filed a protest with our Office alleging that issuance of
the order to Canon was improper because Canon’s FSS contract
prohibited the placement of new orders. In response, the Army
took corrective action by canceling the order. Our Office
dismissed Sharp’s protest as academic on February 26.
On March 3, Canon filed this protest with our Office, alleging
that cancellation of the order was improper because its BPA
remained a valid ordering vehicle through the time the order was
issued. Shortly thereafter, the agency filed a motion to dismiss
the protest, arguing that Canon was not an interested party to
protest the decision because Canon was not eligible to receive
an order under its BPA due to the expiration of its FSS
contract. Because the issue raised involves the FSS program, our
Office solicited GSA’s views on the issue of the BPA’s validity.
Consistent with the position taken by the Army, GSA’s view is
that, when a BPA holder’s FSS contract expires, the BPA is no
longer viable as there is no longer an active contract against
which orders may be placed. Thus, in this case, when Canon’s FSS
contract expired, its BPA, established pursuant to that FSS
contract, also expired as a valid ordering vehicle for new
photocopier service leases.
In response, Canon asserts that GSA fails to address the central
issue in the protest, whether the BPA was established pursuant
to, and is wholly dependent on, the FSS contract. On this issue
Canon essentially contends that its BPA was not dependent on its
FSS contract, but was a separate agreement against which orders
could be placed and which was not made coterminous with Canon’s
FSS contract by its own terms or by the FAR. We agree with Canon
that an FSS BPA is a separate agreement from its associated FSS
contract. Nevertheless, we conclude that when Canon’s FSS
contract expired, Canon’s BPA ceased to be a valid procurement
vehicle for the placement of new orders because, as explained
below, an FSS BPA is in effect solely a pass-through to the BPA
holder’s FSS contract and does not provide an independent
foundation for issuing orders.
In order for any procurement to be valid, it must be conducted
in accordance with the competition requirements set forth in the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 10 U.S.C. sect.
2304(a)(1)(A) (2000), and FAR part 6. Under 10 U.S.C. sect.
2303(2)(c), contracts awarded under the FSS program pursuant to
FAR part 8 satisfy the requirements for full and open
competition. As relevant here, FAR sect. 8.405-3(a)(1)
authorizes the establishment of BPAs under FSS contracts as a
means to fill “repetitive needs for supplies or services.” It is
well-settled, however, that a BPA itself is not a contract;
rather, a contract is formed by the subsequent placement of a
valid order against the BPA, or by the incorporation of the
basic agreement into a new contract. See Envirosolve LLC,
B-294974.4, June 8, 2005, 2005 CPD para. 106 at 3 n.3, citing
Modern Sys. Tech. Corp. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 360, 363
(1991). As with any contract, orders placed under an FSS BPA
must satisfy the applicable statutory requirements for
competition.
In this case, the record shows that the BPA was issued pursuant
to Canon’s FSS contract, the plain language of Canon’s BPA
states that it is established “[p]ursuant to GSA Federal Supply
Schedule (FSS) Contract Number GS-25F-0023M,” Motion to Dismiss,
Tab 1, Canon BPA, at 1, and Canon itself does not dispute that
the BPAs here were all “initially awarded to vendors based on
their then current GSA copier schedule contracts.” Protest at 5.
It is therefore clear that Canon’s BPA is an FSS BPA,
established under FAR part 8.4. Because use of the FSS
procedures constitutes full and open competition under 10 U.S.C.
sect. 2303(2)(c), orders placed under a valid FSS contract,
whether directly or via a BPA, meet the CICA competition
requirements. Conversely, in the absence of a valid FSS
contract, any order placed under a BPA must independently
satisfy the statutory competition requirements; that is, to be a
valid ordering vehicle independent from an FSS contract, the BPA
itself would have to have been established using procedures that
satisfy the statutory requirements for competition. That clearly
is not the case here, or in any FSS BPA of this type, given that
the pool of vendors that could receive a BPA was limited to FSS
contract holders, as directed by FAR sect. 8.404(a) (“ordering
activities shall not seek competition outside of the Federal
Supply Schedules”). Consistent with this interpretation, we have
stated that an FSS BPA is not established with the contractor
directly, but rather is established under the contractor’s FSS
contract, such that FSS BPA orders “ultimately are to be placed
against the successful vendor’s FSS contract.” Panacea
Consulting, Inc., B-299307.4, B-299308.4, July 27, 2007, 2007
CPD para. 141 at 1-2 n.1; see also CMS Info. Servs., Inc.,
B-290541, Aug. 7, 2002, 2002 CPD para. 132 at 4 n.7. Thus, in
our view, when, as in this case, an agency intends to place an
order under an FSS BPA, the vendor must have a valid FSS
contract in place because that contract is the means by which
the agency satisfies the competition requirements of CICA in
connection with any orders issued under the BPA.
