On April 28, 2014, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (“SpaceX”) filed a Complaint
in the United States Court of Federal Claims alleging, inter alia, that the United States Air Force
(“Air Force”) has entered into an unlawful contract with United Launch Systems, LLC,1 a joint
venture between The Boeing Company and Lockheed Martin Corporation, to procure rocket
launch vehicles on a sole source basis, pursuant to the Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (“EELV”) Program.
(sections deleted)
The April 28, 2014 Complaint alleges that the majority of EELV launch vehicles use RD-180 rocket engines manufactured by NPO Energomash, a corporation owned and controlled by
the Russian Government. Compl. ¶ 5. Dmitry Rogozin, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, is
the head of the Russian defense industry and, in particular, the Russian space program. Compl.
¶ 5; see also http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis.
On March 16, 2014, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 13,661,
declaring that,
All property and interests in property [of Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin]
that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or
that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States
person (including any foreign branch) . . . are blocked and may not be
transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in[.]
Exec. Order No. 13,661, 79 FED. REG.
15,535, Section 1(a) (March 19, 2014).
On On April 28, 2014, the United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign
Assets Control, issued a “Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List,” which
includes three references to Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin. In addition, on April 28, 2014, the
United States Department of State and the United States Department of Commerce issued
restrictions banning the export or re-export of “any high technology defense articles or services.”
United States Expands Export Restrictions on Russia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps
/2014/04/225241.htm; Commerce Department Announces Expansion of Export Restrictions on
Russia – April 28, 2014, http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/component/content/article/9-bis
/carousel/666-commerce-department-anounces-expansion-of-export-restrictions-on-russia.
(section deleted)
After considering the April 28, 2014 Complaint, Executive Order No. 13,661, together
with subsequent Executive Branch restrictions, and conducting a hearing on this date, in the
court’s judgment, the public interest and national defense and security concerns that underlie
Executive Order 13,661 warrant issuance of a preliminary injunction in this case that prohibits:
The United States Air Force and United Launch Services, LLC (“ULS”), a
majority owned subsidiary of United Launch Alliance, LLC (“ULA”), and
affiliates thereof, including general partners, directors, officers, employees,
agents, representatives, predecessors, assigns, joint ventures, subsidiaries, and
divisions, from making any purchases from or payment of money to NPO
Energomash or any entity, whether governmental, corporate or individual, that is
subject to the control of Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin, unless and until the
court receives the opinion of the United States Department of the Treasury, and
the United States Department of Commerce and United States Department of
State, that any such purchases or payments will not directly or indirectly
contravene Executive Order 13,661.
The scope of this preliminary injunction does not extend to any purchase orders
that have been placed or moneys paid to NPO Energomash prior to the date of this
Order.
(Space
Exploration Technologies Corp. v. U. S. and United Launch Systems, LLC, No.
14-354C, April 30, 2014) (pdf)
On February 22,
2011, the Army issued solicitation number W91B4N-11-R-5000 for [National
Afghan Trucking]
NAT services in Afghanistan. The purpose of the NAT
contract was to provide a secure and reliable means of distributing
reconstruction material, security equipment, fuel, miscellaneous dry cargo, and
life support assets to operating bases and distribution sites throughout the
combined joint operations area in Afghanistan. The Army anticipated the
award of indefinite delivrey/indefinite quantity contracts for trucking services
. . . . The NAT procurement was essentially a follow-on procurement to the
prior Host Nation Trucking
("HNT") contract, which had covered substantially the same
mission requirements. The Army awarded NAT contracts to 20 contractors,
none of whom had been HNT prime contractors. (emphasis added by
Wifcon.com.)
(pages deleted)
NCL Has Not Shown That the Army Adopted a Politically
Motivated Blacklist Precluding NCL from Receiving a NAT Award
(start at p. 33)
NCL claims that it was arbitrarily excluded from the NAT
competition because the Army adopted an improper "blacklist" excluding all HNT
incumbent contractors. Plaintiff contends that the Army's blanket
exclusion of all HNT contractors, but not HNT subcontractors, based on their
nonresponsibility evaluations was contrary to the FAR and the solicitation.
NCL further contends that the Army's nonresponsibility determinations for the
HNT incumbent contractors were pretexts for the Army's politically motivated
blacklisting of these contractors.
Although Plaintiff denies that it is alleging bad faith,
the substance of NCL's argument is that the Army's responsibility determinations
were pretextual and manufactured to exclude the HNT contractors from the NAT
procurement. Such an allegation is quintessential accusation of bad faith
because it claims that the entirety of HNT contractors' nonresponsibiity
determination were unfound fabrications. See Madison Servs., Inc. V.
United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 120, 130 (2010) ( rejecting plaintiff's argument that
"bad faith is 'not essential to establish that a cancellation was a pretext'" as
"untenable" argument}. Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff's
pretext argument as an allegation that NCL's responsibility evaluation was
conducted in bad faith.
A bidder alleging bad faith bears a heavy burden of
proof to establish its claim with clear and convincing evidence. See
Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. V. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (requiring disappointed bidder to make a showing of clear and convincing
evidence to support claim that agency did not act in good faith). As the
Federal Circuit has recognized,
[W]hen a bidder alleges bad faith, "[i]n order to
overcome the presumption of good faith [on behalf of the government], the
proof must ne almost irrefragable." Info. Tech. Appications Corp. v.
United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 2003). "Almost
irrefragable proof" amounts to "clear and convincing evidence." Am-Pro
Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
"In the cases where the court has considered allegations of bad faith, the
necessary 'irrefragable proof' has been equated with evidence of some specific
intent to injure the plaintiff." Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl.
20, 681 F.2d 756, 770 (1982).
Galen Med. Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 369 F.3d
1324, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
NCL alleges that the Army was apparently under pressure
from Congress to exclude HNT incumbent contractors from the NAT procurement.
Plaintiff notes that Congress initiated an investigation of the Army's
transportation arrangements in Afghanistan following media reports alleging that
HNT contractors made payments to the Taliban and Afghan warlords to ensure safe
passage for their trucking convoys. Subsequently, in June 2010, Congress
published a report alleging "that U. S. reconstruction dollars were finding
their way into the hands of Afghan warlords and Taliban." Pl.'s Mot. for
J. on the Admin. R. 20-21. NCL claims that this congressional report
prompted the Army to unlawfully exclude all incumbent HNT contractors from the
NAT procurement in order to appease Congress. Id. at 21.
Plaintiff's claim that the congressional report caused
the Army to implement a blacklist excluding all HNT contractors from the NAT
procurement is conjecture, wholly devoid of record support, and does not come
close to making a showing of clear and convincing evidence required to prove bad
faith.
The performance concerns identified by the contracting
officer in NCL's responsibility determination were not, as Plaintiff contends, "relatiely
minor matters of contract administration . . . ." Pl.'s Mot. for J. on the
Admin. R. 21. Plaintiff's [ ]
noncompliance with ITV standards, forged mission sheets, pilferage,
incident of transponder stacking, referral for proposed debarment, taken
together reflect serious shortcomings. The contracting officer's reliance
on NCL's documented HNT performance failures was a reasonable business judgment,
and the fact that Congress was critical of all HNT contractors' practices does
not demonstrate the contracting officer's bad faith toward NCL. Nor does
the existence of this report prove that the contracting officer failed to
exercise her independent judgment in NCL's responsibility assessment.
NCL also contends that the Army's disparate treatment of
the HNT prime contractors as compared to the HNT subcontractors is evidence that
the Army blacklisted these HNT contractors or applied a per se debarment
standard to them. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Army
systematically rejected all of the HNT prime contractors after subjecting them
to a more rigorous responsibility evaluation than the HNT subcontractors.
However, the Army's exclusion of other HNT offerors from the NAT procurement
based upon their individualized nonresponsibility determinations is not
probative evidence that NCL's responsibility evaluation was unreasonable.
Plaintiffs effort to impugn a contracting officer's individual responsibility
determinations of the other HNT prime contractors not only requires Plaintiff to
marshal substantial additional proof but would, if seriously pursued,
significantly have expanded the record and scope of NCL's bid protest.