Applying this analysis to the facts here, any order placed under
Canon’s BPA must necessarily be placed through Canon’s FSS
contract. On December 1, 2007, Canon’s FSS contract was modified
to prohibit the placement of new orders. As of that date,
Canon’s BPA was no longer a valid procurement vehicle for the
placement of new orders, because new orders could not be placed
through Canon’s FSS contract and because Canon’s BPA was not
established pursuant to competitive procedures required to
create a valid foundation for orders to be issued directly from
the agency to Canon. Therefore, both on the date the RFQ was
issued and on the date the order was issued, Canon was
ineligible to receive the order. As a result, the agency’s
decision to cancel the order to Canon was proper. (Canon
USA, Inc., B-311254.2, June 10, 2008) (pdf) |
|
Comptroller
General - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
New
MSC Industrial Direct Company, Inc.
B-416255: Jul 12, 2018 |
Tempus Nova, Inc. B-412821: Jun
14, 2016 (pdf) |
AINS, Inc., B-400760.2;
B-400760.3, June 12, 2009 (pdf) |
Glotech, Inc., B-406761,
B-406761.2, Aug 21, 2012 (pdf) |
Canon USA, Inc., B-311254.2, June
10, 2008. (pdf) |
Cyberdata Technologies, Inc.,
B-406692, Aug 8, 2012 (pdf) |
|
The Clay Group, LLC, B-406647,
B-406647.2, Jul 30, 2012 (pdf) |
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims- Key Excerpts |
Sometime prior to December 2013, a number of Command Fleet
Readiness Centers (“COMFRC”) and DLA Aviation Fleet Readiness Centers
(“FRC”) requested the 4PL program. In order to provide supply services to the
FRCs, GSA Retail Operations issued an RFQ on December 9, 2013, for the
purpose of establishing multiple BPAs with existing MAS vendors to provide
and manage inventory within the FRCs. On June 16, 2014, GSA established BPAs with four vendors: MSC,
Grainger, [ ], and [ ]. All four vendors have contracts pursuant to FSS
Schedule 51V, which covers hardware supply needs. The BPAs did not
authorize vendors to begin supplying products; instead, they provided that
GSA would issue a competitive RFQ and would award two BPA modifications
to the vendor(s) whose quotations represented the best value to the
government.
The BPAs contemplated that the awardee vendors would establish
physical storefronts for the purpose of stocking and managing industrial
product inventory for military FRCs. Vendors would also be required to fill instore
“referral” orders of items from the vendor’s catalog which were not
currently stocked in the store and allow for on-line “referral” ordering. The
BPAs provided that “[d]elivery is required no later than 3 calendar days after
receipt of order.” Administrative Record (“AR”) 31. Further, the vendor was
to maintain a fill rate for in-store/online referral and web ordering of 95%. AR
43. This rate is “based upon the maximum time interval (in business days)
from the issuance of the order to the date that the order is delivered.” Id.
The modifications required vendors to “ensure that no item which is
essentially the same as an AbilityOne item be sold to a Government customer,”
and to delete “all items, terms and conditions not accepted by the Government,
including items Essentially-the-Same (“ETS”) as AbilityOne products” from print
and electronic catalogs. AR 123-24.