Although the responsibility determinations for the NAT awardees are in the AR,
the nonresponsibilty determinations for six former HNT prime contractors are
not, and Plaintiff did not seek to add them. See AR 17938-18266. As
such, there is no factual predicate to conduct the disparate treatment analysis
Plaintiff urges the Court to undertake. Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the contracting officer implemented a "blacklist" or unfairly
excluded all HNT contractors rom the NAT competition. (NCL
Logistics Company, v. U. S., No. 11-535C, March 8, 2013) (pdf)
IV. Material misrepresentation
Plaintiff’s primary challenge to the award of the Contract is that intervenor
made a
material misrepresentation in its proposal by listing [ ] as a supplier to be
used in the
completion of the procurement. In order to establish a material
misrepresentation, “plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) [the awardee] made a false statement; and (2) the
[agency] relied
upon that false statement in selecting [the awardee’s] proposal for the contract
award.” Blue
& Gold Fleet, LP v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl. 487, 495 (2006) (citation
omitted), aff’d, 492 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also Sealift, Inc v. United
States, 82 Fed. Cl. 527, 538 (2008). 7/ According to the Federal Circuit,
the submission of a misstatement . . .
which materially influences consideration
of a proposal should disqualify the proposal. The integrity of the system
demands no less. Any further consideration of the proposal in these
circumstances would provoke suspicion and mistrust and reduce confidence
in the competitive procurement system.
Planning Research Corp. v. United
States, 971 F.2d 736, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (illustrating
misrepresentation tactic known as “bait and switch” in which offeror submits
proposal with
the intent to substitute some aspect that it had used to win award). Thus, if
plaintiff can
establish that (1) intervenor falsely indicated that [ ] was a subcontractor
that intervenor
intended to use in the work performed under the Solicitation and (2) the
[Marine Corps
Systems Command] MCSC
relied upon
this representation in the awarding of the Contract, then plaintiff has met
its burden of
proving a material misrepresentation.
As an initial matter, this court rejects defendant’s
attempts to vary the
misrepresentation analysis depending on where on a procurement time line one
examines the
statements at issue. See Def.’s Br. filed Jan. 6, 2012, at 20-29. Analyzing
misrepresentations that may have occurred at other stages of this protracted
legal battle is
unnecessary because the controlling issue is whether or not intervenor made a
material
misrepresentation in its proposal to the MCSC. The MCSC was entitled to rely
on
intervenor’s representations in its response to the Solicitation, and it is
irrelevant that
intervenor’s proposal was facially acceptable. See id. at 22. Defendant has
mistaken the
nature of the analysis called for. It is apparent that material
misrepresentation claims arise
from proposals that appear facially valid because an agency would make an
award based on
a patently obvious misrepresentation. Instead, it is the nature of a
misrepresentation to
appear valid on its face because that validity—indeed appeal— is what leads to
reliance by
the agency. Thus, courts do not examine the subjective mindset of the agency,
but instead
look only to whether or not the statement itself constitutes
misrepresentation—something that
is determinable the moment that it is submitted for agency consideration—and
then whether
or not the agency relied on that statement in making its award decision. As
long as the representation has in fact been made, then it is appropriate to
apply the misrepresentation standard, regardless of when the information
casting doubt on the statement came to light.
The material misrepresentation claim in this case
stems from the information
requested of the potential offerors in the Solicitation and the manner in
which intervenor
structured its proposal. The Solicitation queried offerors, regarding past
performance, to
provide particular information on at least “2 programs underway or completed
during the past
3 years by your subcontractors similar in content and scope to that propose.”
AR 365.
Among the information to be provided about the offeror’s subcontractors was a
“description
of relevance to proposed work.” Id. The MCSC informed potential offerors that
past
performance was the most important factor to be evaluated, and for which the
Government
would “evaluate how well the Offeror performed on previous relevant efforts of
similar
type.” Id. at 367.
In response to this particular requirement in the
Solicitation, intervenor devoted an
entire section to past performance in its proposal. See AR 1154-60. According
to
intervenor’s proposal, “Tables 3 through 5 contain past performance data for
JGB suppliers.”
Id. at 1154. Table 3 was titled [ ]. Id. at 1157.
Under the first, “Relevance to Proposed Work,” intervenor stated, [
] and, under the second, [
]. Id. at 1157-58. Table 4 was listed immediately beneath Table 3 and was
titled [
]. Id. at 1158. Under the first “Relevance” entry, intervenor stated, [
]. Id. The second “Relevance” entry stated,
[
]. Id.
This court also has examined the technical aspects of
intervenor’s proposal in order
to appreciate fully the context in which the MCSC considered and evaluated the
proposal.
Under “Teaming Arrangements” intervenor stated that “JGB is the source for
approximately
[ ] of the part numbers required . . . . The remaining are produced by a
variety of [OEMs]
with whom JGB has had long and successful relationships.” Id. at 1161. As
noted above,
intervenor previously had communicated to the MCSC that its “key tactical fuel
and water
components OEMs include . . . [ ]. Id. at 145. Intervenor then goes on to
detail a
teaming arrangement with [ ]. Id. at 1162. Following, under the section “Prime
and
Subcontractors’ Roles,” intervenor explained that “[s]pecific hardware
suppliers will perform as subcontractors to JGB. Their role is to deliver
fully compliant hardware, on time, to JGB
in response to orders.” Id.
The first issue is whether or not these quoted
representations suffice to constitute a
representation from intervenor that [ ] was being proposed as a
supplier—thereby
meaning, based on the language of intervenor’s proposal, that [ ] would be a
subcontractor
on this effort. Interestingly, a consensus among the parties has emerged that
these
representations in intervenor’s proposal do indicate that [ ] was being
offered as a
supplier of [ ] component parts. Defendant’s analysis of the proposal led it
to state that
“[t]he only reasonable conclusion is that [ ] was a supplier, but that JGB
Enterprises
would not use [ ] to supply end items in a way that violates the
small-business
requirements.” Def.’s Br. filed Jan. 6, 2012, at 23. Intervenor also stated
that “a review of
the proposal will reveal that . . . JGB did mention [ ] as a supplier.”
Intvr.’s Br.
filed Jan. 7, 2012, at 19. This court agrees with those assessments.
Given that this court has found that intervenor did
represent to the MCSC that it was
proposing [ ] as a supplier, the next issue is whether or not this
representation was false
or misinformation. The evidence presented—most notably in the form of the
communications that intervenor had with the SBA—indicate that the proposing of
[ ] was<
a means utilized by intervenor to secure a high past-performance rating. In
response to
inquiries from the SBA, intervenor stated, as follows:
The intended purpose for including the past
performance of [ ] in our
proposal was to provide other relevant information as required by the proposal
instructions. In particular the [ ] . . . is an item that past
procurement history rests exclusively with [ ] . . . . You will notice that
every purchase of this item by the military since 2005 has been awarded to [
]. Our intention as previously stated in this letter was to either manufacture
this item ourselves or thru [sic] another viable small business manufacturer.
[ ] was simply listed as they are the only previous supplier [
] that we listed in our proposal. We would only use [
] as a technical reference point if questions arose during our assembly of the
item.
AR 2127. In light of all the evidence, this
explanation is equivocal.
Intervenor’s position is that it provided this
information to the MCSC because in all
other instances the military procured this part through [ ]. In other words,
intervenor
wanted to list [ ] in the past performance section of its proposal, not
because it had a
supply arrangement in place for this particular contract, but simply because
the MCSC was
familiar with [ ]. This begs the obvious question why list a fact that the
MCSC (1) already knows, and (2) is completely irrelevant for the manner in
which intervenor intended
to satisfy the demands of this procurement. The equally obvious answer is that
intervenor
was seeking to bolster its past-performance evaluation, given that this was
the most important
factor in the award under the Solicitation.
When pressed about [ ] involvement with this
procurement, intervenor stated that
[ ] would only “supply” it with technical services to help intervenor
manufacture the part
itself. This explanation of the duties to be preformed by [ ]is not
supported by the
record that was available when the representations were made to the MCSC.
Absolutely no
evidence in the technical section of intervenor’s proposal indicates that one
of the duties of
its subcontractors was to act as a “technical reference point.” See AR
1160-67. Moreover,
the SBA found that “[t]here are no other indicia of potential affiliation
between JGB and
[ ] such as joint venture agreements, financial agreements or other
contractual
agreements.” Id. at 1985. It is inconceivable that [ ] would be providing
technical
information to a separate business without a contract in place that provides
it with
remuneration for its services, thereby leading this court to wonder whether [
] is even
aware of the role that intervenor has assigned to it. Based on the evidence
presented, this
court finds that the listing of [ ] as a supplier in the proposal was a
misrepresentation of
the role that [ ] was to play in performance should intervenor win the award,
given that
intervenor explicitly stated to the SBA that it was never intervenor’s intent
to use [ ] as a
supplier of the parts for which it listed past performance.