(sections deleted)
GSA’s Decision to Award the BPA Modifications to Grainger
We come now to MSC’s separate contention that the agency’s decision
to award the BPA modifications to Grainger was arbitrary and capricious. As
to the first element in this line of argument that the agency should have
deduced that Grainger was manipulating the procurement by targeting price
changes on its FSS price schedule to market basket items counsel conceded
at oral argument that there is little daylight between this argument and its
challenges to the corrective actions. In effect, the argument is that, even if the
second corrective action was warranted in principle, as applied, it should have
been obvious that the agency was being duped. As Grainger argues in its
motion to dismiss, however, the opportunity for such manipulation, if it
existed, should have been apparent before MSC submitted its final revised
quotation, and, in any event, was an opportunity that MSC could have taken
advantage of. The evaluation methodology has remained unchanged since the
initial RFQ. The “as applied” challenge comes too late. A contractor who has
the opportunity to object to the terms of a solicitation but fails to do so prior
to the close of the bidding process waives its right to later object in this court.
Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 492 F.3d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
In any event, we do not find support for the argument that Grainger
manipulated the market basket by selectively reducing the prices of its highest
priced items. While some of the market basket items were repriced, under the
circumstances, that is not surprising. During April and July 2015, Grainger
deleted approximately 53,000 products from its catalog, and reduced prices for
approximately 700,000 items. While the 548 items in the common market
basket were known to the bidders, they could not be certain which ones would
be common to all bidders and thus made the point of price comparison.
Next, we disagree that Grainger’s quotation was noncompliant with the
delivery requirement. Although Grainger’s proposal mentions its “ability to
meet the 5 to 7 day delivery requirement,” id. at 469, this is plainly an
irrelevant mistake. Elsewhere it clearly indicated its intent to meet the RFQ’s
actual requirement that orders be acknowledged within 24 hours of receipt and
shipped within one business day of acknowledgment using three-business-day
delivery. Id. at 12; 159-162. Grainger’s proposal contained numerous
indications that it intended to deliver referral orders within three business days.
See AR 451 (referencing one day delivery ability for FRCSE); 452
(referencing same and next day delivery ability for FRCE);453 (referencing
two day delivery ability for FRCMA); 454 (referencing same and next day
delivery ability for FRCSW); 459 (indicating next day pickup for referral
orders).
Finally, we believe that Grainger’s proposal complied with the
solicitation’s AbilityOne requirements. The BPAs simply stated that the
vendors were to “ensure that no item when is essentially the same as an
AbilityOne item be sold to a Government customer.” AR 1053 (emphasis
added). Thus the requirement refers to the items sold, not the items quoted.
Nowhere does the solicitation prohibit a vendor from quoting items that are
essentially the same as AbilityOne items. This is particularly understandable
in light of the fact that the vendors’ quotations were simply meant to be a
representative sample of the cost to the government rather than an exact list of
items to be sold. Accordingly, there was nothing unreasonable about the
agency’s decision to award the BPA modifications to a vendor, even if it
quoted items essentially the same as AbilityOne items. The AbilityOne list
changes over time, and whether an item offered by the vendors here was truly
the same as one on the AbilityOne list would be nuanced. Requiring that purge
prior to actual purchases would be a waste of time. (MSC
Industrial Direct Co., Inc. v. U. S. and W.W. Grainger,
Inc., No. 15-1409C, May 6, 2016) (pdf)
As noted, it is undisputed that ADCSC—the company that submitted the bid to
DHA for the test strips—is not, itself, a party to an FSS Contract. Instead, the FSS
contract that offers the subject test strips is held by an ADCSC affiliate—Abbott
Laboratories Inc. [ALI]—under FSS contract number V797P-2032D. On remand, the
Contracting Officer undertook an evaluation of ALI’s FSS contract and ADCSC’s rights
under that contract. According to the materials provided in the newly supplemented
Administrative Record, the Contracting Officer (1) researched the websites of the VA,
ALI, and Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. (“ADCI”); (2) reviewed ALI’s offer to the VA and
subsequent FSS contract (i.e., V797P-2032D); and (3) solicited performance assurances
and information concerning ADCSC’s legal relationships with ALI and other Abbott affiliated companies from Duncan Williams, the ADCSC vice-president who signed
ADCSC’s BPA bid. In addition, the Contracting Officer received a declaration from
Stephanie Organ, the ALI employee who executed ALI’s FSS contract with the VA.