The final issue is whether or not the MCSC relied on
the misrepresentation when
making the award decision. Again, the answer must be in the affirmative based
upon the
TET’s narrative evaluation of interveor. See AR 1297-98. Under the past
performance
evaluation section, the TET gave intervenor a [ ] rating based on [
]. Id. at 1297. Although this statement by itself is vague, the technical
factor
evaluation narrative provides the necessary context. In giving intervenor an [
]
technical rating, the TET stated, “Teaming arrangements with: [
]. Proposed work by prime and subcontractors adequately
addressed.” Id. at 1298. It is not at all apparent why the MCSC inferred a
teaming
arrangement between [ ] and intervenor. However, what that explanation does
show is
that MCSC placed great emphasis on the fact that [ ] involvement was
delineated in
intervenor’s proposal, and, consequently, the TET awarded intervenor high
marks in the two
most important evaluation factors. Defendant even concedes that “the Marine
Corps based
its evaluation in part upon its belief that [ ] was a supplier in some
capacity.” Def.’s Br.
filed Jan. 6, 2012, at 25. In addition, this court notes that the MCSC was
justified in thinking that the listing of [ ] past-performance information
indicated that it was being proposed
as a subcontractor, given that the instructions in the Solicitation required
potential offerors
to list past performance information for “your subcontractors.” AR 365. The
MCSC can be
excused for not assuming that [ ] was being listed simply because it had
previously
supplied the Corps with those component parts on separate, unrelated
occasions. In fact, this
is the only rational way to interpret intervenor’s listing [ ] past
performance.
Therefore, this court finds that plaintiff has met its
burden by showing that intervenor
made a material misrepresentation in listing [ ] past performance; that this
constitutes a
clear violation of an applicable procurement regulation, FAR 52.212-2; that
intervenor
represented to the MCSC that [ ] was being proposed as a supplier and a
subcontractor for
this procurement; and that the MCSC’s evaluation showed that the agency relied
on the
misrepresentation in evaluating intervenor’s past performance, which was
prejudicial to
plaintiff. (GTA Containers, Inc., v. U. S. and
J.G.B. Enterprises, Inc., No. 11-606C, February 6, 2012) (pdf)
C. The Air Force Decision Not to Reinstate FAS in the
TSBMC Procurement
The suspension of FAS required its removal from competition for the TSBMC.
This left the Air Force with one offeror, VBR, for the contract award. After FAS
divested its 49% owner, Taos-Agility, and DLA then removed FAS from the EPLS,
FAR 9.405(d)(3) provided that the contracting officer “may, but is not required
to,
consider” the proposal FAS had previously submitted. Plaintiff asserts that the
contracting officer’s exercise of the discretion provided by FAR 9.405(d)(3)
must be
closely scrutinized to fulfill the mandates of the Competition in Contracting
Act of
1984 (“CICA”), Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 2713, 98 Stat. 1175, 1182 (1984). See Birch
& Davis Int’l, Inc. v. Christopher, 4 F.3d 970, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The CICA
requires full and open competition. 41 U.S.C. § 253(a)(1)(A). Competition is
required so that “a sufficient number of offers is received to ensure that the
government’s requirements are filled at the lowest possible cost.” H.R. Rep. No.
1157, 98 Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984). See th United States v. Thorson Co., 806
F.2d
1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Defendant and intervenor argue that close scrutiny is not
required for the FAR
9.405(d)(3) decision not to reinstate FAS, but if required, even under this
level of
scrutiny the decision was reasonable. Plaintiff argues that the contracting
officer
abused her discretion in deciding not to reinstate FAS and that the decision
lacks a
reasonable basis. FAS asserts that the contracting officer’s concern with the
delay
involved in reinstating FAS was not reasonable. Reliance is placed on the short
response time given to FAS in a draft list of questions concerning the
responsibility
determination the contracting officer would have to make had Taos-Agility
remained
one of the owners of FAS. However, there is a considerable difference between
the
time that would be required to explain the Taos-Agility function in an unchanged
FAS proposal and the time required to redraft and submit a new proposal without
Taos-Agility involvement and for the Air Force to complete the required
evaluations
and discussions on such a new proposal. The evaluations and discussions on the
proposal FAS submitted on May 22, 2009, were not completed until September 30,
2009. (AR 002158.) Plaintiff also indicates that the contracting officer on the
date
of issuing her seven-page “Justification” for not reinstating FAS had knowledge
of
the agency-level protest that FAS submitted on the same date requesting
reinstatement. Since an award could not be made until the protest was concluded,
plaintiff argues that delay involving a new FAS proposal in the procurement, was
not
a reasonable concern because there would be delay in any event due to the
protest.