Based on his review of the aforementioned websites, the Contracting Officer
concluded that multiple entities within the Abbott family of companies work together to
manufacture and sell the test strips at issue in this case. AR 2226. The Contracting
Officer noted that ADCSC’s bid listed the same FSS contract number and same corporate
point of contact (with the same contact information) as was associated with ALI’s FSS
contract in the VA Contract Catalog Search Tool available on the VA website. Id. The
Contracting Officer also noted that ADCI manufactures and holds the trademarks for
some of the test strips sold by ADCSC, which is a wholly-owned subsidiary of ADCI.
Id. The Contracting Officer concluded, based on this evidence, that there was a “joint
involvement in the sale of diabetes products.” Id.
In reviewing ALI’s FSS Contract, the Contracting Officer determined that it was
clear that ALI’s affiliates—rather than ALI itself—are responsible for providing the
products under ALI’s FSS contract. AR 2226-27. For example, a letter accompanying
ALI’s FSS offer listed two of ALI’s corporate affiliates, Abbott Point of Care (“APOC”)
and ADCSC/ADCI, as supplying certain products through ALI’s FSS contract. AR 2230.
The Contracting Officer also noted that two provisions of ALI’s FSS contract authorized
Duncan Williams—the individual who signed ADCSC’s bid—to also submit quotes
under ALI’s FSS contract. AR 2226. The FSS contract authorizes any
. . . Divisional Vice President . . . or Manager or any Administrator of any
one of Contracts, Pricing, Marketing; Sales or Commercial Operations; or
any Divisional Government Sales Manager . . . to quote prices and tender
bids, and to enter into contracts for the sale of any products or services of
[ALI] to, and with, any and all customers of [ALI], including specifically
the United States and any of its offices, agencies or departments, having
full authority in their discretion as to prices, terms, conditions, warranties,
or any other provisions necessarily relating to said bids and contracts.
AR 2232. The FSS also expressly lists Mr. Williams as an “authorized negotiator,” who
is “authorized to negotiate with the Government in connection with this request for
proposals or quotations[.]” AR 2248.
The Contracting Officer noted that Duncan Williams’ letter and the attached
declaration from Stephanie Organ, the Senior Manager of Contracts & Pricing at ALI,
reconfirmed that ADCSC was authorized to submit a BPA quote under ALI’s FSS
contract. AR 2248. In his letter, Mr. Williams explained that Abbott Laboratories is the
parent company of ALI, APOC, and ADCI, and that ADCSC is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of ADCI.3 AR 2375-76. Further, Mr. Williams explained that ALI does not
make products, but instead acts as a “trading company” or “contracting agent” for other
Abbott Laboratories companies, including ADCI/ADCSC and APOC. In this connection,
Mr. Williams explained that when ALI’s FSS Contract V797P-2032D was negotiated, the
VA, ADCI/ADCSC and APOC considered establishing separate FSS contracts with
ADCI and APOC, but elected to continue, out of administrative convenience, selling
ADCI and APOC’s products on ALI’s FSS contract. AR 2376. Accordingly, Mr.
Williams stated that although “the ALI-executed contract is the only contract through
which users of the FSS can order diabetes care products from ADC[SC],” AR 2377,
ALI’s FSS contract authorized various Abbott-affiliated employees—including Mr.
Williams—to quote prices and tender bids “for the purpose of establishing a Blanket
Purchase Agreement . . . under the FSS contract.” AR 2376.
Stephanie Organ, in her declaration on behalf of ALI, stated that Mr. Williams
“was authorized to negotiate pricing under the FSS Contract on behalf of ALI, including
through a subsequent Blanket Purchase Agreement established under the FSS.” AR
2378. However, she also confirmed that the FSS contract “was executed in the name of
ALI,” and that the BPA “price quote that was submitted to and ultimately accepted by the
Defense Health Agency on November 12, 2013 . . . was executed in the name of
ADC[SC]” and “does not specifically mention ALI by name . . . .” AR 2378-79.
Based on the aforementioned evaluation, the Contracting Officer determined that
“ADCSC was authorized to submit a BPA quote under the FSS contract listed in their
quote, V797P-2032D, and therefore, as a practical matter, ADCSC possessed, and could
properly hold itself out as having an FSS contract for all of the pharmaceutical agents
quoted . . . .” AR 2227. In the alternative, the Contracting Officer concluded that the
solicitation did not prohibit offerors from relying on the resources of their corporate agreement, and, thus, DHA “could properly rely upon ADCSC’s implicit representations
that ALI would support [ADCSC’s] performance.” AR 2228.
The Contracting Officer concluded his decision on remand by noting that there
was “no reason to question ADCSC’s ability to deliver the quoted strips at the quoted
pricing . . . because of ALI’s history of performance.” Id. This conclusion was further
consistent, the Contracting Officer stated, with the contractual commitment of ADCSC
and ALI, as well as the representations made in Mr. Williams’ letter and the declaration
from Stephanie Organ. Id.
(section deleted)
a. The Contracting Officer’s Conclusion that ADCSC Was Eligible to Enter
into the BPA Because ADCSC Was Acting on Behalf of ALI Was
Arbitrary and Capricious
The government and defendant-intervenor contend that the Contracting Officer’s
decision is consistent with the solicitation and FAR because ADCSC was authorized,
through Duncan Williams, to negotiate on behalf of ALI with regard to ALI’s FSS
contract. The government goes so far as to state that Mr. Williams was actually acting on
behalf of ALI, Def.’s Suppl. Br. 7 n.2, 8, and that Mr. Williams failure to “explicitly
invoke” ALI’s name constitutes a non-material defect in the award that can be cured. Id.
at 9-10 n.3. In this connection, the government relies on Am. Anchor & Chain Corp. v.
United States, 331 F.2d 860, 861 (Ct. Cl. 1964), for the proposition that Mr. Williams
could and did act as ALI’s agent when he signed the BPA quote. As explained below,
however, the government’s agency theory is unsupported by the record evidence, to
include Mr. Williams’ letter in response to the Contracting Officer, Ms. Organ’s carefully
worded declaration, and the BPA quote itself. Accordingly, the court concludes that the
Contracting Officer’s decision to award a BPA to ADCSC on the grounds that it was
ALI’s agent was arbitrary and capricious.
The record reflects that Duncan Williams was not actually acting as an agent on
behalf of ALI when he signed the BPA quote. While it is no doubt true that he was
authorized to offer items from ALI’s FSS contract, this authorization does not, in and of
itself, make ALI the BPA awardee or ADCSC the FSS contract holder. Notably, rather
than state that he signed the BPA on behalf of ALI, Mr. Williams’ letter to the
Contracting Officer focuses on ADCSC’s rights under ALI’s FSS contract. AR 2377.
Moreover, the fact that Mr. Williams stated that he “considered” ALI’s FSS contract to
actually be ADCSC’s contract is undermined by his admission that the VA had
considered and purposefully declined to enter into a separate FSS contract with ADCSC
out of “administrative convenience.” AR 2376.
Ms. Organ’s carefully worded declaration further demonstrates that Mr. Williams
did not execute the BPA on behalf of ALI. Although she acknowledges that ALI would
agree to be bound by the price offered by ADCSC, nowhere does she state—or even
suggest—that ADCSC was acting on behalf of ALI when it offered the BPA quote. See
AR 2379 (“The BPA price quote was executed in the name of ADC[SC].”). That Mr.
Williams was not acting as ALI’s agent is further confirmed by the fact that he signed the
BPA in his capacity as “Division [Vice President], US [Commercial Operations[,] Abbott
Diabetes Care Sales Corporation Inc.” AR 227 (emphasis added).
In light of the foregoing, the mere fact that ADCSC listed ALI’s FSS contract
number in its bid is insufficient to show that Mr. Williams entered into a BPA as an agent
on behalf of ALI, or that ADCSC held an FSS contract. See Am. Anchor & Chain Corp.,
331 F.2d at 861 (agent binds principal by taking actions on behalf of principal).
Accordingly, the government’s argument that ADCSC satisfied FAR 8.405–3 by acting
as ALI’s agent is rejected, and the Contracting Officer’s conclusion that ADCSC—as the
BPA awardee—satisfied the FSS requirement was arbitrary and capricious.