FAS’s protest does not refer to the contracting officer’s Justification and the
Justification does not refer to the protest, indicating that neither party had
knowledge
of the other’s submission when drafting their own. The fact that delay could
occur
from a protest submission in no way impacts whether the contracting officer’s
concern over delay a new FAS proposal eliminating Taos-Agility would engender
was reasonable.
A close examination of the reasons given for
the decision not to reinstate FAS
after it had divested its Taos-Agility ownership leads to the conclusion that
the
reasons have a rational basis. Delay was a factor and the contracting officer’s
Justification in this regard demonstrates a rational basis for the conclusion
reached.
The full and open competition requirement of CICA was not violated. There was
competition up to the point where FAS was suspended and the price proposals of
the
two competitors were evaluated. FAS did not change its price proposal in its FPR,
whereas VBR substantially lowered its already lower price proposal in its FPR
and
retained this lower price up to award. Based on this history, the contracting
officer
rationally concluded that with the substantial challenges ahead that FAS would
face,
were it to be reinstated, it was unlikely that FAS would lower its price
proposed,
when it had not done so previously. In this circumstance, with the award to VBR,
the
Air Force obtained the lowest possible cost that competition, as required by
CICA,
was intended to achieve.
Finally, the contracting officer in her
Justification for not reinstating FAS
concluded that with the divesting of Taos-Agility, entities that FAS relied upon
in its
proposal for performance, resources and past performance, FAS’s higher price,
and
the challenges ahead in submitting and obtaining successful evaluations for a
new
proposal, FAS did not have a reasonable chance to receive the award of the TSBMC.
In this procurement protest matter the issue is whether the agency action has a
rational, reasonable basis. Impresa Construzioni Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United
States, 238 F.3d 1324, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Honeywell, Inc. v. United
States, 870 F.2d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989). For the reasons stated in the
Justification issued
by the contracting officer, the suspension of Agility-Taos, resulting in the
removal of
49% of the ownership of FAS, and the challenges this presented to the viability
of a
new FAS proposal, comprised a rational basis for her conclusion that the
reorganized
FAS, at this stage of the procurement, had no reasonable chance of obtaining the
award of TSBMC. Plaintiff has failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating a
lack of rational basis for the contracting officer’s decision in the record of
this protest. (FAS Support Services, LLC v. U.
S. and Vinnell Brown & Root LLC, No. 10-289C, August 4, 2010) (pdf)
See above FAS
Support Services, LLC, B-402464; B-402464.2; B-402464.3,
April 21, 2010 (pdf)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
in Planning Research
Corp. v. United States, 971 F.2d 736 (Fed. Cir. 1992) that:
[T]he submission of a misstatement . . . which materially influences
consideration
of a proposal should disqualify the proposal. The integrity of the system
demands
no less. Any further consideration of the proposal in these circumstances would
provoke suspicion and mistrust and reduce confidence in the competitive
procurement system.
Id. at 741 (citation omitted).
Therefore, to establish a material misrepresentation, Sealift must demonstrate
both that TAL intentionally made a false statement and that MSC relied on that false
statement in awarding
the contract to TAL. See Blue & Gold Fleet, LP v. United States, 70 Fed. Cl.
487, 495 (2006)
("To establish a material misrepresentation, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1)
[the awardee]
made a false statement; and (2) the [agency] relied on that false statement in
selecting [the
awardee’s] proposal for the contract award. . . . To preserve the integrity of
the solicitation
process when such a material misrepresentation influences the award of the
proposal, the proposal
is disqualified from consideration.") (citations omitted), aff'd, 492 F.3d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 2007);
see also Northrop Grumman Corp. v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 443, 468 (2001)
("[I]t is quite
common for proposals to fall short of their assertions; it is not something to
be punished unless
the errors were willful and egregious."). Intent may be established by
circumstantial evidence.