b. The Contracting Officer’s Alternative Conclusion that ADCSC Could
Rely on ALI’s FSS Contract Was Arbitrary and Capricious
In the alternative, the government and defendant-intervenor contend that,
regardless of whether ADCSC was ALI’s actual agent, the relationship between ADCSC
and ALI was sufficiently close to allow ADCSC to rely on ALI’s FSS contract to satisfy
the terms of the solicitation and FAR 8.405–3. The government and ADCSC rely on T &
S Prods., 48 Fed. Cl. 100, and Femme Comp, 83 Fed. Cl. 704, for the uncontested
proposition that a contractor in certain circumstances may rely upon an affiliated entity to
meet solicitation requirements. The court finds that ADCSC’s reliance on ALI’s FSS
contract is different from the reliance at issue in those cases because here ADCSC’s
reliance is foreclosed by both the FAR and the terms of the solicitation.
T & S Prods. and Femme Comp stand for the proposition that absent a term in the
solicitation that prohibits offerors from relying on their corporate affiliates, a contracting
officer has discretion to take offerors at their word that the resources of their affiliates
will be made available. In T & S Prods., a protester challenged an award on the ground
that the evaluators assessed the awardee’s proposal based, at least partly, on the
capabilities of the awardee’s parent company. 48 Fed. Cl. at 109. Although the
awardee’s proposal described how it would leverage its “Retail Support Center,”
“Warehouse Management System,” and dedicated sales force in meeting the solicitation’s
requirements, in reality these resources were owned or controlled by the awardee’s parent
company. See id. at 108, 111. In denying the protest, the court recognized the “well[-
]established principle that a parent corporation and a subsidiary are in law separate and
distinct entities.” Id. at 111 (quoting BLH, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 265, 272
(1987)). Nevertheless, the court held that absent contrary language in the solicitation,
“where an offeror represents in its proposal that resources of its parent company will be
committed to the contract, the agency properly may consider such resources in evaluating
its proposal.” Id. (citations omitted). In Femme Comp, the court adopted the same rule,
and held that the fact that the awardee did not expressly list its affiliates as subcontractors
was immaterial where there was “no requirement that an offeror must designate its
affiliated corporations as subcontractors in order to officially commit their resources to
the performance of a contract.” 83 Fed. Cl. at 747.
In contrast to the reliance at issue in T&S Prods. and Femme Comp, ADCSC’s
reliance on ALI’s FSS contract is clearly prohibited by FAR 8.405–3 and the plain
language of the solicitation. As explained above, the FAR and the solicitation prohibit
DHA from entering into an FSS BPA with a non-schedule contractor. See, e.g., 48
C.F.R. § 8.405–3(a)(1) (BPAs shall be established with schedule contractors); AR 225
(offerors “must have an existing FSS Contract for any pharmaceutical agent(s) quoted”).
Accordingly, regardless of whether procurement officials generally have discretion to
allow offerors to rely on their affiliates’ performance history or expertise to meet
solicitation requirements, the Contracting Officer in this case did not have discretion to
ignore the clear regulatory requirements in the FAR or terms of the solicitation. See
Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (agency could
not, through policy memorandum, alter statutory or regulatory requirements). Thus, the
fact that ADCSC is authorized to offer supplies from the ALI FSS contract and that ALI will agree to the price ADCSC offered does not eliminate the legal defect in the BPA
award. Accordingly, the Contracting Officer’s decision to allow ADCSC to rely on
ALI’s FSS contract is arbitrary and capricious. (ARKRAY
USA, Inc. v. U. S. and Abbott Diabetes Care Sales
Corporation, No. 14-233C, September 9, 2014) (pdf)
2. The VA Used an Irrational Price
Evaluation.
The VA’s price evaluation also violated the
terms of the RFQ. It is well-settled that agencies must evaluate
proposals based on the criteria in the solicitation. Banknote
Corp. of Am., Inc. v. United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 377, 386-87
(2003), aff’d, 365 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, the RFQ
indicated that the VA would evaluate the offerors’ prices by
“adding the total price for all options to the total price for
the basic requirement.” The solicitation requested that each
offeror price 1,567 different types of laboratory tests using
the BPA Price Schedule. The Price Schedule identified “total
price” as the offeror’s price for a particular test multiplied
by the VA’s estimated usage of that same test for the base and
option years. Neither the RFQ, nor the SOW, nor the Price
Schedule disclosed that the VA would limit its consideration to
the prices that offerors proposed for tests available under
their respective FSS Contracts.
Many of this procurement’s problems stem
from the fact that the solicitation requested vendors to price
all tests even though no vendor offered all tests on its FSS
contract. As LabCorp’s counsel aptly described at oral argument,
the requirement to price all tests was a “head-fake” because it
appeared that the VA would consider all tests when evaluating
price. The protest thus turns on whether LabCorp was reasonable
in believing that the price evaluation would encompass all
tests. The Court finds that this was the only reasonable
interpretation. Solicitation provisions must be interpreted in a
manner that harmonizes and gives reasonable meaning to all
provisions. Coast Fed. Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 F.3d
1035, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here, the use of the term “total
price” in the Price Schedule for all tests leads to the
reasonable conclusion that the VA would evaluate all test prices
listed therein.
According to the Government, “total
price” in the context of a FAR Part 8 procurement means the
total price for FSS tests. The Government argues that it would
have been impermissible for the VA to evaluate price based on
open market tests in a procurement pursuant to FAR §
8.405-3(a)(1). According to this logic, the VA could not procure
any products or services that were not on an offeror’s FSS
Contract. The Court finds this argument unavailing because no
reasonable offeror would conclude that the “total price” would
include only the FSS tests subset. Indeed, all three offerors
priced as many of the required 1,567 laboratory tests as
possible. The VA clearly sought pricing information for all
tests, and the VA’s decision to evaluate only the price of the
FSS Contract tests violated the solicitation’s unambiguous
pricing instructions.
Even if the VA’s price evaluation did
not violate the RFQ, the VA’s process was arbitrary and
capricious because the VA conducted an unfair “apples and
oranges” comparison. “[T]he agency at a minimum [ is] required
to evaluate offerors on an equal basis and in a manner such that
the total cost to the government for the required services could
be meaningfully assessed.” Simplicity Corp., B-291902, 2003 WL
1989428, *5 (Comp. Gen. Apr. 29, 2003). The FAR requires the
contracting officer to ensure that “all quotes are fairly
considered.” FAR 8.405-3(b)(2)(vi). Thus, an “apples and
oranges” assessment is improper when comparing dissimilar
services or products.
Here, the VA created an “apples and
oranges” comparison when it limited price evaluations to the FSS
tests subset. LabCorp and Quest offered a negligible number of
distinct tests when considering both FSS and open market tests.
Conversely, LabCorp and Quest offered a significant number of
different tests when examining only the FSS subset; LabCorp
listed [. . .] tests on its FSS Contract distinct from Quest,
and Quest listed [. . .] tests on its FSS Contract distinct from
LabCorp. Thus, the proposals contained [. . .] distinct tests
with only [. . .] tests in common. Yet the VA treated the
proposals as if they were equivalent, not accounting for these
important differences. The VA also failed to acknowledge Quest’s
[. . .] computational errors, which caused Quest to underprice
its proposal by $[. . .]. Thus, the VA not only improperly
conducted an “apples and oranges” comparison, but it did so with
incorrect figures. Therefore, the Court finds that the VA’s
price comparison method renders the evaluation irrational.
The Government again argues that
LabCorp’s disagreement with the “apples and oranges” comparison
is an untimely challenge to the RFQ. Blue & Gold Fleet, 492 F.3d
at 1313. However, the Court finds that LabCorp has not waived
its right to challenge the price term on this basis because the
RFQ did not place LabCorp on notice. No reasonable party would
have known that the VA planned to compare the prices of
dissimilar test subsets. It was only after the VA limited its
evaluation to FSS tests that the “apples and oranges” problem
arose. (Laboratory Corporation
of America v U. S. and Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 14-261C,
June 23, 2014) (pdf) |
|
U.
S. Court of Federal Claims - Listing of Decisions |
For
the Government |
For
the Protester |
MSC Industrial Direct Co., Inc. v. U.
S. and W.W. Grainger, Inc., No. 15-1409C, May 6, 2016 (pdf) |
ARKRAY USA, Inc. v. U. S. and
Abbott Diabetes Care Sales Corporation, No. 14-233C,
September 9, 2014) (pdf) |
|
Laboratory Corporation of America v U.
S. and Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 14-261C, June 23, 2014
(pdf) |
|
|