See Planning Research Corp., 971 F.2d at 742 ("This court has held that intent
frequently must be proved by circumstantial evidence.”) (citing Klein v.
Peterson, 866 F.2d 412, 415 (Fed. Cir.
1989)).
In awarding this contract, MSC advised that:
It is useful to compare the offered rate to previous contract awards for
comparable
vessels under similar requirements. . . . Th[ese] comparisons provide support
that
the rates offered by [TAL] and Sealift under this procurement are both highly
competitive and very reasonable.
AR 1985.
MSC's price analysis also stated that:
[T]he daily rate proposed by [TAL] is considered fair and reasonable based on
price competition and comparison with previous competitively awarded prices for
comparable vessels under similar requirements in accordance with FAR [] 15.404-
1(b)(2)(i) and (ii)15 respectively.
AR 1992.
Sealift's primary evidence that TAL misrepresented the Bonito's warranted fuel
consumption is the Raggio Declaration that relies on a single data point found
on a website. See AR 2266. The Government, however, states that: "[t]o assess [TAL]'s
compliance with its fuel
warranties, it is necessary to gather information on the vessel's speed, weather
conditions, load,
and fuel consumption for each voyage the vessel makes." See AR 2513. Sealift
agrees that "[g]auging actual fuel consumption requires some research, judgment, and
initiative" in addition
to "expert review of the varying factors that affect vessel operations." Pl. Mem.
at 16.
The March 31, 2006 Solicitation provided that the "[c]ost of fuel consumed will
be based
on an operational scenario of 60% underway laden at 12 knots . . . , 28% in-port
idle . . . , and
12% in-port discharge[.]" AR 1572. The Raggio Declaration, however, only
considered the
Bonito's fuel consumption "when steaming at 12 knots." AR 2266 (Raggio
Declaration ¶ 6).
Moreover, it did not consider the March 31, 2006 Solicitation’s required
“operational scenario.”
See AR 1572. The Raggio Declaration also assumed that "[t]he slightly larger
engine on the
Bonito should have a fuel consumption no less than that of the Montauk." See AR
2266 (Raggio
Declaration ¶3) (emphasis added). Other evidence, however, indicates that the
Montauk burned
188 grams of fuel per KWH under a 100 percent load and 187 grams of fuel per KWH
under an
85 percent load, while the Bonito burned 182 grams of fuel per KWH, under a 100
percent load,
and 180 grams of fuel under an 85 percent load. See AR 2266, 2476-77, 2481
(citing
http://www.sea-web.com, an online service of LLOYD'S LIST). Sealift did not
challenge this
data.
Nordtank does not guarantee or warrant the data on the website. See AR 2301-07.
In
addition, the cases cited by Sealift are not precedential and do not stand for
the proposition that
fuel consumption rates on a website are warranted. See Pl. Reply at 5. Instead,
they hold that a
representation of fuel consumption in a charter may create a warranty in certain
circumstances.
See Transatlantic Lines, LLC, Soc’y of Mar. Arb., No. 3834 (Nov. 4, 1998)
(determining that
"speed and fuel consumption capabilities" were incorporated into a contract
through an annex);
see also Denholm Shipping Co., 47 F.2d at 214-15 ("[A] description of a ship's
capacity, in speed,
as well as in any other respect, when inserted in the body of a charter, will
support a suit for
damages.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); The Atlanta, 82 F. Supp. at 230
(a statement as
to speed and fuel consumption in a charter results in a warranty "rather than a
representation,
even though the statement is not expressly designated as a warranty").
Accordingly, the court has determined that the Bonito's fuel consumption rate,
posted on Nordtank's website, does not evidence a material misrepresentation by TAL,
particularly since
Sealift has not proffered any independent evidence that the information on
Nordtank's website
was reliable. See AR 2301-07. In addition, the Administrative Record contains no
evidence that
the Bonito did not achieve a consumption rate of [redacted] barrels per day,
although the court afforded Sealift the opportunity to supplement the
Administrative Record with post-award
information. See AR 2536-3047; see also 1/17/08 TR 38, 41-42.
For these reasons, the court has determined that, as a matter of law, Sealift
did not
establish a false statement was made by TAL to the CO. See Blue & Gold Fleet,
LP, 70 Fed. Cl.
at 495.
(Sealift, Inc., v. U. S., No.
07-627C, July 11, 2008) (pdf) |